On 1/15/2013 8:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Jan 2013, at 20:14, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 1/13/2013 2:02 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 1/13/2013 12:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
OK. My point is that if we assume computationalism it is
necessarily so, and constructively so, so making that hypothesis
testable.
We have the logical entaiment:
Arithmetic -> computations -> consciousness -> sharable dreams ->
physical reality/matter -> human biology -> human consciousness.
It is a generalization of "natural selection" operating from
arithmetical truth, and in which the physical reality is itself the
result of a self-selection events (the global first person
indeterminacy).
This generalizes both Darwin and Everett, somehow.
But you stop one step too soon.
Arithmetic -> computations -> consciousness -> sharable dreams ->
physical reality/matter -> human biology -> human consciousness ->
arithmetic.
That there is something fundamental is unscientific dogma.
Brent
Hi,
I agree with Brent but would refine the point to say that 'that
there is something fundamental that has particular properties is
unscientific dogma'.
A dogma is only something that you cannot doubt or question.
Now something fundamental without properties is just meaningless. In
my opinion. How could anything emerge from something without any
properties?
Dear Bruno,
I am amazed at your inability to understand this very simple idea.
It is just the generalization of what we see in the additive identity in
arithmetic, X - X = 0. Have you not understood the idea that Russell
Standish discusses in his book? The Nothing, that is the main idea in
his book is a great example of the concept that I am using. When one
imagines a substance that has *all possible properties*, there would
always be properties within such that are equal and opposite to others
such that they cancel each other out resulting in a neutral condition.
This idea also occurs in numbers, where we to consider all of the
positive numbers cancelling with the negative numbers to zero.
I use the process philosophy view of ontology and epistemology, but
the same cancellation effects holds there as well; all processes have
anti-processes that would cancel them.
You have not been able to explain this, up to now.
I will keep trying, but you need to consider that you have some
kind of mental block such that the idea is invisible to you, or
something. It is so utterly simple: Objects or processes cannot be
considered to have specific and definite properties if there does not
exist a means to distinguish those properties. Thus to be coherent in
out ontological theories, we cannot assume that our primitives have
specific properties innately. All properties are the result of the act
of distinguishing, so this action is necessarily the most primitive.
This is consciousness at its most primitive, the action of
distinguishing. I think that subconsciously you assume that the result
of consciousness is prior to the existence of consciousness and thus
imagine that numbers have specific properties innately. One might try to
justify this reasoning by appeals to the idea of well foundedness and
regularity, but as Zuckerman, Kaufmann and others have pointed out,
consciousness requires non-well foundedness - self-reference - and so
the appeal to well foundedness is maybe an intentional blindness.
--
Onward!
Stephen
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