Hi Stephen P. King  

How can you know that the simulation is exact ?
Solipsim prevents that.

And who or what experiences the computer output ?


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
10/24/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


----- Receiving the following content -----  
From: Stephen P. King  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-10-23, 14:21:44 
Subject: Re: Solipsism = 1p 


On 10/23/2012 10:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 



On 22 Oct 2012, at 18:49, Craig Weinberg wrote: 




On Monday, October 22, 2012 12:28:41 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:  

But that's what the brain does, simulate experience from the point of    
view of the owner or liver of the experience. According to some    
theory. You can't talk like if you knew that this is false.  



This is the retrospective view of consciousness that takes experience for 
granted. How can experience itself be simulated?  


The question is senseless. An experience is lived. never simulated, neither by 
a computer, nor by a brain, which eventually are object of thought, describing 
compactly infinities of arithmetical relations.  



Hi Craig and Bruno, 

    If the simulation by the computation is exact then the simulation *is* the 
experience. I agree with what Bruno is saying here except that that the model 
that Bruno is using goes to far into the limit of abstraction in my opinion. 




I can have an experience within which another experience is simulated,  


Never. It does not make sense. You take my sentence above too much literally. 
Sorry, my fault. I wanted to be short. I meant "simulate the context making the 
experience of the person, "really living in Platonia" possible to manifest 
itself locally. 

    We can think about our thoughts. Is that not an experience within another?  




but there is no ontological basis for the assumption that experience itself - 
*all experience* can be somehow not really happening but instead be a 
non-happening that defines itself *as if* it is happening. Somewhere, on some 
level of description, something has to actually be happening. If the brain 
simulates experience, what is it doing with all of those neurotransmitters and 
cells?  


It computes, so that the person can manifest itself relatively to its most 
probable computation. 

    There is a difference between a single computation and a bundle of 
computations. The brain's neurons, etc. are the physical (topological space) 
aspect of the intersection of computational bundle. They are not a "separate 
substance". 




Why bother with a simulation or experience at all? Comp has no business 
producing such things at all. If the world is computation, why pretend it isn't 
- and how exactly is such a pretending possible. 



The world and reality is not computation. On the contrary it is almost the 
complementary of computations. 

    Yes, it is exactly only the content that the computations generate. 


That is why we can test comp by doing the math of that "anti-computation" and 
compare to physics.  


    But, Bruno, what we obtain from comp is not a particular physics. What we 
get is an infinite "landscape" of possible physics theories. 




Bruno 




--  
Onward! 

Stephen

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