I stopped a long time ago to read the 'transported' versions for one
if it is REALLY (only) a transport, it does not make a difference whether
"you" will CONTINUE in Moscow or in Helsinki, it is 'your' undisrupted self.
However, if it goes into a multiple existence then - my problem is - what
happens to the 'experience' of self1 while you consider yourself at self2
location? the self-s inadvertently diverge so you cannot be both (or more).
In such case the 'pronoun' sindrom is valid. "YOU" are the "ONE" passing
several locations - accumulating continual experience upon yourself (the 1)
and if you happen to return to a former one, it will not be "YOU".

You can dismiss my problem by "you did not follow the suvject".
John M

On Fri, Dec 14, 2012 at 4:50 PM, meekerdb <> wrote:

>  On 12/14/2012 12:54 PM, John Clark wrote:
> On Fri, Dec 14, 2012 at 5:45 AM, Bruno Marchal <> wrote:
>  > In the 3p-view. But with the Computationalist Theory of Mind (CTM,
>> alias comp), there are two first person points of view
> Yes, Bruno Marchal has said that many times and it's true that after the
> duplication there will be 2 first person Bruno Marchal points of view, but
> the problem is that before the duplication there is only one first person
> point of view at it is here the question is asked about the future state of
> "you" and demands are made for one and only one answer.
> John Clark has been complaining about the unfettered use of personal
> pronouns in a world with duplicating chambers for a long time now, and yet
> those who disagree with John Clark continue to use those pronouns as
> frequently as ever, it seems that those people just cannot help themselves.
> The very fact that opponents are simply unable to express ideas without
> using those cancerous pronouns should give those people some insight into
> the nature of those aforesaid ideas.
>   > you just limit yourself to the 3p view, and never put you feet in the
>> shoes of the reconstituted person,
> And Bruno Marchal never explains which of those two first person points of
> view "you" should put feet into and which first person viewpoint "you"
> should not. Bruno Marchal simply cannot converse on this subject unless 5
> to 10% of the words are personal pronouns, in spite of the fact that if it
> was always clear what those pronouns referred to this entire debate would
> be unnecessary.
> Brent Meeker appreciates John Clark's concern with pronouns.  I think it
> needs to put in the context of QM, which is what Bruno is proposing to
> explain.  Suppose Bruno is Helsinki and he steps in a transporter and it
> sends him to Washington. That Bruno, Bruno_w goes back to Helsinki, gets in
> the transporter again and it sends him to Moscow. That Bruno_wm goes back
> to Helsinki and repeats this process many times.  Eventually
> Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm concludes that the transporter seems to be random
> and just sends him to Washington or Moscow at random with probability 1/2.
> This is hailed as a great Copenhagen.  But in Washington
> (state) near the upper reached of Puget Sound there is a dislike of random
> things and a general feeling that randomness can never be a property of the
> world, but only a quantification of ignorance.  So there a different view
> of Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm's experiment is that every time he pushed the
> button two whole universes were created, separated by more than the Hubble
> radius, and in one Bruno went to Bruno_w and in the other he went to
> Bruno_m.  And so there was no probability involved, exactly the same thing
> happened every time.  It only seemed like probability and randomness.  Some
> people thought this was a little extravagant and asked how was energy
> conserved and how could this theory be tested.  But they were silenced by
> being told the theory predicted exactly the same things as the probability
> theory without probabilities, so it must be right.
> Brent
> Not only does God play dice, but... he sometimes throws them
> where they cannot be seen.
>     --- Stephen W. Hawking
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