2012/10/21 John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com>

> On Sun, Oct 21, 2012  Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
>>
>>  >> I stopped reading after your proof of the existence of a new type of
>>> indeterminacy never seen before because the proof was in error, so there
>>> was no point in reading about things built on top of that
>>>
>>
>> > From your "error" you have been obliged to say that in the WM
>> duplication, you will live both at W and at W
>>
>
> Yes.
>
> yet your agree that both copy will feel to live in only one place
>>
>
> Yes.
>
> > so the error you have seen was dues to a confusion between first person
>> and third person.
>>
>
> Somebody is certainly confused but it's not me. The fact is that if we are
> identical then my first person experience of looking at you is identical to
> your first person experience of looking at me, and both our actions are
> identical for a third person looking at both of us. As long as we're
> identical it's meaningless to talk about 2 conscious beings regardless of
> how many bodies or brains have been duplicated.
>
> Your confusion stems from saying "you have been duplicated" but then not
> thinking about what that really means, you haven't realized that a noun
> (like a brain) has been duplicated but a adjective (like Bruno Marchal) has
> not been as long as they are identical; you are treating adjectives as if
> they were nouns and that's bound to cause confusion. You are also confused
> by the fact that if 2 identical things change in nonidentical ways, such as
> by forming different memories, then they are no longer identical. And
> finally you are confused by the fact that although they are not each other
> any more after those changes both still have a equal right to call
> themselves Bruno Marchal. After reading these multiple confusions in one
> step of your proof I saw no point in reading more, and I still don't.
>
> > By the way, it is irrational to stop in the middle of a proof.
>>
>
> If one of the steps in a proof contains a blunder then it would be
> irrational to keep reading it.
>
> > By assuming a physical reality at the start
>>
>
> That seems like a pretty damn good place to make an assumption.
>
>  > But the physical reality can emerge or appear without a physical
>> reality at the start
>>
>
> Maybe maybe not, but even if you're right that wouldn't make it any less
> real; and maybe physical reality didn't even need to emerge because there
> was no start.
>
>
>> >> If you change your conscious state then your brain changes, and if I
>>> make a change in your brain then your conscious state changes too, so I'd
>>> say that it's a good assumption that consciousness is interlinked with a
>>> physical object, in fact it's a downright superb assumption.
>>>
>>
>>  > But this is easily shown to be false when we assume comp.
>
>
> It's not false and I don't need to assume it and I haven't theorized it
> from armchair philosophy either, I can show it's true experimentally. And
> when theory and experiment come into conflict it is the theory that must
> submit not the experiment. If I insert drugs into your bloodstream it will
> change the chemistry of your brain, and when that happens your conscious
> state will also change. Depending on the drug I can make you happy-sad,
> friendly-angry, frightened-clam, alert-sleepy, dead-alive, you name it.
>
>
>>  > If your state appears in a far away galaxies [...]
>>
>
> Then he will be me and he will remain me until differences between that
> far away galaxy and this one cause us to change in some way, such as by
> forming different memories; after that he will no longer be me, although we
> will still both be John K Clark because John K Clark has been duplicated,
> the machine duplicated the body of him and the environmental differences
> caused his consciousness to diverge. As I've said before this is a odd
> situation but in no way paradoxical.
>
> > You keep defending comp, in your dialog with Craig,
>>
>
> I keep defending my ideas, "comp" is your homemade term not mine, I have
> no use for it.
>
> > You can attach consciousness to the owner of a brain,
>>
>
> Yes, consciousness is what the brain does.
>
>  > but the owner itself must attach his consciousness to all states
>> existing in arithmetic
>>
>
> Then I must remember events that happened in the Precambrian because
> arithmetic existed even back then, but I don't, I don't remember existing
> then at all. Now that is a paradox! Therefore one of the assumptions must
> be wrong,
>

Therefore that shows that you do your best to turn the meaning of
everything you read to be able to marvel at yourself... but well, that only
fools you.

Quentin


> namely that the owner of a brain "must attach his consciousness to all
> states existing in arithmetic".
>
>   John K Clark
>
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