# Re: Lee Smolin and Darwin's Uncommon Success

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On 06 Feb 2013, at 20:36, Alberto G. Corona wrote:```
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2013/2/6 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>

On 06 Feb 2013, at 10:22, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

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2013/2/6 Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net>
On 2/5/2013 3:27 PM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
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2013/2/5 Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net>
Hi,

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ISTM that purpose is a 1p, so to ask the question in a 3p sense is to make it meaningless.
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That´s it.

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But to insist into make the question in 3p may force the introduction of an implicit 1p that contemplate the 3p, that is, a metamind , with a metatime etc. (To avoid pavlovian responses, i don´t mention the G. world). That is the meaning of my previous response.
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Hi Alberto,

But the meta versions would be 1p's in their own right, no?

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Absolutely. Not only when talking about purpose. Most of the concepts we use are 1p, so it is supposed that they are meaningless when used in the description of a multiverse . Precisely because the multiverse is a design with the explicit goal of eliminate purpose as an axiom.
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But at the end, as I mentioned, this goal is not possible, because we can not avoid the infinite regression in the search for causes, and causality is 1p indeed.
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I agree that causality is 1p, but that makes causality emergent, and secondary, not fundamental. We can stop the regression at the place we postulate the theory. I have explained why arithmetic is a good starting places. It explains the physical and non physical 1p and 3p, and it explains why we cannot take less than arithmetic (or Turing equivalent).
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Se inadvertently, when we talk about what exist and what do not exist in a multiverse, we turn into looking at an implicit 1p designer of the multiverse
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Arithmetic is enough. It is 3p.

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At the end we can not think outside 1p. Scientific inquiry is comunicable 1p.
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If it is communicable, it can be 1p, but it is genuinely 3p too. The 1p part is not relevant, I think. Unless you assume that the whole arithmetic truth is conscious. That's an open problem, but we don't need to solve it to extract physics from the "number's dreams".
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Math is ambiguous on that.
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A priori, yes. But once we assume computationalism in cognitive science, then we can accept that when numbers, relatively to other numbers, behave in some ways (self-reference, etc.) they get mind, or at least some mind can be associate to them (and then on the infinity of them).
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We can postulate a 3p mathematical existence apart from any mind and any reality.
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That is clear for arithmetic, but already not so clear for more than arithmetic. With the exception of the very rare ultrafinitsis, mathematicians agree on arithmetic, and then disagree on anything else, even if most mathematician will agree on large part of analysis, but apparently, when they do, soon or later some logicians shows that they were agreeing on a part which can be re-explained in arithmetical terms.
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We can imagine that, but this is probably because we assume an implicit 1p mind or meta-mind that is contemplating the mathematical thing. That is my guess and this is the most coherent notion of existence, related to a mind,, even for mathematical existence (apart form a null hypothesis in which everything exist). That is indeed the neoplatonic view. Its´nt it?
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It becomes close to neoplatonism, if you made the everything into the meta-mind, perhaps. The "everything exist" is not a null hypothesis, because the everything, once made precise, needs to define what we mean by thing (set? categories? numbers? computations?). Almost all attempts to define "everything" in math has led to contradictory theories. To avoid the contradiction, some restriction principles must be introduced, and then we can show that some reasonable mathematical objects get lost. In fact the only exception is "all computations", which, thanks to the non trivial Church thesis, and the "closure of the computations for Cantor diagonalization", leads to a quite conceptually solid notion of everything. This is the strongest point in favor of comp: it has a non trivial and solid notion of "everything" on its ontological side. Then it can explain why we live the appearance "from inside" of "more than arithmetic".
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Bruno

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Because the world of the mind -where we live- is and ever will be teleological.
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OK with this. In a sense, matter is teleological with comp.

Bruno

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On 2/5/2013 6:23 AM, Russell Standish wrote:
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Only in the same sense that evolution is teleological, ie not really.
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Cheers

On Tue, Feb 05, 2013 at 06:59:01PM +1100, Kim Jones wrote:
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So does this explain the PURPOSE of the universe or merely a dominant FUNCTION? The blind exercise of function doesn't seem to me to include the global concept of purpose. The use of this word is about my only gripe with it. I could be wrong.
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Cheers,

K

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Onward!

Stephen

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