On Nov 2, 2012, at 4:02 PM, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Fri, Nov 2, 2012  Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> He believes he still exist, because he believes, or assumed, comp.

People believe they exist and in real life they don't have or need a reason for doing so. And I no longer know what "comp" means.


It is just short for computationalism, the computational theory of mind. The idea that your consciousness is the result of a computation.

> Comp is that we can survive with a digital machine replacing the brain.

I have no difficulty with that, but now you tell me that it means a great many other things too, things that are clearly untrue; like consciousness was there before Evolution produced brains or "the owner [of a brain] itself must attach his consciousness to all states existing in arithmetic".

As Bruno explained these are the implications of computationalism, not in the definition and not usually realized by most of those who ascribe to computationalism.



> you are stuck in step 3

And I will remain stuck there until you fix the blunders you made in step 3; after that perhaps the additional steps that were built on that fatally flawed foundation would be worth reading.

 > the guy in W and the guy in M are both the guy in H

Yes.

> by definition of comp.

I don't know what that is.

> This is enough to get the 1_indeterminacy.

You don't know what your environment will be, what's new and mysterious about that?

As Bruno told you, but you erased from your reply, there is no mystery, no paradox. The only point of that step is to show interdeterminacy exists from a first person view. You seemed to have agreed with this in previous posts.

I have no duplicating machine but I still don't know if my environment will include rain tomorrow, but I can't find anything of philosophical interest in that fact .

> And the guy in Helsinki, if he can reason like any Löbian machine,

Like your other invention "comp" I don't know what a "Löbian machin e" is.

>>>> What is the probability the Washington man will write in his diary he sees Washington? 100%.

>>> The question was asked to the Helsinki man.

>> But you said the Helsinki man was destroyed, if so then he's got a rather severe case of writers block and is writing very little in his diary.

> The body of the guy in Helsinki is destroyed, but by comp, we have already accept that the guy itself survives.


So when you say "The question was asked to the Helsinki man" you are asking a question to a man who's body has been destroyed. Yes the Helsinki man is also the Washington man so you could say there is a 100% chance the Helsinki man will write in his diary "I see Washington". Of course the Helsinki man is also the Moscow man so there is a 100% chance the Helsinki man will write in his diary "I DO NOT see Washington". There is no contradiction because you have been duplicated.
>> If Bruno Marchal's body is duplicated and sent to Washington and Moscow but inside identical boxes then Bruno Marchal's consciousness has not been duplicated and will not be until the boxes are opened and different things are observed by the Brunos, at that point they will no longer be each other but both will still be Bruno Marchal

> Exactly. This contradict what you say above though.

I said a great deal above but I'll be damned if I see any contradiction .

Your contradiction is that at some times you accept survival and other times you deny there is survival.



> It doesn't matter if Boltzman brains exist or not.

> Of course it does matter. That the point of step 4, 5, 6, 7.

Which are useless because they were built on top of a step that does not work.


Sometimes I wonder if you are just playing a game with all of us.

Jason

  John K Clark

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