Hi Richard,
On 12 Oct 2012, at 13:26, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Bruno,
Well if you do not need any substances at all, that includes
electrons, protons, neutrons,
neutrinos, dark matter and energy as well as particles of the mind.
So
if any of these so-called substances have any existence at all,
then I
bet that they all do, which is all I need for my metaphysics string
theory models.
Comp explains that physics has to be justified from a phenomemon:
the comp
first person indeterminacy + computation (basically a number
property). The
UDA explains why physicalism can't work, when you bet that
consciousness can
be rematively invariant for some class of digital transformations.
It's like saying that god is everything, which is next
to saying nothing.
The (one) theory of everything is given by the non trivial laws of
addition
and multiplication(*). You can derive physics from that and then
compare it
with the empirical current extrapolation, or with some facts,
making comp
refutable, and (partially) confirmable. Comp explains already why
nature
behave in a quantum "MW" way, but not yet why there are
hamiltonians, and
why they have the current shape.
(*)
x + 0 = x
x + s(y) = s(x + y)
x *0 = 0
x*s(y) = x*y + x
An even shortest theory use the combinators, and has the following
axioms
((K, x), y) = x
(((S, x), y), z) = ((x, z), (y, z))
A combinator is either K or S, or (x, y) with x and y already
combinators.
All you need is a Turing universal theory. BEC are OK, and actually
the
whole condensed matter is a fascinating field, notably for its
relation with
quantum computations and topology, but to take it in the ontology
will make
confusing the derivation of physics, and will miss more easily the
quanta/qualia distinction.
Bruno
On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 at 7:08 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
On 11 Oct 2012, at 17:39, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Bruno: BEC are Turing emulable, so you can't get substance dualism,
Richard: Please explain why not.
It is the object of the UD Argument. If there is a level where my
body/brain
(whatever it is) is Turing emulable, then the physical reality *has
to*
emerges from the first person indeterminacy applied to the UD* (the
complete
infinite running of the UD), or to any Turing-complete ontology.
So we don't need, and worst: we can't use, anything more than the
numbers
and the laws of + and * (to choose a simple Turing universal
ontology).
There is no substances at all, unless you use the terms (like
Roger) in its
greek sense of hypostases, and which in comp are machine's point of
view
(except for "truth").
It is long to explain and not trivial. I have explained this many
times on
this list, and recently on the FOAR list which might be easier to
consult.
Or you can look at my paper:
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
Or other paper that you can find on my URL.
But, if you want I can explain it step by step, tell me, and be
patient, as
I am in a super-busy period.
Bruno
On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at 11:30 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
On 10 Oct 2012, at 18:47, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Craig,
I claim that a connection is needed in substance dualism between the
substance of the mind and the substance of the brain. That is, if
consciousness resides in a BEC in the brain and also in the mind,
then
the two can become entangled and essentially be copies of each other.
So the BEC connection mechanism supports substance dualism.
Substance dualism then solves the hard problem using string theory
monads..
For example take the binding problem where:
"There are an almost infinite number of possible, different
objects we are capable of seeing, There cannot be a single
neuron, often referred to as a grandmother cell, for each
one." (http://papers.klab.caltech.edu/22/1/148.pdf)
However, at a density of 10^90/cc
(from string theory; e.g., ST Yau, The Shape of Inner Space),
the binding problem can be solved by configurations of monads for
"all different values of depth, motion, color, and spatial
location"
ever sensed. (I have a model that backs this up:
http://yanniru.blogspot.com/2012/04/implications-of-conjectured-megaverse.html)
So the monads and the neurons experience the same things
because of the BEC entanglement connection.
These experiences are stored physically in short-term memory
that Crick and Kock claim is essential to physical consciousness
and the experiences in my model are also stored in the monads
perhaps to solve the binding problem
and at least for computational support of physical consciousness.
Richard
BEC are Turing emulable, so you can't get substance dualism, only,
by making
the level that low, you can get, perhaps, that substance dualism
will look
"very probable" in our neighborhood.
Bruno
On Wed, Oct 10, 2012 at 11:26 AM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com
>
wrote:
On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 8:51:50 AM UTC-4, yanniru wrote:
Roger,
To say that a connection is based on logic is a category error.
More specifically,
I conjecture that the connection in the brain between the physical
brain
and the (computational?) mind/monads is based on BEC entanglement.
BEC stands for Bose-Einstein Condensate.
It has been demonstrated experimentally that BECs made of different
substances
can become entangled. I claim based on string theory that the monads
are a BEC since they came from space. They are compactified space,
crystalline in form and essentially motionless. Presumably there is
also a physical BEC in the brain.
So if my conjecture is correct, that disparate BECs, even the monad
BEC is substantive,
are capable of entanglement, which of course is all logical, then the
connection is based on entanglement. To say that a connection is
based
on logic is a category error.
Richard
What advantage does a BEC explanation really have over substance
dualism
though? How dies it solve the hard problem? Why do BECs experience
things
and nothing else does?
Craig
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