On 01 Nov 2012, at 21:25, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Oct 31, 2012 at 2:21 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

>> the you before the duplication or the you after the duplication?

> All the you after, are the you before, by definition of comp.

OK, but the you before is not the you after. The Helsinki man knows nothing about Moscow or Washington, not even if he still exists after the duplication,

He believes he still exist, because he believes, or assumed, comp.

but both the Moscow man and the Washington man know all about Helsinki even if they don't know about each other.

> what you will live, as a first person.

If your mind works deterministically then what you will live to think you see will depend on the external environment.


If your mind does NOT work deterministically then what you will live to think you see will depend on absolutely nothing, in other words it is random. There is no new sort of indeterminacy involved just the boring old sort, and how you expect to draw profound philosophical conclusions from such a flimsy foundation is a mystery.

Here 3-determinacy entails, by simple logic. You are the only one in the list (and out of the list) who have a problem (but which one?) with this. I do not draw any philosophical conclusion: but a theorem. The theorem is that the physical laws emerges, in a precise and testable way, from arithmetic/computer science. test have already been performed, and you can read the math part which explains all this.

> You know by comp that [...]

I don't know anything by "comp".

Comp is that we can survive with a digital machine replacing the brain.

At one time I thought I knew what you meant by the term,

I thought so.

but then you say consciousness was there before Evolution produced brains and that "the owner [of a brain] itself must attach his consciousness to all states existing in arithmetic". So I was wrong, I don't know what "comp" means.

You were just not aware of the logical consequences, and as long as you are stuck in step 3, it is normal you can't get the consequences of comp.

>> Before the duplication the you is the Helsinki man, after the duplication the you is the Helsinki man and the Washington man and the Moscow man. What is the probability the Helsinki man will write in his diary that he sees Washington? 0%.

> The guy reconstituted in Washington will say: "Gosh I was wrong".

That's the problem, you're not clear who "I" is.

This is not relevant. the guy in W and the guy in M are both the guy in H, by definition of comp. This is enough to get the 1_indeterminacy.

The Washington man made no error because he made no predictions of any sort, only the Helsinki man did that. The Washington man and Helsinki man have identical memories up to the point of duplication but after that they diverge.

That is known by the guy in Helsinki. That is why he can make a bet, on what he can possibly live, given that he knows he will remain alive (betting on comp and the default hypothesis, with the given protocol).

>> What is the probability the Helsinki man will write in his diary he sees Helsinki? 100%.

> No. In the protocol that I have described to you many times, the probability here is 0%, as he is cut and pasted. Not copy and pasted.

If the Helsinki man had never seen Helsinki then he's not the Helsinki man, if he has seen that city then he wrote so in his diary.


> And it is not "he sees" but what will he see. And the protocol assures that he will only see washington, or Moscow.

Who is "he"?

The guy in Helsinki, which will be in both M and W, but which will feel being in only once city, as both the W and M guy will concede. And the guy in Helsinki, if he can reason like any Löbian machine, can know that in advance, and that is why he can be aware that he does not know in advance where he will feel. It is simple math.

>> What is the probability the Washington man will write in his diary he sees Washington? 100%.

> The question was asked to the Helsinki man.

But you said the Helsinki man was destroyed, if so then he's got a rather severe case of writers block and is writing very little in his diary.

The body of the guy in Helsinki is destroyed, but by comp, we have already accept that the guy itself survives. With comp we already know that we can survive an annihilation of the body.

>> And if the duplicating process destroys the Helsinki man then the probability the Helsinki man will write anything at all in his diary is 0%.

> Then comp is false.

OK if you say so, its your invention so whatever "comp" means its false; although I am a little surprised that you expect a man who no longer exists to write stuff in his diary.

The simple teleprtation kills us, and then a brain substitution kills us too, and this is what I mean by comp is false.

> The question is about your first person experience. [...]The question is not about you, but about the most probable result of an experiment that you can do. You push on a button, and you localize your directly accessible body.

Your? You? John Clark believes that when considering matters of identity if Bruno Marchal stopped using so many pronouns without considering what they refer to then Bruno Marchal's thinking would be less muddled.

"you" here refer to the guy in helsinki. After the duplication things get clear when you distiunguish the 1p and the 3p. No difficulty, just an 1p indeterminacy.

>As Quentin said, it is implicit in the Everett understanding of QM.

In Everett a world does not split until there is a difference between them and neither does consciousness. And the same is true in the thought experiment,


If Bruno Marchal's body is duplicated and sent to Washington and Moscow but inside identical boxes then Bruno Marchal's consciousness has not been duplicated and will not be until the boxes are opened and different things are observed by the Brunos, at that point they will no longer be each other but both will still be Bruno Marchal

Exactly. This contradict what you say above though. And this entails the 1p indeterminacy.

>> In most physics experiments, even very advanced ones at CERN, the experimenter himself is not duplicated so in the question "What particle do you expect to see?" it's clear who "you" is;

> Only if you assume that the universe does not contain Boltzman brains, or a universal dovetailer,

It doesn't matter if Boltzman brains exist or not.

Of course it does matter. That the point of step 4, 5, 6, 7. But you have to grasp step 3 before. You pretend to have found a blunder, but we keep explaining to you that you are the one conflating the different person points of view.

In physics experiments not involving self duplications which "you" is involved is obvious,

Yes, but only if there is no universal dovetailer, or if comp is false, so that you can use the physical supervenience thesis.

and it can be proven to be correct by observing that when "you" predicts what "you" will see using physical laws the prediction usually proves to be true, so all the yous must have been assigned correctly.

But that is what we cannot do if there is a UD, or if the universe is very big, or, after step 8, just if comp is true.



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