Wiki: "In philosophy of mind, dualism is the assumption that mental
phenomena are, in some respects, non-physical,[1] or that the mind and
body are not identical.[2] Thus, it encompasses a set of views about
the relationship between mind and matter, and is contrasted with other
positions, such as physicalism, in the mind–body problem.[1][2]"

Bruno,
It seems that your comp negates both substance dualism
(ie., that the mind is composed of a non-physical substance)
and now physicalism..
What is left?
Richard

On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 at 9:58 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> Hi Richard,
>
> On 12 Oct 2012, at 13:26, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>
> Bruno,
>
> Well if you do not need any substances at all, that includes
> electrons, protons, neutrons,
> neutrinos, dark matter and energy as well as particles of the mind. So
> if any of these so-called substances have any existence at all, then I
> bet that they all do, which is all I need for my metaphysics string
> theory models.
>
>
> Comp explains that physics has to be justified from a phenomemon: the comp
> first person indeterminacy + computation (basically a number property). The
> UDA explains why physicalism can't work, when you bet that consciousness can
> be rematively invariant for some class of digital transformations.
>
>
>
>
> It's like saying that god is everything, which is next
> to saying nothing.
>
>
> The (one) theory of everything is given by the non trivial laws of addition
> and multiplication(*). You can derive physics from that and then compare it
> with the empirical current extrapolation, or with some facts, making comp
> refutable, and (partially) confirmable. Comp explains already why nature
> behave in a quantum "MW" way, but not yet why there are hamiltonians, and
> why they have the current shape.
>
>
> (*)
> x + 0 = x
> x + s(y) = s(x + y)
>
>  x *0 = 0
>  x*s(y) = x*y + x
>
> An even shortest theory use the combinators, and has the following axioms
>
> ((K, x), y) = x
> (((S, x), y), z) = ((x, z), (y, z))
>
> A combinator is either K or S, or (x, y) with x and y already combinators.
>
> All you need is a Turing universal theory. BEC are OK, and actually the
> whole condensed matter is a fascinating field, notably for its relation with
> quantum computations and topology, but to take it in the ontology will make
> confusing the derivation of physics, and will miss more easily the
> quanta/qualia distinction.
>
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 at 7:08 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
>
> On 11 Oct 2012, at 17:39, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>
>
> Bruno: BEC are Turing emulable, so you can't get substance dualism,
>
>
> Richard: Please explain why not.
>
>
>
> It is the object of the UD Argument. If there is a level where my body/brain
>
> (whatever it is) is Turing emulable, then the physical reality *has to*
>
> emerges from the first person indeterminacy applied to the UD* (the complete
>
> infinite running of the UD), or to any Turing-complete ontology.
>
>
> So we don't need, and worst: we can't use, anything more than the numbers
>
> and the laws of + and * (to choose a simple Turing universal ontology).
>
> There is no substances at all, unless you use the terms (like Roger) in its
>
> greek sense of hypostases, and which in comp are machine's point of view
>
> (except for "truth").
>
>
> It is long to explain and not trivial. I have explained this many times on
>
> this list, and recently on the FOAR list which might be easier to consult.
>
> Or you can look at my paper:
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
>
>
> Or other paper that you can find on my URL.
>
>
> But, if you want I can explain it step by step, tell me, and be patient, as
>
> I am in a super-busy period.
>
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
> On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at 11:30 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
>
>
> On 10 Oct 2012, at 18:47, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>
>
>
> Craig,
>
>
>
> I claim that a connection is needed in substance dualism between the
>
>
> substance of the mind and the substance of the brain. That is, if
>
>
> consciousness resides in a BEC in the brain and also in the mind, then
>
>
> the two can become entangled and essentially be copies of each other.
>
>
> So the BEC connection mechanism supports substance dualism.
>
>
>
> Substance dualism then solves the hard problem using string theory
>
>
> monads..
>
>
>
> For example take the binding problem where:
>
>
> "There  are  an  almost  infinite  number  of  possible, different
>
>
> objects we are capable of seeing,  There  cannot  be  a  single
>
>
> neuron,  often  referred  to  as  a  grandmother  cell,  for  each
>
>
> one." (http://papers.klab.caltech.edu/22/1/148.pdf)
>
>
> However, at a density of 10^90/cc
>
>
> (from string theory; e.g., ST Yau, The Shape of Inner Space),
>
>
> the binding problem can be solved by configurations of monads for
>
>
> "all different  values  of  depth,  motion,  color, and  spatial
>
>
> location"
>
>
> ever sensed. (I have a model that backs this up:
>
>
>
> http://yanniru.blogspot.com/2012/04/implications-of-conjectured-megaverse.html)
>
>
>
> So the monads and the neurons experience the same things
>
>
> because of the BEC entanglement connection.
>
>
> These experiences are stored physically in short-term memory
>
>
> that Crick and Kock claim is essential to physical consciousness
>
>
> and the experiences in my model are also stored in the monads
>
>
> perhaps to solve the binding problem
>
>
> and at least for computational support of physical consciousness.
>
>
> Richard
>
>
>
>
>
> BEC are Turing emulable, so you can't get substance dualism, only, by making
>
>
> the level that low, you can get, perhaps, that substance dualism will look
>
>
> "very probable" in our neighborhood.
>
>
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Wed, Oct 10, 2012 at 11:26 AM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>
>
>
> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 8:51:50 AM UTC-4, yanniru wrote:
>
>
>
>
> Roger,
>
>
>
> To say that a connection is based on logic is a category error.
>
>
>
> More specifically,
>
>
> I conjecture that the connection in the brain between the physical brain
>
>
> and the (computational?) mind/monads is based on BEC entanglement.
>
>
> BEC stands for Bose-Einstein Condensate.
>
>
>
> It has been demonstrated experimentally that BECs made of different
>
>
> substances
>
>
> can become entangled. I claim based on string theory that the monads
>
>
> are a BEC since they came from space. They are compactified space,
>
>
> crystalline in form and essentially motionless. Presumably there is
>
>
> also a physical BEC in the brain.
>
>
>
> So if my conjecture is correct, that disparate BECs, even the monad
>
>
> BEC is substantive,
>
>
> are capable of entanglement, which of course is all logical, then the
>
>
> connection is based on entanglement. To say that a connection is based
>
>
> on logic is a category error.
>
>
> Richard
>
>
>
>
> What advantage does a BEC explanation really have over substance dualism
>
>
> though? How dies it solve the hard problem? Why do BECs experience things
>
>
> and nothing else does?
>
>
>
> Craig
>
>
>
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