Roger, Brian definitely thinks that spacetime exists. You have said otherwise. Richard
On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 at 6:48 AM, Roger Clough <[email protected]> wrote: > Hi Richard Ruquist > > So what's your problem ? > > > Roger Clough, [email protected] > 10/12/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > From: Richard Ruquist > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2012-10-11, 11:35:29 > Subject: Re: Re: Impossible connections > > > Roger, > I know Brian Greene personally and have read his book, Fabric of the Cosmos. > He was a postdoc at my school. He is not a founder of string theory, > Max Green is. > His view of space is quite conventional except for the extra > dimensions of string theory. > Richard > > > On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at 10:39 AM, Roger Clough wrote: >> Hi Richard, >> >> The most entertaining way to understand the views of modern physics >> on space (same as that of Leibniz) would be to watch >> >> NOVA | The Fabric of the Cosmos: What Is Space (Brian Greene, a founder of >> sgtring theory) >> >> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CD5tBIqJU4U&playnext=1&list=PLYslgvtKtawg5gknf6QmpFRqdqkwYAs7H&feature=results_main >> >> >> or go to >> >> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_relativity >> >> >> Concepts introduced by the theories of relativity include: >> >> " Measurements of various quantities are relative to the velocities of >> observers. In particular, space and time can dilate. >> Spacetime: space and time should be considered together and in relation to >> each other. >> The speed of light is nonetheless invariant, the same for all observers." >> >> or >> >> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space >> >> >> "In the seventeenth century, the philosophy of space and time emerged as a >> central issue in epistemology and metaphysics. >> At its heart, Gottfried Leibniz, the German philosopher-mathematician, and >> Isaac Newton, the English physicist-mathematician, >> set out two opposing theories of what space is. Rather than being an entity >> that independently >> exists over and above other matter, Leibniz held that space is no more than >> the collection of spatial relations between objects in the world >> "space is that which results from places taken together".[5] Unoccupied >> regions are those that could have objects in them, and thus spatial >> relations with other places. >> For Leibniz, then, space was an idealised abstraction from the relations >> between individual entities or their possible locations and therefore could >> not be continuous but must be discrete.[6] Space could be thought of in a >> similar way to the relations between family members. Although people in the >> family are related to one another, >> the relations do not exist independently of the people.[7] Leibniz argued >> that space could not exist independently of objects in the world because >> that implies a difference between >> two universes exactly alike except for the location of the material world in >> each universe. But since there would be no observational way of telling these >> universes apart then, according to the identity of indiscernibles, there >> would be no real difference between them. According to the principle of >> sufficient reason, >> any theory of space that implied that there could be these two possible >> universes, must therefore be wrong.[8] >> >> Roger Clough, [email protected] >> 10/11/2012 >> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen >> >> >> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >> From: Craig Weinberg >> Receiver: everything-list >> Time: 2012-10-11, 08:11:17 >> Subject: Re: Impossible connections >> >> >> I agree with Roger on this one (except for the insults). I did not know that >> Einstein recognized that spacetime was a true void - I had assumed that his >> conception of gravitational warping of spacetime was a literal plenum or >> manifold, but if it's true that he recognized spacetime as an abstraction, >> then that is good news for me. It places cosmos firmly in the physics of >> private perception and spacetime as the participatory realizer of public >> bodies. >> >> Craig >> >> PS Roger, you wouldn't happen to have any citations or articles where >> Einstein's view on this are discussed, would you? I'll Google it myself, but >> figured I'd ask just in case. Thanks. >> >> On Thursday, October 11, 2012 7:59:39 AM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: >> Roger, You are entitled to your opinion, but that is all it is. >> Richard >> >> On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at 5:31 AM, Roger Clough wrote: >>> Hi Richard Ruquist >>> >>> Here you go again. Monads are basically ideas. >>> The BECs are physical. No physical connection is possible >>> between ideas and things. >>> >>> >>> Roger Clough, [email protected] >>> 10/11/2012 >>> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen >>> >>> >>> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >>> From: Richard Ruquist >>> Receiver: everything-list >>> Time: 2012-10-10, 14:32:39 >>> Subject: Re: Re: more firewalls >>> >>> >>> Craig, >>> The experiencers are the monads and the physical neurons.. >>> I conjure experiencers because I have experiences. >>> But it appears that two kinds of experiencers are necessary. >>> The BEC just connects them. I do not care what you call that. >>> Names are not important. >>> Richard >>> >>> >>> On Wed, Oct 10, 2012 at 1:45 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 12:47:47 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Craig, >>>>> >>>>> I claim that a connection is needed in substance dualism between the >>>>> substance of the mind and the substance of the brain. That is, if >>>>> consciousness resides in a BEC in the brain and also in the mind, then >>>>> the two can become entangled and essentially be copies of each other. >>>>> So the BEC connection mechanism supports substance dualism. >>>> >>>> >>>> I understand what you are saying. Not to be a weenie, but just fyi I think >>>> that what you are describing would be technically categorized as >>>> interactionism and/or parallelism, since substance dualism is supposed to >>>> be >>>> two unconnected substances - a brain that doesn't think and a mind that >>>> doesn't...bleed? >>>> (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dualism_%28philosophy_of_mind%29) >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Substance dualism then solves the hard problem using string theory >>>>> monads.. >>>>> >>>>> For example take the binding problem where: >>>>> "There are an almost infinite number of possible, different >>>>> objects we are capable of seeing, There cannot be a single >>>>> neuron, often referred to as a grandmother cell, for each >>>>> one." (http://papers.klab.caltech.edu/22/1/148.pdf) >>>>> However, at a density of 10^90/cc >>>>> (from string theory; e.g., ST Yau, The Shape of Inner Space), >>>>> the binding problem can be solved by configurations of monads for >>>>> "all different values of depth, motion, color, and spatial >>>>> location" >>>>> ever sensed. (I have a model that backs this up: >>>>> >>>>> http://yanniru.blogspot.com/2012/04/implications-of-conjectured-megaverse.html) >>>> >>>> >>>> I think that you are still dealing with a mechanical model which only tries >>>> to account for the complexity of consciousness, not one which actually >>>> suggests that such a model could have a reason to experience itself. The >>>> hard problem is 'why is there any such thing as experience at all'? >>>> >>>>> >>>>> So the monads and the neurons experience the same things >>>>> because of the BEC entanglement connection. >>>>> These experiences are stored physically in short-term memory >>>>> that Crick and Kock claim is essential to physical consciousness >>>>> and the experiences in my model are also stored in the monads >>>>> perhaps to solve the binding problem >>>>> and at least for computational support of physical consciousness. >>>> >>>> >>>> This is more of a quantum method of closing the gap between physics and >>>> neurophysiology, but it doesn't really suggest why that would result in >>>> what >>>> we experience. Like Orch-OR, I'm not opposed to the idea of human >>>> consciousness being instantiated by a particular neuroscientific-quantum >>>> framework, but it still doesn't touch the hard problem. Why does this >>>> capacity to experience exist at all? Can't a BEC or microtubule ensemble >>>> perform each and every function that you say it does without conjuring an >>>> experiencer? >>>> >>>> Craig >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Richard >>>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>>> "Everything List" group. >>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/SK1WBWfunroJ. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>>> [email protected]. >>>> For more options, visit this group at >>>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> [email protected]. >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> [email protected]. >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/vKAYTmOVQygJ. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> [email protected]. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> [email protected]. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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