On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > >> I stopped reading after your proof of the existence of a new type of >> indeterminacy never seen before because the proof was in error, so there >> was no point in reading about things built on top of that >> > > > From your "error" you have been obliged to say that in the WM > duplication, you will live both at W and at W >
Yes. yet your agree that both copy will feel to live in only one place > Yes. > so the error you have seen was dues to a confusion between first person > and third person. > Somebody is certainly confused but it's not me. The fact is that if we are identical then my first person experience of looking at you is identical to your first person experience of looking at me, and both our actions are identical for a third person looking at both of us. As long as we're identical it's meaningless to talk about 2 conscious beings regardless of how many bodies or brains have been duplicated. Your confusion stems from saying "you have been duplicated" but then not thinking about what that really means, you haven't realized that a noun (like a brain) has been duplicated but a adjective (like Bruno Marchal) has not been as long as they are identical; you are treating adjectives as if they were nouns and that's bound to cause confusion. You are also confused by the fact that if 2 identical things change in nonidentical ways, such as by forming different memories, then they are no longer identical. And finally you are confused by the fact that although they are not each other any more after those changes both still have a equal right to call themselves Bruno Marchal. After reading these multiple confusions in one step of your proof I saw no point in reading more, and I still don't. > By the way, it is irrational to stop in the middle of a proof. > If one of the steps in a proof contains a blunder then it would be irrational to keep reading it. > By assuming a physical reality at the start > That seems like a pretty damn good place to make an assumption. > But the physical reality can emerge or appear without a physical reality > at the start > Maybe maybe not, but even if you're right that wouldn't make it any less real; and maybe physical reality didn't even need to emerge because there was no start. > >> If you change your conscious state then your brain changes, and if I >> make a change in your brain then your conscious state changes too, so I'd >> say that it's a good assumption that consciousness is interlinked with a >> physical object, in fact it's a downright superb assumption. >> > > > But this is easily shown to be false when we assume comp. It's not false and I don't need to assume it and I haven't theorized it from armchair philosophy either, I can show it's true experimentally. And when theory and experiment come into conflict it is the theory that must submit not the experiment. If I insert drugs into your bloodstream it will change the chemistry of your brain, and when that happens your conscious state will also change. Depending on the drug I can make you happy-sad, friendly-angry, frightened-clam, alert-sleepy, dead-alive, you name it. > > If your state appears in a far away galaxies [...] > Then he will be me and he will remain me until differences between that far away galaxy and this one cause us to change in some way, such as by forming different memories; after that he will no longer be me, although we will still both be John K Clark because John K Clark has been duplicated, the machine duplicated the body of him and the environmental differences caused his consciousness to diverge. As I've said before this is a odd situation but in no way paradoxical. > You keep defending comp, in your dialog with Craig, > I keep defending my ideas, "comp" is your homemade term not mine, I have no use for it. > You can attach consciousness to the owner of a brain, > Yes, consciousness is what the brain does. > but the owner itself must attach his consciousness to all states > existing in arithmetic > Then I must remember events that happened in the Precambrian because arithmetic existed even back then, but I don't, I don't remember existing then at all. Now that is a paradox! Therefore one of the assumptions must be wrong, namely that the owner of a brain "must attach his consciousness to all states existing in arithmetic". John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.