On Thu, Oct 25, 2012 at 05:13:50PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> Oh yes, I remember that you did agree once with the 323 principle,
> but I forget what is your problem with the movie-graph/step-8, then.
> If you find the time, I am please if you can elaborate. I think
> Russell too is not yet entirely convinced.
> 
> Bruno
> 

Indeed I still have problems with step 8, and want to get back to
that. But I want to do it when it when you're not exhausted arguming
other points... Part of the problem, is that I already agree with the
reversal at step 7, so in some sense step 8 is redundant for me.

There may be an issue with the interpretation of the 323 principle. I
have no problems with the removal of a register that is never
physically used in the calculation of a consious computation. The
nuances arise when we consider Everett's many-minds picture. A
counterfactually used register will still be used by one of my
differentiated copies, and ISTM that these alternate differentiated
minds are essential to my consciousness, and that removing the
counterfactually-used register in this case may well prevent my
consciousness.

To sum up, a counterfactually-used register is being physically used
if many-worlds is accepted, so therefore the 323 principle isn't
applicable.

Cheers

-- 

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Prof Russell Standish                  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics      hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales          http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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