On 14 Jan 2013, at 20:42, Richard Ruquist wrote:

On Mon, Jan 14, 2013 at 1:30 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 13 Jan 2013, at 12:53, Richard Ruquist wrote:

On Sun, Jan 13, 2013 at 3:44 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

We have the logical entaiment:

Arithmetic -> computations -> consciousness -> sharable dreams ->
physical
reality/matter -> human biology -> human consciousness.

It is a generalization of "natural selection" operating from arithmetical
truth, and in which the physical reality is itself the result of a
self-selection events (the global first person indeterminacy).

This generalizes both Darwin and Everett, somehow.

Bruno


Where dies the substitution level lie in this entainment?



Do you agree with the first seven step of UDA?

If you get them, you can understand that for each computations going through your state, there is an infinity of "finer grained" (notably) computations going through you state below your substitution level. That is why if you
look below, you get indirect information on the "comp parallel
computations", which all exists in arithmetic. We might call them the
3-dreams. You next events are given by a probability bearing on that
continuum.

So the substitution level lies in the "computation-> consciousness", and in
"sharable dreams -> physical reality/matter".

OK?

Two substitution levels??? Are different things being substitutes at each level?

It is the same. But in computation->consciousness we just bet on its existence, and in "dreams-matter" we look below the subst level. The "- >" are not "physical causation", but are more like logical entailment. The same subst. level can play different roles.

Bruno




Bruno

PS I will have to go soon ... Sorry for the comments delays.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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