Hi Richard,

On 12 Oct 2012, at 13:26, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Bruno,

Well if you do not need any substances at all, that includes
electrons, protons, neutrons,
neutrinos, dark matter and energy as well as particles of the mind. So
if any of these so-called substances have any existence at all, then I
bet that they all do, which is all I need for my metaphysics string
theory models.

Comp explains that physics has to be justified from a phenomemon: the comp first person indeterminacy + computation (basically a number property). The UDA explains why physicalism can't work, when you bet that consciousness can be rematively invariant for some class of digital transformations.




It's like saying that god is everything, which is next
to saying nothing.

The (one) theory of everything is given by the non trivial laws of addition and multiplication(*). You can derive physics from that and then compare it with the empirical current extrapolation, or with some facts, making comp refutable, and (partially) confirmable. Comp explains already why nature behave in a quantum "MW" way, but not yet why there are hamiltonians, and why they have the current shape.


(*)
x + 0 = x
x + s(y) = s(x + y)

 x *0 = 0
 x*s(y) = x*y + x

An even shortest theory use the combinators, and has the following axioms

((K, x), y) = x
(((S, x), y), z) = ((x, z), (y, z))

A combinator is either K or S, or (x, y) with x and y already combinators.

All you need is a Turing universal theory. BEC are OK, and actually the whole condensed matter is a fascinating field, notably for its relation with quantum computations and topology, but to take it in the ontology will make confusing the derivation of physics, and will miss more easily the quanta/qualia distinction.


Bruno



On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 at 7:08 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 11 Oct 2012, at 17:39, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Bruno: BEC are Turing emulable, so you can't get substance dualism,

Richard: Please explain why not.


It is the object of the UD Argument. If there is a level where my body/brain (whatever it is) is Turing emulable, then the physical reality *has to* emerges from the first person indeterminacy applied to the UD* (the complete
infinite running of the UD), or to any Turing-complete ontology.

So we don't need, and worst: we can't use, anything more than the numbers and the laws of + and * (to choose a simple Turing universal ontology). There is no substances at all, unless you use the terms (like Roger) in its greek sense of hypostases, and which in comp are machine's point of view
(except for "truth").

It is long to explain and not trivial. I have explained this many times on this list, and recently on the FOAR list which might be easier to consult.
Or you can look at my paper:

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html

Or other paper that you can find on my URL.

But, if you want I can explain it step by step, tell me, and be patient, as
I am in a super-busy period.

Bruno




On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at 11:30 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:


On 10 Oct 2012, at 18:47, Richard Ruquist wrote:


Craig,


I claim that a connection is needed in substance dualism between the

substance of the mind and the substance of the brain. That is, if

consciousness resides in a BEC in the brain and also in the mind, then

the two can become entangled and essentially be copies of each other.

So the BEC connection mechanism supports substance dualism.


Substance dualism then solves the hard problem using string theory

monads..


For example take the binding problem where:

"There  are  an  almost  infinite  number  of  possible, different

objects we are capable of seeing,  There  cannot  be  a  single

neuron,  often  referred  to  as  a  grandmother  cell,  for  each

one." (http://papers.klab.caltech.edu/22/1/148.pdf)

However, at a density of 10^90/cc

(from string theory; e.g., ST Yau, The Shape of Inner Space),

the binding problem can be solved by configurations of monads for

"all different  values  of  depth,  motion,  color, and  spatial

location"

ever sensed. (I have a model that backs this up:


http://yanniru.blogspot.com/2012/04/implications-of-conjectured-megaverse.html)


So the monads and the neurons experience the same things

because of the BEC entanglement connection.

These experiences are stored physically in short-term memory

that Crick and Kock claim is essential to physical consciousness

and the experiences in my model are also stored in the monads

perhaps to solve the binding problem

and at least for computational support of physical consciousness.

Richard




BEC are Turing emulable, so you can't get substance dualism, only, by making

the level that low, you can get, perhaps, that substance dualism will look

"very probable" in our neighborhood.


Bruno








On Wed, Oct 10, 2012 at 11:26 AM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com >

wrote:




On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 8:51:50 AM UTC-4, yanniru wrote:



Roger,


To say that a connection is based on logic is a category error.


More specifically,

I conjecture that the connection in the brain between the physical brain

and the (computational?) mind/monads is based on BEC entanglement.

BEC stands for Bose-Einstein Condensate.


It has been demonstrated experimentally that BECs made of different

substances

can become entangled. I claim based on string theory that the monads

are a BEC since they came from space. They are compactified space,

crystalline in form and essentially motionless. Presumably there is

also a physical BEC in the brain.


So if my conjecture is correct, that disparate BECs, even the monad

BEC is substantive,

are capable of entanglement, which of course is all logical, then the

connection is based on entanglement. To say that a connection is based

on logic is a category error.

Richard



What advantage does a BEC explanation really have over substance dualism

though? How dies it solve the hard problem? Why do BECs experience things

and nothing else does?


Craig


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