On 06 Nov 2012, at 19:45, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Nov 6, 2012  Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> Define "John Clark".

Define "define".

See below.

> the semantic of proper name is the most difficult unsolved problem in philosophy.

No it is not, the meaning of pronouns like "I" and "He" and "you" where it is not even known what proper name they refer to because of the existence of duplicating chambers is the most difficult unsolved problem in philosophy.

> Comp gives hints,

Hints that do me no good because I no longer know what "comp" means, and I strongly suspect you don't either.

>> And after its all over and the dust has settled John Clark can see that John Clark's Helsinki prediction, that was made before all this started, was completely accurate.

> I don't see this at all. After the duplication all the John Clark realise that they are in only one city,

And that is exactly what John Clark predicted would happen.

And John Clark is correct on this. But that was not yet the question asked, which concerns the experience that you (in Helsinki) will lived in the future. From your correct prediction above, you can already predict that whoever you will happen to feel to be, as human single individual, you will see only one city.

> and that they were unable to predict which one.

Wrong! John Clark correctly predicted that the Moscow man would see Moscow and the Washington man would see Moscow.

But John Clark in helsinki is not asked what will see both men, but which men he will feel to be. He already know that he will feel to be only one among the M and W men.

John Clark doesn't understand what more should be expected of a prediction;

The result of the experience "who am I ", done after pushing the button.

and before either saw either city John Clark does not even understand what is meant by "which one".

This means that he lacks the cognitive ability to imagine what both the M-man and the W-man will feel.

The words "which city" has meaning but the words "which John Clark" does not as long as neither has seen a city and both are still identical.

"Which city" is asked to the Helsinki man, which has already understand that after pushing the button and localize himself he will see only one city, as he illustrated himself above.

> You the 3p view on the 1p views, which makes indeed sense, as it is the 3p view on the 1p views that we can attribute to another,

John Clark is getting tired of all this peeing and still doesn't know what the 3p view on the 1p views by two 1p as seen from the 3p view is supposed to mean. John Clark can only view John Clark's view, the first person view.

> You said that after the duplication the 1-views of the John Clark have been duplicated, and this contradict what you say now.

John Clark said that after John Clark's body and brain has been duplicated John Clark's consciousness has NOT been duplicated because it is not a noun, it's what a noun does. There will be only one mind until the environment causes a change in one brain that is not made in the other, and after that the 2 brains operate differently and thus what they do, mind, is different and they become different people;

Yes. And the question is about which one, which makes sense as you admit that there is only one 1p, from the 1p view after the experience. The prediction is on the experience itself, so a list of experience (which is never experienced by any 1p, as you say yourself) does not make sense.

although they are both John Clark because John Clark has been duplicated. And there is nothing contradictory in any of that, it's just odd.

Nobody has pretend that comp is contradictory. Just that you cannot predict which among W and M you will experience in the future of the Helsinki experiment. It is not even odd, as it gives a simple explanation of why determinism can lead to indeterminacy of experience.

> Only one question is asked, to only one guy: "Where will you feel to be after the duplication?"

And the answer is Washington and Moscow.

That the 3-view on the 1-views. But the question is about your future 1-views on the 1-view. None of the copy will live "washington and Moscow". Boththe copy will live "I am in one city". And both will grasp that they could not have been able to predict, in Helsinki, which one thay are living now, after the duplication + self-localization.

If you then asked "me" if "I" would feel like "I" was in one city or two "I" would answer just one without hesitation. And this is strange but not contradictory because "I" HAS BEEN DUPLICATED.

You keep talking like if someone saw a contradiction. Why would I study comp if comp was leading to a contradiction. There is no contradiction here, only indeterminacy, which is the point.

> If you reason like that in quantum QM without collapse, and if you look at the position of an electron in hydrogen atom, you have to answer "I will find the electron is everywhere".

Yes the electron is everywhere but If Many Worlds is correct then John Clark is everywhere too and has as many states to be in as the electron has places to go.

But you will still use the quantum rule for predicting where the electron can be find in the majority of those worlds.

So no matter where the electron is after a experiment there will always be a John Clark who observes the electron hitting that and only that point on the photographic plate. No matter where a electron is there will always be a John Clark observing it there after a experiment.

That's the correct explanation of the origin of the quantum indeterminacy from the comp indeterminacy.

 > pronouns have a far simpler semantic than proper name.

That can't be, all pronouns are supposed to refer to a noun so can't be simpler than the noun.

That is false. You can define anonymous self-referential expression. And there is a technic for doing that. But for the proper name we can't use such technic, and non are eminently ambiguous.

Bruno Marchal keeps shoving John Clark into duplicating chambers and then sends John Clark on various exciting but very different adventures and then asks what "you" will see; but there can be no answer because it is a incomplete question. It's like asking how much is 2 +....?

No, it like asking John Clark to predict which hole a quantum particle will go through, assuming he will measure exactly that. IF John Clark remembers QM he will say (1/sqrt(2))^2 = 1/2, despite the situation is deterministic in the 3p view. It is the same, but simpler as it does not assume QM, in the WM-duplication.

> You opush on a button, and you look around. What will you see.

What will who see?

Oh, you can ask the question to all the copies. Both will answer something like W and not M, or M and not W. And both will say "I was not able to predict in advance which among {W and not M, M and not W} I could see".

A correct prediction would have been W or M. In that case both copies will still agree on the prediction. With W & M, both are false, as W and M represents here personal location feeling, and not the location of the bodies.

> a first person indeterminacy in Helsinki, about which city you will see.

Which city will who see?

John Clark. Well defined in Helsinki, and even after.

> Define "John Clark".

Why? Examples are vastly more important than definitions.

Sure. I have no problem with that. And this answer your question above.

I have no clue what you miss. You don't succeed at all to make a point. What you call "odd" is the first person person indeterminacy, by definition. And you clearly grasp enough of it to pursue the reasoning. You even seem to see now the relationship between the comp indeterminacy and the quantum-without-collapse indeterminacy.

Please read step 4, in sane2004, and let us proceed.



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