On 28 Oct 2012, at 20:41, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/28/2012 8:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 27 Oct 2012, at 21:35, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/27/2012 7:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 26 Oct 2012, at 21:30, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/26/2012 6:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Oh yes, I remember that you did agree once with the 323
principle, but I forget what is your problem with the movie-
graph/step-8, then. If you find the time, I am please if you
can elaborate. I think Russell too is not yet entirely
convinced.
What bothers me about it is that counterfactuals are virtually
infinite. So to make the argument go through I think it
implicitly requires a whole 'world';
Not really, as here, you can use Maudlin who showed that the
conuterfactuals does not require physical activity. In MGA, if
you give a role to the conuterfactual, you violate the 323
principle, so that you attribute a functional role in a
particular computation to object having no physical activity
for the actual computation.
But I'm not sure about the 323 principle in a QM world.
Even QM worlds, with QM observers, even having Q brains, are
emulated in the UD, or in arithmetic. If the 323 principles does
not hold for them, it might mean that QM is the winning
computation, but then you have to explain this from arithmetic.
Or you are meaning that you need a *primary* QM world and brain?
In that case, my consciousness would not be invariant when the Q
brain is entirely simulated by a classical machine, and comp is
made false.
The latter. But why the restriction to "my consciousness"? Only
a small fraction of thought is conscious.
Consciousness is what will select the arithmetical or computer-
science-theoretical branches in the arithmetical reality. It is not
a fraction of thought which is conscious, it is a person, supported
by infinities of "unconscious" computations.
If you opt for the latter, you can't accept a digital brain, not
even a quantum one, per computatio.
That doesn't follow. My new digital brain will be entangled with
this QM world, just as my biological one was. It may not be exactly
the same consciousness but I think it will be similar; just as I
think general intelligence will always be accompanied by some kind
of consciousness. Supposing this entanglement is necessary is why I
think a simulation must simulate a whole world in order to
instantiate human like consciousness.
But this does not change the UDA. That simulation is still classicaly
emulable, and emulated in arithmetic, or by a concrete UD. The 323
principle is correct at that level. It is just a case of very low
substitution level.
You negate comp, by putting something magical, needed for your
consciousness, in the quantum material reality.
Not magical. As you often point out, QM is computable. You are
making an assumption that the substitution can be done at the
classical level where 'classical' is taken not as an approximation
but to be fundamental.
But it can, as QM is computable, and classically emulable. So I don't
see the objection here.
If you assume you need the QM at the basic ontological level, then
comp is false, as comp, by definition assume that any universal system
can do the work, if it simulates the right level.
In that non comp reality you are back with all questions unsolved:
where does that QM reality comes from, how do you singularize
actual conscious experiences in it, etc.
Good questions, but just because I don't know the answers it doesn't
follow that I should accept your answer. Your theory also has
unanswered questions.
Only math problems, besides what is explained to be absolutely non
explainable with comp (the 1% of consciousness, as I refer often too).
That was the goal, transforming the mind-body problem into a math
problem.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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