On 23 Oct 2012, at 17:46, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, October 23, 2012 10:15:15 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 22 Oct 2012, at 18:49, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Monday, October 22, 2012 12:28:41 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But that's what the brain does, simulate experience from the point of
view of the owner or liver of the experience. According to some
theory. You can't talk like if you knew that this is false.
This is the retrospective view of consciousness that takes
experience for granted. How can experience itself be simulated?
The question is senseless. An experience is lived. never simulated,
neither by a computer, nor by a brain, which eventually are object
of thought, describing compactly infinities of arithmetical relations.
That's what I'm saying, experience can't be simulated.
OK. Even the experience "made by a computer". The experience is a
mathematical fixed point living atemporally in arithmetic.
I can have an experience within which another experience is
simulated,
Never. It does not make sense.
Why not? I am sitting here at my desk while I am imagining I am in a
coffee shop instead - or a talking bowling ball is eating a coffee
shop, or whatever. I can simulate practically any experience I like
by imagining it.
In that sense, OK.
You take my sentence above too much literally. Sorry, my fault. I
wanted to be short. I meant "simulate the context making the
experience of the person, "really living in Platonia" possible to
manifest itself locally.
Oh, ok.
but there is no ontological basis for the assumption that
experience itself - *all experience* can be somehow not really
happening but instead be a non-happening that defines itself *as
if* it is happening. Somewhere, on some level of description,
something has to actually be happening. If the brain simulates
experience, what is it doing with all of those neurotransmitters
and cells?
It computes, so that the person can manifest itself relatively to
its most probable computation.
Why would that result in an experience?
Nobody knows, really. We expect it as we (me and the computationalist)
*bet* on comp, from the study of brain and computers, arithmetic, etc.
Why bother with a simulation or experience at all? Comp has no
business producing such things at all. If the world is computation,
why pretend it isn't - and how exactly is such a pretending possible.
The world and reality is not computation. On the contrary it is
almost the complementary of computations. That is why we can test
comp by doing the math of that "anti-computation" and compare to
physics.
If they are not computation then how can computation refer to them?
?
My computer refers often to Craig, yet is not Craig. Entities can
refer to things which are not themselves.
Bruno
Craig
Bruno
It's a fun theory, but it's really not a viable explanation for the
universe where we actually live.
Craig
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