Roger,
Brian definitely thinks that spacetime exists.
You have said otherwise.
Richard

On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 at 6:48 AM, Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net> wrote:
> Hi Richard Ruquist
>
> So what's your problem ?
>
>
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
> 10/12/2012
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>
>
> ----- Receiving the following content -----
> From: Richard Ruquist
> Receiver: everything-list
> Time: 2012-10-11, 11:35:29
> Subject: Re: Re: Impossible connections
>
>
> Roger,
> I know Brian Greene personally and have read his book, Fabric of the Cosmos.
> He was a postdoc at my school. He is not a founder of string theory,
> Max Green is.
> His view of space is quite conventional except for the extra
> dimensions of string theory.
> Richard
>
>
> On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at 10:39 AM, Roger Clough  wrote:
>> Hi Richard,
>>
>> The most entertaining way to understand the views of modern physics
>> on space (same as that of Leibniz) would be to watch
>>
>> NOVA | The Fabric of the Cosmos: What Is Space (Brian Greene, a founder of 
>> sgtring theory)
>>
>> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CD5tBIqJU4U&playnext=1&list=PLYslgvtKtawg5gknf6QmpFRqdqkwYAs7H&feature=results_main
>>
>>
>> or go to
>>
>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_relativity
>>
>>
>> Concepts introduced by the theories of relativity include:
>>
>> " Measurements of various quantities are relative to the velocities of 
>> observers. In particular, space and time can dilate.
>> Spacetime: space and time should be considered together and in relation to 
>> each other.
>> The speed of light is nonetheless invariant, the same for all observers."
>>
>> or
>>
>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space
>>
>>
>> "In the seventeenth century, the philosophy of space and time emerged as a 
>> central issue in epistemology and metaphysics.
>> At its heart, Gottfried Leibniz, the German philosopher-mathematician, and 
>> Isaac Newton, the English physicist-mathematician,
>> set out two opposing theories of what space is. Rather than being an entity 
>> that independently
>> exists over and above other matter, Leibniz held that space is no more than 
>> the collection of spatial relations between objects in the world
>> "space is that which results from places taken together".[5] Unoccupied 
>> regions are those that could have objects in them, and thus spatial 
>> relations with other places.
>> For Leibniz, then, space was an idealised abstraction from the relations 
>> between individual entities or their possible locations and therefore could 
>> not be continuous but must be discrete.[6] Space could be thought of in a 
>> similar way to the relations between family members. Although people in the 
>> family are related to one another,
>> the relations do not exist independently of the people.[7] Leibniz argued 
>> that space could not exist independently of objects in the world because 
>> that implies a difference between
>> two universes exactly alike except for the location of the material world in 
>> each universe. But since there would be no observational way of telling these
>> universes apart then, according to the identity of indiscernibles, there 
>> would be no real difference between them. According to the principle of 
>> sufficient reason,
>> any theory of space that implied that there could be these two possible 
>> universes, must therefore be wrong.[8]
>>
>> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
>> 10/11/2012
>> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>>
>>
>> ----- Receiving the following content -----
>> From: Craig Weinberg
>> Receiver: everything-list
>> Time: 2012-10-11, 08:11:17
>> Subject: Re: Impossible connections
>>
>>
>> I agree with Roger on this one (except for the insults). I did not know that 
>> Einstein recognized that spacetime was a true void - I had assumed that his 
>> conception of gravitational warping of spacetime was a literal plenum or 
>> manifold, but if it's true that he recognized spacetime as an abstraction, 
>> then that is good news for me. It places cosmos firmly in the physics of 
>> private perception and spacetime as the participatory realizer of public 
>> bodies.
>>
>> Craig
>>
>> PS Roger, you wouldn't happen to have any citations or articles where 
>> Einstein's view on this are discussed, would you? I'll Google it myself, but 
>> figured I'd ask just in case. Thanks.
>>
>> On Thursday, October 11, 2012 7:59:39 AM UTC-4, yanniru wrote:
>> Roger, You are entitled to your opinion, but that is all it is.
>> Richard
>>
>> On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at 5:31 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
>>> Hi Richard Ruquist
>>>
>>> Here you go again. Monads are basically ideas.
>>> The BECs are physical. No physical connection is possible
>>> between ideas and things.
>>>
>>>
>>> Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net
>>> 10/11/2012
>>> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>>>
>>>
>>> ----- Receiving the following content -----
>>> From: Richard Ruquist
>>> Receiver: everything-list
>>> Time: 2012-10-10, 14:32:39
>>> Subject: Re: Re: more firewalls
>>>
>>>
>>> Craig,
>>> The experiencers are the monads and the physical neurons..
>>> I conjure experiencers because I have experiences.
>>> But it appears that two kinds of experiencers are necessary.
>>> The BEC just connects them. I do not care what you call that.
>>> Names are not important.
>>> Richard
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, Oct 10, 2012 at 1:45 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 12:47:47 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Craig,
>>>>>
>>>>> I claim that a connection is needed in substance dualism between the
>>>>> substance of the mind and the substance of the brain. That is, if
>>>>> consciousness resides in a BEC in the brain and also in the mind, then
>>>>> the two can become entangled and essentially be copies of each other.
>>>>> So the BEC connection mechanism supports substance dualism.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I understand what you are saying. Not to be a weenie, but just fyi I think
>>>> that what you are describing would be technically categorized as
>>>> interactionism and/or parallelism, since substance dualism is supposed to 
>>>> be
>>>> two unconnected substances - a brain that doesn't think and a mind that
>>>> doesn't...bleed?
>>>> (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dualism_%28philosophy_of_mind%29)
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Substance dualism then solves the hard problem using string theory
>>>>> monads..
>>>>>
>>>>> For example take the binding problem where:
>>>>> "There are an almost infinite number of possible, different
>>>>> objects we are capable of seeing, There cannot be a single
>>>>> neuron, often referred to as a grandmother cell, for each
>>>>> one." (http://papers.klab.caltech.edu/22/1/148.pdf)
>>>>> However, at a density of 10^90/cc
>>>>> (from string theory; e.g., ST Yau, The Shape of Inner Space),
>>>>> the binding problem can be solved by configurations of monads for
>>>>> "all different values of depth, motion, color, and spatial
>>>>> location"
>>>>> ever sensed. (I have a model that backs this up:
>>>>>
>>>>> http://yanniru.blogspot.com/2012/04/implications-of-conjectured-megaverse.html)
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I think that you are still dealing with a mechanical model which only tries
>>>> to account for the complexity of consciousness, not one which actually
>>>> suggests that such a model could have a reason to experience itself. The
>>>> hard problem is 'why is there any such thing as experience at all'?
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> So the monads and the neurons experience the same things
>>>>> because of the BEC entanglement connection.
>>>>> These experiences are stored physically in short-term memory
>>>>> that Crick and Kock claim is essential to physical consciousness
>>>>> and the experiences in my model are also stored in the monads
>>>>> perhaps to solve the binding problem
>>>>> and at least for computational support of physical consciousness.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> This is more of a quantum method of closing the gap between physics and
>>>> neurophysiology, but it doesn't really suggest why that would result in 
>>>> what
>>>> we experience. Like Orch-OR, I'm not opposed to the idea of human
>>>> consciousness being instantiated by a particular neuroscientific-quantum
>>>> framework, but it still doesn't touch the hard problem. Why does this
>>>> capacity to experience exist at all? Can't a BEC or microtubule ensemble
>>>> perform each and every function that you say it does without conjuring an
>>>> experiencer?
>>>>
>>>> Craig
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Richard
>>>>>
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