2012/10/21 John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> > On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >> >> >> I stopped reading after your proof of the existence of a new type of >>> indeterminacy never seen before because the proof was in error, so there >>> was no point in reading about things built on top of that >>> >> >> > From your "error" you have been obliged to say that in the WM >> duplication, you will live both at W and at W >> > > Yes. > > yet your agree that both copy will feel to live in only one place >> > > Yes. > > > so the error you have seen was dues to a confusion between first person >> and third person. >> > > Somebody is certainly confused but it's not me. The fact is that if we are > identical then my first person experience of looking at you is identical to > your first person experience of looking at me, and both our actions are > identical for a third person looking at both of us. As long as we're > identical it's meaningless to talk about 2 conscious beings regardless of > how many bodies or brains have been duplicated. > > Your confusion stems from saying "you have been duplicated" but then not > thinking about what that really means, you haven't realized that a noun > (like a brain) has been duplicated but a adjective (like Bruno Marchal) has > not been as long as they are identical; you are treating adjectives as if > they were nouns and that's bound to cause confusion. You are also confused > by the fact that if 2 identical things change in nonidentical ways, such as > by forming different memories, then they are no longer identical. And > finally you are confused by the fact that although they are not each other > any more after those changes both still have a equal right to call > themselves Bruno Marchal. After reading these multiple confusions in one > step of your proof I saw no point in reading more, and I still don't. > > > By the way, it is irrational to stop in the middle of a proof. >> > > If one of the steps in a proof contains a blunder then it would be > irrational to keep reading it. > > > By assuming a physical reality at the start >> > > That seems like a pretty damn good place to make an assumption. > > > But the physical reality can emerge or appear without a physical >> reality at the start >> > > Maybe maybe not, but even if you're right that wouldn't make it any less > real; and maybe physical reality didn't even need to emerge because there > was no start. > > >> >> If you change your conscious state then your brain changes, and if I >>> make a change in your brain then your conscious state changes too, so I'd >>> say that it's a good assumption that consciousness is interlinked with a >>> physical object, in fact it's a downright superb assumption. >>> >> >> > But this is easily shown to be false when we assume comp. > > > It's not false and I don't need to assume it and I haven't theorized it > from armchair philosophy either, I can show it's true experimentally. And > when theory and experiment come into conflict it is the theory that must > submit not the experiment. If I insert drugs into your bloodstream it will > change the chemistry of your brain, and when that happens your conscious > state will also change. Depending on the drug I can make you happy-sad, > friendly-angry, frightened-clam, alert-sleepy, dead-alive, you name it. > > >> > If your state appears in a far away galaxies [...] >> > > Then he will be me and he will remain me until differences between that > far away galaxy and this one cause us to change in some way, such as by > forming different memories; after that he will no longer be me, although we > will still both be John K Clark because John K Clark has been duplicated, > the machine duplicated the body of him and the environmental differences > caused his consciousness to diverge. As I've said before this is a odd > situation but in no way paradoxical. > > > You keep defending comp, in your dialog with Craig, >> > > I keep defending my ideas, "comp" is your homemade term not mine, I have > no use for it. > > > You can attach consciousness to the owner of a brain, >> > > Yes, consciousness is what the brain does. > > > but the owner itself must attach his consciousness to all states >> existing in arithmetic >> > > Then I must remember events that happened in the Precambrian because > arithmetic existed even back then, but I don't, I don't remember existing > then at all. Now that is a paradox! Therefore one of the assumptions must > be wrong, >
Therefore that shows that you do your best to turn the meaning of everything you read to be able to marvel at yourself... but well, that only fools you. Quentin > namely that the owner of a brain "must attach his consciousness to all > states existing in arithmetic". > > John K Clark > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.