On 13 Jan 2013, at 20:14, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 1/13/2013 2:02 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 1/13/2013 12:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
OK. My point is that if we assume computationalism it is necessarily so, and constructively so, so making that hypothesis testable.

We have the logical entaiment:

Arithmetic -> computations -> consciousness -> sharable dreams -> physical reality/matter -> human biology -> human consciousness.

It is a generalization of "natural selection" operating from arithmetical truth, and in which the physical reality is itself the result of a self-selection events (the global first person indeterminacy).

This generalizes both Darwin and Everett, somehow.

But you stop one step too soon.

Arithmetic -> computations -> consciousness -> sharable dreams -> physical reality/matter -> human biology -> human consciousness -> arithmetic.

That there is something fundamental is unscientific dogma.

Brent

Hi,

I agree with Brent but would refine the point to say that 'that there is something fundamental that has particular properties is unscientific dogma'.

A dogma is only something that you cannot doubt or question.

Now something fundamental without properties is just meaningless. In my opinion. How could anything emerge from something without any properties?

You have not been able to explain this, up to now.

Bruno




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Onward!

Stephen


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