On Thu, Nov 8, 2012 at 12:30 PM, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net> wrote: > On 11/8/2012 10:04 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote: >> >> The compact manifolds, what I call string theory monads, are more >> fundamental than strings. Strings with spin, charge and mass, as well >> as spacetime, emerge from the compact manifolds, perhaps in the manner >> that you indicate below. > > > Hi Richard, > > OK, but then you are thinking in terms that are different from the > formal models that are in the literature. You will have to define all of the > terms, if they are different. For example. How is the property of > compactness defined in your idea? Why are the Calabi-Yau manifolds are > topological objects that are part of a wide class of "minimal surfaces". > There is a huge zoo of these in topology. See > http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Calabi-Yau_manifold >
According to Cumrun Vafa spacetime emerges from the compactification process. However after a few hours attempting to find any theory of the compactification process, not even where Vafa says that two dimensions must compactify for one to inflate, which is kind of a oxymoron, I have to give up. >> The one difference from what you are >> considering and the compact manifolds (CMs) that I can see is that the >> CMs are fixed in the emergent space and not free floating- which in >> itself implies a spacetime manifold. > > > If you have a proposal that explains how space-time emerges from the > CMs, cool, but you have to explain it to us and answer our question. One > question that I have is: What fundamental process within the compact > manifolds enables them to generate the appearance of space-time. I think > that you are assuming a substantiabalist hypothesis; that substance is > ontologically primitive. There is a long history of this idea, which is by > the way, the idea that Bruno and others -including me- are arguing against. > This article covers the debate well: > http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/substance/ I agree that the compact manifolds are substantive. You and Bruno IMO are arguing that something can come from nothing. I contend that the arithmetic must come from something substantive. > >> Perhaps another is that from your discussion, it appears that all your >> monads can be identical, whereas the CMs are required to be different >> and distinct in order for consciousness to emerge from an arithmetic >> of real numbers. > > > Why? What is acting to distinguish the CMs externally? You seem to > assume an external observer or consciousness or some other means to overcome > to problem of the identity of indiscernibles. My argument is based on empirical observation that the fine structure varies monotonically from north to south in an earth perspective across the universe. That could only be true if the monads were variable since the constants and laws of physics are properties of the compact manifolds/monads. > http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-indiscernible/ I think that your > idea is not that much different from that of Roger and mine. I just would > like to better understand some of your assumptions. You seem to have some > unstated assumptions, we all do. Having these discussions is a good way of > teasing them out, but we have to be willing to consider our own ideas > critically and not be too emotionally wed to them. > >> However since from wiki "Each Boolean algebra B has >> an associated topological space, denoted here S(B), called its Stone >> space" and "For any Boolean algebra B, S(B) is a compact totally >> disconnected Hausdorff space" and "Almost all spaces encountered in >> analysis are Hausdorff; most importantly, the real numbers", > > > No, actually. Real numbers are not Stone spaces. P-adic numbers, OTOH, > are. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Totally_disconnected_space#Examples If so, you should rewrite those wikis. > > >> I contend >> that your monads as well as mine must be enumerable-that is all >> different and distinct. > > > Yes, they would be, but the idea that they are distinct cannot just be > assumed to exist without some means for the information of that partitioning > of the aggregate comes to be knowable. Covered in a previous comment above. >One thing that consciousness does is > that it distinguishes things from each other. Maybe we are putting in the > activity of consciousness into our explanations at the start! Maybe the property of distinguishability of consciousness stems from distinguishable monads > >> >> I apologize for using wiki. But I confess that what it says is the >> limit of my understanding. > > > I love Wiki, but I prefer other references if they can be found. It > helps people to get a better idea of what is being discussed if they wish to > drill down into the complicated ideas that we discuss here in the Everything > List. > >> Any way what I propose is that all of what you say below may more or >> less be appropriate for the compact manifolds of string theory if we >> replace the dust with an array. > > > A dust is more simple - has less structure to be explained than an > array. We can add structure to a dust to get an array, but we can get lots > of other things as well. We need to be able to get smooth fields in some > limit. Can an array do this? > >> Richard > > > > -- > Onward! > > Stephen > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.