On 10/28/2012 10:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 28 Oct 2012, at 00:19, Russell Standish wrote:

On Thu, Oct 25, 2012 at 05:13:50PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Oh yes, I remember that you did agree once with the 323 principle,
but I forget what is your problem with the movie-graph/step-8, then.
If you find the time, I am please if you can elaborate. I think
Russell too is not yet entirely convinced.


Indeed I still have problems with step 8, and want to get back to
that. But I want to do it when it when you're not exhausted arguming
other points...

Ah well, that's nice.

Part of the problem, is that I already agree with the
reversal at step 7, so in some sense step 8 is redundant for me.

That is interesting. You are not alone. I have made attempt to make that precise, and it leads to some use of stronger form of Occam razor.

How do you answer the person who get the 1-7 points, and concludes (as he *believes* in a primary material world, and in comp) that this proves that a physical universe, to procede consciousness, has to be "little" (never run a big portion of the UD, so that it maintain the brain-consciousness identity thesis).

I understand that a familiarity with digital machines and computer science can make us feeling that this is really an had move, almost inventing the physical universe, to prevent its possible explanation and origin in dreams interferences.

But, still, logically, he is still consistent. he can say yes to the doctor, and believes he is a "unique" owner of, perhaps in the quantum weaker sense, primitively material machine/body.

The Movie-Graph is just a way to show more precisely that such a move is *very* ad hoc, and will ask for non Turing emulable, nor 1-person comp-indeterminacy recoverable elements in the computation. They can only been missed by the digitalist doctor, and so it would contradict the "yes doctor" assumption.

There may be an issue with the interpretation of the 323 principle. I
have no problems with the removal of a register that is never
physically used in the calculation of a consious computation.


nuances arise when we consider Everett's many-minds picture.

Do you mean the Albert-Loewer many-mind theory? I guess you mean it in a more general sense.

counterfactually used register will still be used by one of my
differentiated copies, and ISTM that these alternate differentiated
minds are essential to my consciousness,

What trans-world, or trans-terms of a superposition, interaction would made 
this senseful?
I mean, is the consciousness of the one in Washington dependent of the consciousness of the one in Moscow?

It *might* be the case, if the brain was a quantum computer. In that case we could put ourselves in the W+M superposition state, do some different task, get some result, and then operate a Fourier rotation on our resulting W'+M' state and extract some consciousness relevant information.

The brain is a quantum object. It doesn't do quantum computations in the sense of existing in superpositions of what we regard as different conscious classical propositions. But it does quantum computations at the microscopic level that maintain it's identity as an (approximately) classical object, i.e. it must be entangled with the environment to maintain classicality. So the experience of being in Washington may, because of the way the transporter is constructed to send to both places, depend on the *possibility* of an experience of being in Moscow.

But if this is what you mean, it would just mean that we need to emulate the brain at a lower level. A simulation of that quantum brain can be done classically, and we can reiterate the 323 question at that level.

But then I think your simulation needs to include the environment with which the brain interacts to produce its quasi-classical character.


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