Hi Bruno Marchal The simulated experience is not a real experience. OK ?
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/24/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-24, 08:57:19 Subject: Re: Solipsism = 1p On 23 Oct 2012, at 20:21, Stephen P. King wrote: > On 10/23/2012 10:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> On 22 Oct 2012, at 18:49, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On Monday, October 22, 2012 12:28:41 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> But that's what the brain does, simulate experience from the point >>> of >>> view of the owner or liver of the experience. According to some >>> theory. You can't talk like if you knew that this is false. >>> >>> >>> This is the retrospective view of consciousness that takes >>> experience for granted. How can experience itself be simulated? >> >> The question is senseless. An experience is lived. never simulated, >> neither by a computer, nor by a brain, which eventually are object >> of thought, describing compactly infinities of arithmetical >> relations. >> > > Hi Craig and Bruno, > > If the simulation by the computation is exact then the > simulation *is* the experience. I agree with what Bruno is saying > here except that that the model that Bruno is using goes to far into > the limit of abstraction in my opinion. The point is that I think we have no real choice in the matter. Also, for me the numbers 2 and 3 are far more concrete than a apple or a tree. It is just that I have a complex brain which makes me believe, by a vast amount of computations that a tree is something concrete. > >> >>> I can have an experience within which another experience is >>> simulated, >> >> Never. It does not make sense. You take my sentence above too much >> literally. Sorry, my fault. I wanted to be short. I meant "simulate >> the context making the experience of the person, "really living in >> Platonia" possible to manifest itself locally. > > We can think about our thoughts. Is that not an experience > within another? OK. I would say that an emulation of an experience is equal to that experience. Now, just a simulation of an experience, is more like faking to be in love with a girl. But then you are a zombie with respect to the feeling of love, somehow. > >> >>> but there is no ontological basis for the assumption that >>> experience itself - *all experience* can be somehow not really >>> happening but instead be a non-happening that defines itself *as >>> if* it is happening. Somewhere, on some level of description, >>> something has to actually be happening. If the brain simulates >>> experience, what is it doing with all of those neurotransmitters >>> and cells? >> >> It computes, so that the person can manifest itself relatively to >> its most probable computation. > > There is a difference between a single computation and a bundle > of computations. The brain's neurons, etc. are the physical > (topological space) Topological space are mathematical. > aspect of the intersection of computational bundle. They are not a > "separate substance". OK. But that remains unclear as we don't know what you assume and what you derive. > >> >>> Why bother with a simulation or experience at all? Comp has no >>> business producing such things at all. If the world is >>> computation, why pretend it isn't - and how exactly is such a >>> pretending possible. >> >> The world and reality is not computation. On the contrary it is >> almost the complementary of computations. > > Yes, it is exactly only the content that the computations > generate. That is: views by persons. > >> That is why we can test comp by doing the math of that "anti- >> computation" and compare to physics. > > But, Bruno, what we obtain from comp is not a particular physics. It has to be. It is not a particular geography, but it has to be a particular physics. Physics really becomes math, with comp. There is only one physical reality. But it is still unknown if it is a multiverse, or a multi-multiverse, or a layered structure with different type of realm for different type of consciousness. There a lot of open problems, to say the least. > What we get is an infinite "landscape" of possible physics theories. Not with comp. The main basic reason is that "we" are distributed in all computations, and physics emerges from that. There might be inaccessible cluster of "dead physical realities", which would not rich enough to implement Turing universal machines. But those cannot interfere (statistically) with our observations, like the "material" universe. We don't have to worry about them. They are like invisible horses. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
