On 20 Oct 2012, at 19:29, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Oct 20, 2012 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
>> I have no idea what that means, not a clue
> Probably for the same reason that you stop at step 3 in the UD
Argument.
Probably. I remember I stopped reading after your proof of the
existence of a new type of indeterminacy never seen before because
the proof was in error, so there was no point in reading about
things built on top of that; but I don't remember if that was step 3
or not.
From your "error" you have been obliged to say that in the WM
duplication, you will live both at W and at W, yet your agree that
both copy will feel to live in only one place, so the error you have
seen was dues to a confusion between first person and third person. We
were many to tell you this, and it seems you are stick in that
confusion.
By the way, it is irrational to stop in the middle of a proof.
Obviously, reading the sequel, can help you to see the confusion you
are doing.
>You assume a physical reality,
I assume that if physical reality doesn't exist then either the
words "physical" or "reality" or "exists" are meaningless, and I
don't think any of those words are.
By assuming a physical reality at the start, you make it into a
primitive ontology. But the physical reality can emerge or appear
without a physical reality at the start, like in the numbers' dreams.
> and you assume that our consciousness is some phenomenon related
exclusively to some construct (brain, bodies)
If you change your conscious state then your brain changes, and if I
make a change in your brain then your conscious state changes too,
so I'd say that it's a good assumption that consciousness is
interlinked with a physical object, in fact it's a downright superb
assumption.
But this is easily shown to be false when we assume comp. If your
state appears in a far away galaxies, what will happen far away might
change your outcome of an experience you decided to do "here". You
believe in an identity thesis which can't work, unless you singularize
both the mind and the brain matter with special sort of infinities.
>> so if it [Evolution] produced it [consciousness]
>No. With comp, consciousness was there before.
Well I don't know about you but I don't think my consciousness was
there before Evolution figured out how to make brains, I believe
this because I can't seem to remember events that were going on
during the Precambrian. I've always been a little hazy about what
exactly "comp" meant but I had the general feeling that I sorta
agreed with it, but apparently not.
You keep defending comp, in your dialog with Craig, but you don't
follow its logical consequences,
I guess, this is by not wanting to take seriously the first person and
third person distinction, which is the key of the UD argument.
You can attach consciousness to the owner of a brain, but the owner
itself must attach his consciousness to all states existing in
arithmetic (or in a physical universe if that exists) and realizing
that brain state.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
[email protected].
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
