Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/24/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-24, 08:57:19
Subject: Re: Solipsism = 1p
On 23 Oct 2012, at 20:21, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 10/23/2012 10:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 22 Oct 2012, at 18:49, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Monday, October 22, 2012 12:28:41 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But that's what the brain does, simulate experience from the point
of
view of the owner or liver of the experience. According to some
theory. You can't talk like if you knew that this is false.
This is the retrospective view of consciousness that takes
experience for granted. How can experience itself be simulated?
The question is senseless. An experience is lived. never simulated,
neither by a computer, nor by a brain, which eventually are object
of thought, describing compactly infinities of arithmetical
relations.
Hi Craig and Bruno,
If the simulation by the computation is exact then the
simulation *is* the experience. I agree with what Bruno is saying
here except that that the model that Bruno is using goes to far into
the limit of abstraction in my opinion.
The point is that I think we have no real choice in the matter. Also,
for me the numbers 2 and 3 are far more concrete than a apple or a
tree. It is just that I have a complex brain which makes me believe,
by a vast amount of computations that a tree is something concrete.
I can have an experience within which another experience is
simulated,
Never. It does not make sense. You take my sentence above too much
literally. Sorry, my fault. I wanted to be short. I meant "simulate
the context making the experience of the person, "really living in
Platonia" possible to manifest itself locally.
We can think about our thoughts. Is that not an experience
within another?
OK. I would say that an emulation of an experience is equal to that
experience. Now, just a simulation of an experience, is more like
faking to be in love with a girl. But then you are a zombie with
respect to the feeling of love, somehow.
but there is no ontological basis for the assumption that
experience itself - *all experience* can be somehow not really
happening but instead be a non-happening that defines itself *as
if* it is happening. Somewhere, on some level of description,
something has to actually be happening. If the brain simulates
experience, what is it doing with all of those neurotransmitters
and cells?
It computes, so that the person can manifest itself relatively to
its most probable computation.
There is a difference between a single computation and a bundle
of computations. The brain's neurons, etc. are the physical
(topological space)
Topological space are mathematical.
aspect of the intersection of computational bundle. They are not a
"separate substance".
OK. But that remains unclear as we don't know what you assume and what
you derive.
Why bother with a simulation or experience at all? Comp has no
business producing such things at all. If the world is
computation, why pretend it isn't - and how exactly is such a
pretending possible.
The world and reality is not computation. On the contrary it is
almost the complementary of computations.
Yes, it is exactly only the content that the computations
generate.
That is: views by persons.
That is why we can test comp by doing the math of that "anti-
computation" and compare to physics.
But, Bruno, what we obtain from comp is not a particular physics.
It has to be. It is not a particular geography, but it has to be a
particular physics. Physics really becomes math, with comp. There is
only one physical reality. But it is still unknown if it is a
multiverse, or a multi-multiverse, or a layered structure with
different type of realm for different type of consciousness. There a
lot of open problems, to say the least.
What we get is an infinite "landscape" of possible physics theories.
Not with comp. The main basic reason is that "we" are distributed in
all computations, and physics emerges from that. There might be
inaccessible cluster of "dead physical realities", which would not
rich enough to implement Turing universal machines. But those cannot
interfere (statistically) with our observations, like the "material"
universe. We don't have to worry about them. They are like invisible
horses.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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