On Sun, Oct 21, 2012  Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

>
>  >> I stopped reading after your proof of the existence of a new type of
>> indeterminacy never seen before because the proof was in error, so there
>> was no point in reading about things built on top of that
>>
>
> > From your "error" you have been obliged to say that in the WM
> duplication, you will live both at W and at W
>

Yes.

yet your agree that both copy will feel to live in only one place
>

Yes.

> so the error you have seen was dues to a confusion between first person
> and third person.
>

Somebody is certainly confused but it's not me. The fact is that if we are
identical then my first person experience of looking at you is identical to
your first person experience of looking at me, and both our actions are
identical for a third person looking at both of us. As long as we're
identical it's meaningless to talk about 2 conscious beings regardless of
how many bodies or brains have been duplicated.

Your confusion stems from saying "you have been duplicated" but then not
thinking about what that really means, you haven't realized that a noun
(like a brain) has been duplicated but a adjective (like Bruno Marchal) has
not been as long as they are identical; you are treating adjectives as if
they were nouns and that's bound to cause confusion. You are also confused
by the fact that if 2 identical things change in nonidentical ways, such as
by forming different memories, then they are no longer identical. And
finally you are confused by the fact that although they are not each other
any more after those changes both still have a equal right to call
themselves Bruno Marchal. After reading these multiple confusions in one
step of your proof I saw no point in reading more, and I still don't.

> By the way, it is irrational to stop in the middle of a proof.
>

If one of the steps in a proof contains a blunder then it would be
irrational to keep reading it.

> By assuming a physical reality at the start
>

That seems like a pretty damn good place to make an assumption.

 > But the physical reality can emerge or appear without a physical reality
> at the start
>

Maybe maybe not, but even if you're right that wouldn't make it any less
real; and maybe physical reality didn't even need to emerge because there
was no start.


> >> If you change your conscious state then your brain changes, and if I
>> make a change in your brain then your conscious state changes too, so I'd
>> say that it's a good assumption that consciousness is interlinked with a
>> physical object, in fact it's a downright superb assumption.
>>
>
>  > But this is easily shown to be false when we assume comp.


It's not false and I don't need to assume it and I haven't theorized it
from armchair philosophy either, I can show it's true experimentally. And
when theory and experiment come into conflict it is the theory that must
submit not the experiment. If I insert drugs into your bloodstream it will
change the chemistry of your brain, and when that happens your conscious
state will also change. Depending on the drug I can make you happy-sad,
friendly-angry, frightened-clam, alert-sleepy, dead-alive, you name it.


>  > If your state appears in a far away galaxies [...]
>

Then he will be me and he will remain me until differences between that far
away galaxy and this one cause us to change in some way, such as by forming
different memories; after that he will no longer be me, although we will
still both be John K Clark because John K Clark has been duplicated, the
machine duplicated the body of him and the environmental differences caused
his consciousness to diverge. As I've said before this is a odd situation
but in no way paradoxical.

> You keep defending comp, in your dialog with Craig,
>

I keep defending my ideas, "comp" is your homemade term not mine, I have no
use for it.

> You can attach consciousness to the owner of a brain,
>

Yes, consciousness is what the brain does.

 > but the owner itself must attach his consciousness to all states
> existing in arithmetic
>

Then I must remember events that happened in the Precambrian because
arithmetic existed even back then, but I don't, I don't remember existing
then at all. Now that is a paradox! Therefore one of the assumptions must
be wrong, namely that the owner of a brain "must attach his consciousness
to all states existing in arithmetic".

  John K Clark

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