2012/10/22 Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com>
> On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 12:46 PM, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>> >> I stopped reading after your proof of the existence of a new type of
>>>> indeterminacy never seen before because the proof was in error, so there
>>>> was no point in reading about things built on top of that
>>> > From your "error" you have been obliged to say that in the WM
>>> duplication, you will live both at W and at W
>> yet your agree that both copy will feel to live in only one place
>> > so the error you have seen was dues to a confusion between first person
>>> and third person.
>> Somebody is certainly confused but it's not me. The fact is that if we
>> are identical then my first person experience of looking at you is
>> identical to your first person experience of looking at me, and both our
>> actions are identical for a third person looking at both of us. As long as
>> we're identical it's meaningless to talk about 2 conscious beings
>> regardless of how many bodies or brains have been duplicated.
>> Your confusion stems from saying "you have been duplicated" but then not
>> thinking about what that really means, you haven't realized that a noun
>> (like a brain) has been duplicated but a adjective (like Bruno Marchal) has
>> not been as long as they are identical; you are treating adjectives as if
>> they were nouns and that's bound to cause confusion. You are also confused
>> by the fact that if 2 identical things change in nonidentical ways, such as
>> by forming different memories, then they are no longer identical. And
>> finally you are confused by the fact that although they are not each other
>> any more after those changes both still have a equal right to call
>> themselves Bruno Marchal. After reading these multiple confusions in one
>> step of your proof I saw no point in reading more, and I still don't.
> I think you are missing something. It is a problem that I noticed after
> watching the movie "The Prestige" and it eventually led me to join this
> Unless you consider yourself to be only a single momentary atom of
> thought, you probably believe there is some stream of
> thoughts/consciousness that you identify with. You further believe that
> these thoughts and consciousness are produced by some activity of your
> brain. Unlike Craig, you believe that whatever horrible injury you
> suffered, even if every atom in your body were separated from every other
> atom, in principle you could be put back together, and if the atoms are put
> back just right, you will be removed and alive and well, and conscious
> Further, you probably believe it doesn't matter if we even re-use the same
> atoms or not, since atoms of the same elements and isotopes are
> functionally equivalent. We could take apart your current atoms, then put
> you back together with atoms from a different pile and your consciousness
> would continue right where it left off (from before you were obliterated).
> It would be as if a simulation of your brain were running on a VM, we
> paused the VM, moved it to a different physical computer and then resumed
> it. From your perspective inside, there was no interruption, yet your
> physical incarnation and location has changed.
> Assuming you are with me so far, an interesting question emerges: what
> happens to your consciousness when duplicated? Either an atom for atom
> replica of yourself is created in two places or your VM image which
> contains your brain emulation is copied to two different computers while
> paused, and then both are resumed. Initially, the sensory input to the two
> duplicates could be the same, and in a sense they are still the same mind,
> just with two instances, but then something interesting happens once
> different input is fed to the two instances: they split. You could say
> they split in the same sense as when someone opens the steel box to see
> whether the cat is alive or dead. All the splitting in quantum mechanics
> may be the result of our infinite instances discovering/learning different
> things about our infinite environments.
I would add that what's interresting in the duplication is the what happens
next probability (when the "two" copies diverge). If you're about to do an
experience (for exemple opening a door and looking what is behind) and that
just before opening the door, your are duplicated, the copy is put in the
same position in front of an identical door, the fact that you were
originally (just before duplication) in front of a door that opens on new
york city, what is the probability that when you open it *it is* new york
city... in case of a single universe (limited) where not duplications of
state could appear the answer is straighforward, it is 100%, but in case of
comp or MWI, the probability is not 100%, you must take in account all
duplications (now and then) and there relative measure. That is the
"measure" problem. The "before" divergence is not interresting, that's the
point where John stays stuck willingly.
>> > By the way, it is irrational to stop in the middle of a proof.
>> If one of the steps in a proof contains a blunder then it would be
>> irrational to keep reading it.
>> > By assuming a physical reality at the start
>> That seems like a pretty damn good place to make an assumption.
>> > But the physical reality can emerge or appear without a physical
>>> reality at the start
>> Maybe maybe not, but even if you're right that wouldn't make it any less
>> real; and maybe physical reality didn't even need to emerge because there
>> was no start.
>>> >> If you change your conscious state then your brain changes, and if I
>>>> make a change in your brain then your conscious state changes too, so I'd
>>>> say that it's a good assumption that consciousness is interlinked with a
>>>> physical object, in fact it's a downright superb assumption.
>>> > But this is easily shown to be false when we assume comp.
>> It's not false and I don't need to assume it and I haven't theorized it
>> from armchair philosophy either, I can show it's true experimentally. And
>> when theory and experiment come into conflict it is the theory that must
>> submit not the experiment. If I insert drugs into your bloodstream it will
>> change the chemistry of your brain, and when that happens your conscious
>> state will also change. Depending on the drug I can make you happy-sad,
>> friendly-angry, frightened-clam, alert-sleepy, dead-alive, you name it.
>>> > If your state appears in a far away galaxies [...]
>> Then he will be me and he will remain me until differences between that
>> far away galaxy and this one cause us to change in some way, such as by
>> forming different memories; after that he will no longer be me, although we
>> will still both be John K Clark because John K Clark has been duplicated,
>> the machine duplicated the body of him and the environmental differences
>> caused his consciousness to diverge. As I've said before this is a odd
>> situation but in no way paradoxical.
>> > You keep defending comp, in your dialog with Craig,
>> I keep defending my ideas, "comp" is your homemade term not mine, I have
>> no use for it.
>> > You can attach consciousness to the owner of a brain,
>> Yes, consciousness is what the brain does.
>> > but the owner itself must attach his consciousness to all states
>>> existing in arithmetic
>> Then I must remember events that happened in the Precambrian because
>> arithmetic existed even back then, but I don't, I don't remember existing
>> then at all. Now that is a paradox! Therefore one of the assumptions must
>> be wrong, namely that the owner of a brain "must attach his consciousness
>> to all states existing in arithmetic".
>> John K Clark
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