Wiki: "In philosophy of mind, dualism is the assumption that mental phenomena are, in some respects, non-physical,[1] or that the mind and body are not identical.[2] Thus, it encompasses a set of views about the relationship between mind and matter, and is contrasted with other positions, such as physicalism, in the mind–body problem.[1][2]"
Bruno, It seems that your comp negates both substance dualism (ie., that the mind is composed of a non-physical substance) and now physicalism.. What is left? Richard On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 at 9:58 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > Hi Richard, > > On 12 Oct 2012, at 13:26, Richard Ruquist wrote: > > Bruno, > > Well if you do not need any substances at all, that includes > electrons, protons, neutrons, > neutrinos, dark matter and energy as well as particles of the mind. So > if any of these so-called substances have any existence at all, then I > bet that they all do, which is all I need for my metaphysics string > theory models. > > > Comp explains that physics has to be justified from a phenomemon: the comp > first person indeterminacy + computation (basically a number property). The > UDA explains why physicalism can't work, when you bet that consciousness can > be rematively invariant for some class of digital transformations. > > > > > It's like saying that god is everything, which is next > to saying nothing. > > > The (one) theory of everything is given by the non trivial laws of addition > and multiplication(*). You can derive physics from that and then compare it > with the empirical current extrapolation, or with some facts, making comp > refutable, and (partially) confirmable. Comp explains already why nature > behave in a quantum "MW" way, but not yet why there are hamiltonians, and > why they have the current shape. > > > (*) > x + 0 = x > x + s(y) = s(x + y) > > x *0 = 0 > x*s(y) = x*y + x > > An even shortest theory use the combinators, and has the following axioms > > ((K, x), y) = x > (((S, x), y), z) = ((x, z), (y, z)) > > A combinator is either K or S, or (x, y) with x and y already combinators. > > All you need is a Turing universal theory. BEC are OK, and actually the > whole condensed matter is a fascinating field, notably for its relation with > quantum computations and topology, but to take it in the ontology will make > confusing the derivation of physics, and will miss more easily the > quanta/qualia distinction. > > > Bruno > > > > On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 at 7:08 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > > On 11 Oct 2012, at 17:39, Richard Ruquist wrote: > > > Bruno: BEC are Turing emulable, so you can't get substance dualism, > > > Richard: Please explain why not. > > > > It is the object of the UD Argument. If there is a level where my body/brain > > (whatever it is) is Turing emulable, then the physical reality *has to* > > emerges from the first person indeterminacy applied to the UD* (the complete > > infinite running of the UD), or to any Turing-complete ontology. > > > So we don't need, and worst: we can't use, anything more than the numbers > > and the laws of + and * (to choose a simple Turing universal ontology). > > There is no substances at all, unless you use the terms (like Roger) in its > > greek sense of hypostases, and which in comp are machine's point of view > > (except for "truth"). > > > It is long to explain and not trivial. I have explained this many times on > > this list, and recently on the FOAR list which might be easier to consult. > > Or you can look at my paper: > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html > > > Or other paper that you can find on my URL. > > > But, if you want I can explain it step by step, tell me, and be patient, as > > I am in a super-busy period. > > > Bruno > > > > > > On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at 11:30 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 10 Oct 2012, at 18:47, Richard Ruquist wrote: > > > > Craig, > > > > I claim that a connection is needed in substance dualism between the > > > substance of the mind and the substance of the brain. That is, if > > > consciousness resides in a BEC in the brain and also in the mind, then > > > the two can become entangled and essentially be copies of each other. > > > So the BEC connection mechanism supports substance dualism. > > > > Substance dualism then solves the hard problem using string theory > > > monads.. > > > > For example take the binding problem where: > > > "There are an almost infinite number of possible, different > > > objects we are capable of seeing, There cannot be a single > > > neuron, often referred to as a grandmother cell, for each > > > one." (http://papers.klab.caltech.edu/22/1/148.pdf) > > > However, at a density of 10^90/cc > > > (from string theory; e.g., ST Yau, The Shape of Inner Space), > > > the binding problem can be solved by configurations of monads for > > > "all different values of depth, motion, color, and spatial > > > location" > > > ever sensed. (I have a model that backs this up: > > > > http://yanniru.blogspot.com/2012/04/implications-of-conjectured-megaverse.html) > > > > So the monads and the neurons experience the same things > > > because of the BEC entanglement connection. > > > These experiences are stored physically in short-term memory > > > that Crick and Kock claim is essential to physical consciousness > > > and the experiences in my model are also stored in the monads > > > perhaps to solve the binding problem > > > and at least for computational support of physical consciousness. > > > Richard > > > > > > BEC are Turing emulable, so you can't get substance dualism, only, by making > > > the level that low, you can get, perhaps, that substance dualism will look > > > "very probable" in our neighborhood. > > > > Bruno > > > > > > > > > > On Wed, Oct 10, 2012 at 11:26 AM, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> > > > wrote: > > > > > > On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 8:51:50 AM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: > > > > > Roger, > > > > To say that a connection is based on logic is a category error. > > > > More specifically, > > > I conjecture that the connection in the brain between the physical brain > > > and the (computational?) mind/monads is based on BEC entanglement. > > > BEC stands for Bose-Einstein Condensate. > > > > It has been demonstrated experimentally that BECs made of different > > > substances > > > can become entangled. I claim based on string theory that the monads > > > are a BEC since they came from space. They are compactified space, > > > crystalline in form and essentially motionless. Presumably there is > > > also a physical BEC in the brain. > > > > So if my conjecture is correct, that disparate BECs, even the monad > > > BEC is substantive, > > > are capable of entanglement, which of course is all logical, then the > > > connection is based on entanglement. To say that a connection is based > > > on logic is a category error. > > > Richard > > > > > What advantage does a BEC explanation really have over substance dualism > > > though? How dies it solve the hard problem? Why do BECs experience things > > > and nothing else does? > > > > Craig > > > > -- > > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > > > "Everything List" group. > > > To view this discussion on the web visit > > > https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/kEWP_Mi0G4IJ. > > > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > > > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > > > [email protected]. > > > For more options, visit this group at > > > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > > > -- > > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > > > "Everything List" group. > > > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > > > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > > > [email protected]. > > > For more options, visit this group at > > > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > > -- > > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > > > "Everything List" group. > > > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > > > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > > > [email protected]. > > > For more options, visit this group at > > > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > > "Everything List" group. > > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > > [email protected]. > > For more options, visit this group at > > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > > "Everything List" group. > > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > > [email protected]. > > For more options, visit this group at > > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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