Brent, I stopped a long time ago to read the 'transported' versions for one reason: if it is REALLY (only) a transport, it does not make a difference whether "you" will CONTINUE in Moscow or in Helsinki, it is 'your' undisrupted self. However, if it goes into a multiple existence then - my problem is - what happens to the 'experience' of self1 while you consider yourself at self2 location? the self-s inadvertently diverge so you cannot be both (or more). In such case the 'pronoun' sindrom is valid. "YOU" are the "ONE" passing several locations - accumulating continual experience upon yourself (the 1) and if you happen to return to a former one, it will not be "YOU".
You can dismiss my problem by "you did not follow the suvject". John M On Fri, Dec 14, 2012 at 4:50 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > On 12/14/2012 12:54 PM, John Clark wrote: > > > > On Fri, Dec 14, 2012 at 5:45 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > > > In the 3p-view. But with the Computationalist Theory of Mind (CTM, >> alias comp), there are two first person points of view >> > > Yes, Bruno Marchal has said that many times and it's true that after the > duplication there will be 2 first person Bruno Marchal points of view, but > the problem is that before the duplication there is only one first person > point of view at it is here the question is asked about the future state of > "you" and demands are made for one and only one answer. > > John Clark has been complaining about the unfettered use of personal > pronouns in a world with duplicating chambers for a long time now, and yet > those who disagree with John Clark continue to use those pronouns as > frequently as ever, it seems that those people just cannot help themselves. > The very fact that opponents are simply unable to express ideas without > using those cancerous pronouns should give those people some insight into > the nature of those aforesaid ideas. > > > you just limit yourself to the 3p view, and never put you feet in the >> shoes of the reconstituted person, >> > > And Bruno Marchal never explains which of those two first person points of > view "you" should put feet into and which first person viewpoint "you" > should not. Bruno Marchal simply cannot converse on this subject unless 5 > to 10% of the words are personal pronouns, in spite of the fact that if it > was always clear what those pronouns referred to this entire debate would > be unnecessary. > > > Brent Meeker appreciates John Clark's concern with pronouns. I think it > needs to put in the context of QM, which is what Bruno is proposing to > explain. Suppose Bruno is Helsinki and he steps in a transporter and it > sends him to Washington. That Bruno, Bruno_w goes back to Helsinki, gets in > the transporter again and it sends him to Moscow. That Bruno_wm goes back > to Helsinki and repeats this process many times. Eventually > Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm concludes that the transporter seems to be random > and just sends him to Washington or Moscow at random with probability 1/2. > This is hailed as a great discovery...in Copenhagen. But in Washington > (state) near the upper reached of Puget Sound there is a dislike of random > things and a general feeling that randomness can never be a property of the > world, but only a quantification of ignorance. So there a different view > of Bruno_wmwwmwmmmww...mwm's experiment is that every time he pushed the > button two whole universes were created, separated by more than the Hubble > radius, and in one Bruno went to Bruno_w and in the other he went to > Bruno_m. And so there was no probability involved, exactly the same thing > happened every time. It only seemed like probability and randomness. Some > people thought this was a little extravagant and asked how was energy > conserved and how could this theory be tested. But they were silenced by > being told the theory predicted exactly the same things as the probability > theory without probabilities, so it must be right. > > Brent > Not only does God play dice, but... he sometimes throws them > where they cannot be seen. > --- Stephen W. Hawking > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.