On 10/22/2012 12:51 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2012/10/22 Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com <mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>>

    On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 12:46 PM, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com
    <mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com>> wrote:

        On Sun, Oct 21, 2012  Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be
        <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:

                >> I stopped reading after your proof of the existence of a new 
type of
                indeterminacy never seen before because the proof was in error, 
so there
                was no point in reading about things built on top of that

            > From your "error" you have been obliged to say that in the WM 
            you will live both at W and at W


            yet your agree that both copy will feel to live in only one place


            > so the error you have seen was dues to a confusion between first 
            and third person.

        Somebody is certainly confused but it's not me. The fact is that if we 
        identical then my first person experience of looking at you is 
identical to your
        first person experience of looking at me, and both our actions are 
identical for
        a third person looking at both of us. As long as we're identical it's
        meaningless to talk about 2 conscious beings regardless of how many 
bodies or
        brains have been duplicated.

        Your confusion stems from saying "you have been duplicated" but then not
        thinking about what that really means, you haven't realized that a noun 
(like a
        brain) has been duplicated but a adjective (like Bruno Marchal) has not 
been as
        long as they are identical; you are treating adjectives as if they were 
        and that's bound to cause confusion. You are also confused by the fact 
that if 2
        identical things change in nonidentical ways, such as by forming 
        memories, then they are no longer identical. And finally you are 
confused by the
        fact that although they are not each other any more after those changes 
        still have a equal right to call themselves Bruno Marchal. After 
reading these
        multiple confusions in one step of your proof I saw no point in reading 
        and I still don't.


    I think you are missing something.  It is a problem that I noticed after 
    the movie "The Prestige" and it eventually led me to join this list.

    Unless you consider yourself to be only a single momentary atom of thought, 
    probably believe there is some stream of thoughts/consciousness that you 
    with.  You further believe that these thoughts and consciousness are 
produced by
    some activity of your brain.  Unlike Craig, you believe that whatever 
    injury you suffered, even if every atom in your body were separated from 
every other
    atom, in principle you could be put back together, and if the atoms are put 
    just right, you will be removed and alive and well, and conscious again.

    Further, you probably believe it doesn't matter if we even re-use the same 
atoms or
    not, since atoms of the same elements and isotopes are functionally 
equivalent.  We
    could take apart your current atoms, then put you back together with atoms 
from a
    different pile and your consciousness would continue right where it left 
off (from
    before you were obliterated).  It would be as if a simulation of your brain 
    running on a VM, we paused the VM, moved it to a different physical 
computer and
    then resumed it.  From your perspective inside, there was no interruption, 
yet your
    physical incarnation and location has changed.

    Assuming you are with me so far, an interesting question emerges: what 
happens to
    your consciousness when duplicated?  Either an atom for atom replica of 
yourself is
    created in two places or your VM image which contains your brain emulation 
is copied
    to two different computers while paused, and then both are resumed.  
Initially, the
    sensory input to the two duplicates could be the same, and in a sense they 
are still
    the same mind, just with two instances, but then something interesting 
happens once
    different input is fed to the two instances: they split.  You could say 
they split
    in the same sense as when someone opens the steel box to see whether the 
cat is
    alive or dead.  All the splitting in quantum mechanics may be the result of 
    infinite instances discovering/learning different things about our infinite

I would add that what's interresting in the duplication is the what happens next probability (when the "two" copies diverge). If you're about to do an experience (for exemple opening a door and looking what is behind) and that just before opening the door, your are duplicated, the copy is put in the same position in front of an identical door, the fact that you were originally (just before duplication) in front of a door that opens on new york city, what is the probability that when you open it *it is* new york city... in case of a single universe (limited) where not duplications of state could appear the answer is straighforward, it is 100%, but in case of comp or MWI, the probability is not 100%, you must take in account all duplications (now and then) and there relative measure. That is the "measure" problem. The "before" divergence is not interresting, that's the point where John stays stuck willingly.


There is something puzzling here. Duplication at the lowest level, cloning the quantum state, is impossible. And even duplicates at a relatively high state, e.g. nuerons, must quickly diverge just because of interactions with the uncontrolled environment - and in fact if QM is correct it is the interaction with the environment that permits the "higher" classical level to exist. In this thought experiments, Bruno sweeps these problems aside by considering conscious states. Conscious states are very crude things. We're not aware of very much of the world. So Bruno notes that a given conscious state is consistent with a lot of different worlds - different computational states in different computational threads of a UD. Then he proposes that the physical world is just a kind of consistency class within all the consciousness threads (intersujective agreement). But each thread of computation that contributes to a given consciousness only does so in virtue of being consistent with the other threads (one is never literally of two minds). So it seems that consciousness, by this theory, is an epiphenomena on certain classes of computation (e.g. those that 'hang together' enough to be conscious "of" something). Then we're back to the same sort of question asked of materialism, but instead of "Why is this physical process conscious and not that one?" the question is "Why is this bundle of computational states conscious and not that one?"


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