On 21 Oct 2012, at 14:25, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal

You say

"No, a zombie will stop at the red light. By definition it behaves like
a human, or like a conscious entity. "

My problem is that the definition is an absurdity to begin with.
If he has no mind, he could not know what a red light means.

Well, there are already robots capable of stopping at a red signals. So they have a mind. Good. That's the strong AI thesis (implied by comp).



He could not know anything. So he could never behave as a
real person would unless the response was instinctual.

That's the idea of a what a zombie can be, for some people. Some people agree that a computer can imitate a brain, but still not emulate the consciousness, or inner life usually associated to owner of brain. So they agree with MEC-BEH (behavioral mechanism) but not with comp. They are logically forced to accept the existence of zombie. Craig, here, seems to accept that consequence, but dismiss a little bit the zombie idea by calling them
puppet.


Note that you may be right, you could never know
if you married a zombie, but that does not follow
from the p-zombie definition. The definition is an absurdity.

In logic everything can follow from an absurdity. The notion of zombie is a philosophical concept. It can be absurd in some theory, and not in another theory. If you believe in MEC-BEH, but not in COMP, you are forced to accept the existence of zombie. If you believe that the notion of zombie is absurd (as most of us do here) then you are forced to accept comp, or to believe that MEC-BEH is wrong, which is akin in the belief in magic, as we have not yet find anything non Turing emulable, or recoverable by first person indeterminacy, in nature.

Bruno




Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/21/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-20, 10:11:25
Subject: Re: A test for solipsism




On 20 Oct 2012, at 12:38, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal

In that definition of a p-zombie below, it says that
a p-zombie cannot experience qualia, and qualia
are what the senses tell you.


Yes. Qualia are the subjective 1p view, sometimes brought by percepts, and supposed to be treated by the brain.
And yes a zombie as no qualia, as a qualia needs consciousness.












The mind then transforms
what is sensed into a sensation. The sense of red
is what the body gives you, the sensation of red
is what the mind transforms that into. Our mind
also can recall past sensations of red to compare
it with and give it a name "red", which a real
person can identify as eg a red traffic light
and stop. A zombie would not stop




No, a zombie will stop at the red light. By definition it behaves like a human, or like a conscious entity. By definition, if you marry a zombie, your will never been aware of that, your whole life.




(I am not allowing
the fact that red and green lights are in different
positions).
That would be a test of zombieness.


There exists already detector of colors, smells, capable of doing finer discrimination than human. I have heard about a machine testing old wine better than human experts.


Machines evolve quickly. That is why the non-comp people are confronted with the idea that zombie might be logically possible for them.


Bruno











Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/20/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-19, 03:47:51
Subject: Re: A test for solipsism

On 17 Oct 2012, at 19:12, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal

Sorry, I lost the thread on the doctor, and don't know what Craig
believes about the p-zombie.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie

"A philosophical zombie or p-zombie in the philosophy of mind and
perception is a hypothetical being
that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except in that
it lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.[1] When a
zombie is poked with a sharp object, for example, it does not feel
any pain though it behaves
exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say "ouch" and recoil from
the stimulus, or tell us that it is in intense pain)."

My guess is that this is the solipsism issue, to which I would say
that if it has no mind, it cannot converse with you,
which would be a test for solipsism,-- which I just now found in
typing the first part of this sentence.
Solipsism makes everyone zombie except you.
But in some context some people might conceive that zombie exists,
without making everyone zombie. Craig believes that computers, if they
might behave like conscious individuals would be a zombie, but he is
no solipsist.
There is no test for solipsism, nor for zombieness. BY definition,
almost. A zombie behaves exactly like a human being. There is no 3p
features that you could use at all to make a direct test. Now a theory
which admits zombie, can have other features which might be testable,
and so some indirect test are logically conceivable, relatively to
some theory.
Bruno





Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/17/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-17, 08:57:36
Subject: Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of
overlycomplexcomputations ?




On 16 Oct 2012, at 15:33, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 10/16/2012 9:20 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Stephen P. King

Thanks. My mistake was to say that P's position is that
consciousness, arises at (or above ?)
the level of noncomputability. He just seems to
say that intuiton does. But that just seems
to be a conjecture of his.


ugh, rclo...@verizon.net
10/16/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


Hi Roger,

IMHO, computability can only capture at most a "simulation" of the
content of consciousness, but we can deduce a lot from that ...



So you do say "no" to the doctor? And you do follow Craig on the
existence of p-zombie?


Bruno




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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