Hi Richard Ruquist  

I don't think he meant that spacetime physically exists. 
Spacetime is a formalism. Formalisms don't physically exist.
In fact nothing theoretical physically exists. 
The pythagorean theorem doesn't physically exist.



Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
10/12/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


----- Receiving the following content -----  
From: Richard Ruquist  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-10-12, 07:28:42 
Subject: Re: Re: Re: Impossible connections 


Roger, 
Brian definitely thinks that spacetime exists. 
You have said otherwise. 
Richard 

On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 at 6:48 AM, Roger Clough  wrote: 
> Hi Richard Ruquist 
> 
> So what's your problem ? 
> 
> 
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
> 10/12/2012 
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 
> 
> 
> ----- Receiving the following content ----- 
> From: Richard Ruquist 
> Receiver: everything-list 
> Time: 2012-10-11, 11:35:29 
> Subject: Re: Re: Impossible connections 
> 
> 
> Roger, 
> I know Brian Greene personally and have read his book, Fabric of the Cosmos. 
> He was a postdoc at my school. He is not a founder of string theory, 
> Max Green is. 
> His view of space is quite conventional except for the extra 
> dimensions of string theory. 
> Richard 
> 
> 
> On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at 10:39 AM, Roger Clough wrote: 
>> Hi Richard, 
>> 
>> The most entertaining way to understand the views of modern physics 
>> on space (same as that of Leibniz) would be to watch 
>> 
>> NOVA | The Fabric of the Cosmos: What Is Space (Brian Greene, a founder of 
>> sgtring theory) 
>> 
>> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CD5tBIqJU4U&playnext=1&list=PLYslgvtKtawg5gknf6QmpFRqdqkwYAs7H&feature=results_main
>>  
>> 
>> 
>> or go to 
>> 
>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_relativity 
>> 
>> 
>> Concepts introduced by the theories of relativity include: 
>> 
>> " Measurements of various quantities are relative to the velocities of 
>> observers. In particular, space and time can dilate. 
>> Spacetime: space and time should be considered together and in relation to 
>> each other. 
>> The speed of light is nonetheless invariant, the same for all observers." 
>> 
>> or 
>> 
>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space 
>> 
>> 
>> "In the seventeenth century, the philosophy of space and time emerged as a 
>> central issue in epistemology and metaphysics. 
>> At its heart, Gottfried Leibniz, the German philosopher-mathematician, and 
>> Isaac Newton, the English physicist-mathematician, 
>> set out two opposing theories of what space is. Rather than being an entity 
>> that independently 
>> exists over and above other matter, Leibniz held that space is no more than 
>> the collection of spatial relations between objects in the world 
>> "space is that which results from places taken together".[5] Unoccupied 
>> regions are those that could have objects in them, and thus spatial 
>> relations with other places. 
>> For Leibniz, then, space was an idealised abstraction from the relations 
>> between individual entities or their possible locations and therefore could 
>> not be continuous but must be discrete.[6] Space could be thought of in a 
>> similar way to the relations between family members. Although people in the 
>> family are related to one another, 
>> the relations do not exist independently of the people.[7] Leibniz argued 
>> that space could not exist independently of objects in the world because 
>> that implies a difference between 
>> two universes exactly alike except for the location of the material world in 
>> each universe. But since there would be no observational way of telling 
>> these 
>> universes apart then, according to the identity of indiscernibles, there 
>> would be no real difference between them. According to the principle of 
>> sufficient reason, 
>> any theory of space that implied that there could be these two possible 
>> universes, must therefore be wrong.[8] 
>> 
>> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
>> 10/11/2012 
>> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 
>> 
>> 
>> ----- Receiving the following content ----- 
>> From: Craig Weinberg 
>> Receiver: everything-list 
>> Time: 2012-10-11, 08:11:17 
>> Subject: Re: Impossible connections 
>> 
>> 
>> I agree with Roger on this one (except for the insults). I did not know that 
>> Einstein recognized that spacetime was a true void - I had assumed that his 
>> conception of gravitational warping of spacetime was a literal plenum or 
>> manifold, but if it's true that he recognized spacetime as an abstraction, 
>> then that is good news for me. It places cosmos firmly in the physics of 
>> private perception and spacetime as the participatory realizer of public 
>> bodies. 
>> 
>> Craig 
>> 
>> PS Roger, you wouldn't happen to have any citations or articles where 
>> Einstein's view on this are discussed, would you? I'll Google it myself, but 
>> figured I'd ask just in case. Thanks. 
>> 
>> On Thursday, October 11, 2012 7:59:39 AM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: 
>> Roger, You are entitled to your opinion, but that is all it is. 
>> Richard 
>> 
>> On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at 5:31 AM, Roger Clough wrote: 
>>> Hi Richard Ruquist 
>>> 
>>> Here you go again. Monads are basically ideas. 
>>> The BECs are physical. No physical connection is possible 
>>> between ideas and things. 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net 
>>> 10/11/2012 
>>> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> ----- Receiving the following content ----- 
>>> From: Richard Ruquist 
>>> Receiver: everything-list 
>>> Time: 2012-10-10, 14:32:39 
>>> Subject: Re: Re: more firewalls 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Craig, 
>>> The experiencers are the monads and the physical neurons.. 
>>> I conjure experiencers because I have experiences. 
>>> But it appears that two kinds of experiencers are necessary. 
>>> The BEC just connects them. I do not care what you call that. 
>>> Names are not important. 
>>> Richard 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Wed, Oct 10, 2012 at 1:45 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 12:47:47 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: 
>>>>> 
>>>>> Craig, 
>>>>> 
>>>>> I claim that a connection is needed in substance dualism between the 
>>>>> substance of the mind and the substance of the brain. That is, if 
>>>>> consciousness resides in a BEC in the brain and also in the mind, then 
>>>>> the two can become entangled and essentially be copies of each other. 
>>>>> So the BEC connection mechanism supports substance dualism. 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> I understand what you are saying. Not to be a weenie, but just fyi I think 
>>>> that what you are describing would be technically categorized as 
>>>> interactionism and/or parallelism, since substance dualism is supposed to 
>>>> be 
>>>> two unconnected substances - a brain that doesn't think and a mind that 
>>>> doesn't...bleed? 
>>>> (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dualism_%28philosophy_of_mind%29) 
>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> Substance dualism then solves the hard problem using string theory 
>>>>> monads.. 
>>>>> 
>>>>> For example take the binding problem where: 
>>>>> "There are an almost infinite number of possible, different 
>>>>> objects we are capable of seeing, There cannot be a single 
>>>>> neuron, often referred to as a grandmother cell, for each 
>>>>> one." (http://papers.klab.caltech.edu/22/1/148.pdf) 
>>>>> However, at a density of 10^90/cc 
>>>>> (from string theory; e.g., ST Yau, The Shape of Inner Space), 
>>>>> the binding problem can be solved by configurations of monads for 
>>>>> "all different values of depth, motion, color, and spatial 
>>>>> location" 
>>>>> ever sensed. (I have a model that backs this up: 
>>>>> 
>>>>> http://yanniru.blogspot.com/2012/04/implications-of-conjectured-megaverse.html)
>>>>>  
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> I think that you are still dealing with a mechanical model which only 
>>>> tries 
>>>> to account for the complexity of consciousness, not one which actually 
>>>> suggests that such a model could have a reason to experience itself. The 
>>>> hard problem is 'why is there any such thing as experience at all'? 
>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> So the monads and the neurons experience the same things 
>>>>> because of the BEC entanglement connection. 
>>>>> These experiences are stored physically in short-term memory 
>>>>> that Crick and Kock claim is essential to physical consciousness 
>>>>> and the experiences in my model are also stored in the monads 
>>>>> perhaps to solve the binding problem 
>>>>> and at least for computational support of physical consciousness. 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> This is more of a quantum method of closing the gap between physics and 
>>>> neurophysiology, but it doesn't really suggest why that would result in 
>>>> what 
>>>> we experience. Like Orch-OR, I'm not opposed to the idea of human 
>>>> consciousness being instantiated by a particular neuroscientific-quantum 
>>>> framework, but it still doesn't touch the hard problem. Why does this 
>>>> capacity to experience exist at all? Can't a BEC or microtubule ensemble 
>>>> perform each and every function that you say it does without conjuring an 
>>>> experiencer? 
>>>> 
>>>> Craig 
>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> Richard 
>>>>> 
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