On 22 Oct 2012, at 18:49, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Monday, October 22, 2012 12:28:41 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But that's what the brain does, simulate experience from the point of
view of the owner or liver of the experience. According to some
theory. You can't talk like if you knew that this is false.
This is the retrospective view of consciousness that takes
experience for granted. How can experience itself be simulated?
The question is senseless. An experience is lived. never simulated,
neither by a computer, nor by a brain, which eventually are object of
thought, describing compactly infinities of arithmetical relations.
I can have an experience within which another experience is simulated,
Never. It does not make sense. You take my sentence above too much
literally. Sorry, my fault. I wanted to be short. I meant "simulate
the context making the experience of the person, "really living in
Platonia" possible to manifest itself locally.
but there is no ontological basis for the assumption that experience
itself - *all experience* can be somehow not really happening but
instead be a non-happening that defines itself *as if* it is
happening. Somewhere, on some level of description, something has to
actually be happening. If the brain simulates experience, what is it
doing with all of those neurotransmitters and cells?
It computes, so that the person can manifest itself relatively to its
most probable computation.
Why bother with a simulation or experience at all? Comp has no
business producing such things at all. If the world is computation,
why pretend it isn't - and how exactly is such a pretending possible.
The world and reality is not computation. On the contrary it is almost
the complementary of computations. That is why we can test comp by
doing the math of that "anti-computation" and compare to physics.
Bruno
It's a fun theory, but it's really not a viable explanation for the
universe where we actually live.
Craig
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