On 06 Feb 2013, at 20:36, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
2013/2/6 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
On 06 Feb 2013, at 10:22, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
2013/2/6 Stephen P. King <[email protected]>
On 2/5/2013 3:27 PM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
2013/2/5 Stephen P. King <[email protected]>
Hi,
ISTM that purpose is a 1p, so to ask the question in a 3p
sense is to make it meaningless.
That´s it.
But to insist into make the question in 3p may force the
introduction of an implicit 1p that contemplate the 3p, that is,
a metamind , with a metatime etc. (To avoid pavlovian responses, i
don´t mention the G. world). That is the meaning of my previous
response.
Hi Alberto,
But the meta versions would be 1p's in their own right, no?
Absolutely. Not only when talking about purpose. Most of the
concepts we use are 1p, so it is supposed that they are
meaningless when used in the description of a multiverse .
Precisely because the multiverse is a design with the explicit goal
of eliminate purpose as an axiom.
But at the end, as I mentioned, this goal is not possible, because
we can not avoid the infinite regression in the search for causes,
and causality is 1p indeed.
I agree that causality is 1p, but that makes causality emergent, and
secondary, not fundamental.
We can stop the regression at the place we postulate the theory. I
have explained why arithmetic is a good starting places. It explains
the physical and non physical 1p and 3p, and it explains why we
cannot take less than arithmetic (or Turing equivalent).
Se inadvertently, when we talk about what exist and what do not
exist in a multiverse, we turn into looking at an implicit 1p
designer of the multiverse
Arithmetic is enough. It is 3p.
At the end we can not think outside 1p. Scientific inquiry is
comunicable 1p.
If it is communicable, it can be 1p, but it is genuinely 3p too. The
1p part is not relevant, I think. Unless you assume that the whole
arithmetic truth is conscious. That's an open problem, but we don't
need to solve it to extract physics from the "number's dreams".
Math is ambiguous on that.
A priori, yes. But once we assume computationalism in cognitive
science, then we can accept that when numbers, relatively to other
numbers, behave in some ways (self-reference, etc.) they get mind, or
at least some mind can be associate to them (and then on the infinity
of them).
We can postulate a 3p mathematical existence apart from any mind
and any reality.
That is clear for arithmetic, but already not so clear for more than
arithmetic. With the exception of the very rare ultrafinitsis,
mathematicians agree on arithmetic, and then disagree on anything
else, even if most mathematician will agree on large part of analysis,
but apparently, when they do, soon or later some logicians shows that
they were agreeing on a part which can be re-explained in arithmetical
terms.
We can imagine that, but this is probably because we assume an
implicit 1p mind or meta-mind that is contemplating the mathematical
thing. That is my guess and this is the most coherent notion of
existence, related to a mind,, even for mathematical existence
(apart form a null hypothesis in which everything exist). That is
indeed the neoplatonic view. Its´nt it?
It becomes close to neoplatonism, if you made the everything into the
meta-mind, perhaps. The "everything exist" is not a null hypothesis,
because the everything, once made precise, needs to define what we
mean by thing (set? categories? numbers? computations?).
Almost all attempts to define "everything" in math has led to
contradictory theories. To avoid the contradiction, some restriction
principles must be introduced, and then we can show that some
reasonable mathematical objects get lost. In fact the only exception
is "all computations", which, thanks to the non trivial Church thesis,
and the "closure of the computations for Cantor diagonalization",
leads to a quite conceptually solid notion of everything. This is the
strongest point in favor of comp: it has a non trivial and solid
notion of "everything" on its ontological side. Then it can explain
why we live the appearance "from inside" of "more than arithmetic".
Bruno
Because the world of the mind -where we live- is and ever will be
teleological.
OK with this. In a sense, matter is teleological with comp.
Bruno
On 2/5/2013 6:23 AM, Russell Standish wrote:
Only in the same sense that evolution is teleological, ie not
really.
Cheers
On Tue, Feb 05, 2013 at 06:59:01PM +1100, Kim Jones wrote:
So does this explain the PURPOSE of the universe or merely a
dominant FUNCTION? The blind exercise of function doesn't seem to
me to include the global concept of purpose. The use of this word
is about my only gripe with it. I could be wrong.
Cheers,
K
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