On 26 Feb 2013, at 14:53, Richard Ruquist wrote:

<snip>
That does not work. We belong automatically to an infinity of computations. With comp, the physical reality is unique, and derivable from 0, s, + and *
(and the usual axioms). But cosmos or branch of a multiverse can be
numerous, but before they differentiated, we are in all of them.


Bruno,

I am pleased that you believe that "With comp, the physical reality is
unique" because that is what I conclude in my paper "Dreams of a
Metaverse- Math///Mind -Matter Doubly Dualistic Loop-String Cosmology"
Richard

OK. But keep in mind that the physical reality, although unique and equivalent for all universal machine, might still be, and very plausibly is, a multiverse à-la Everett, or worst, a multi-multi- multiverse, when we assume mechanism.

The physical laws are the same for all observers (indeed they are consequence of arithmetic self-reference), but this does not prevent many different histories and geographies. "we" are not unique. You have already such a sort of physical unicity with Everett, through the universal wave function, with many different terms on which our consciousness differentiate.

Bruno







I conjecture that most of those physical realities would be Boltzmann
brains.


We don't need them, arithmetic is enough. It contains the UD.






Rather than assuming that belief is a logical stick model built up from
nothing,


It is not build up for nothing. It is an arithmetical relation between a
number, and some universal numbers.


No, Bruno. The fact that we can construct any number from the empty set


I don't assume sets, at the base level.



explicitly demands that we are building up things from nothing.


You refer to one implementation of number in set theory. But we don't need
that.




This does not, IMHO, remove the 'reality' from them so long as the mutual
agreement actions are possible.


OK.





I think it makes more sense to see it as a local fog which interferes with
out larger grounding in the sense of eternity and totality.


Knowledge does that. By linking belief with truth.


   But where does the 'truth' obtain from if not a physical instance?


It comes from arithmetical truth.



It need not be ontological primitive, as a physical world could be defined as merely that which at least 3 observers can agree upon as being real.


Not with comp. Physics is more solid than that. Infinities of observers can
be wrong.






We say: "Jim believed that Brussels was the capital of the USA, but now, he
know better".
We don't say "Jim knew that Brussels was the capital of the USA, but now, he
believed better".


Careful that we don't define a word to have a property and then use the
word to show the existence of that property. This is bootstrapping!


This is not done here.



This is something that can easily creep into any immaterialist ontology and ruin it (unless it is accounted for, like what Jon Barwise does in his
work).


We can't bootstrap belief from inert conditions - sense and participation
are implicit and inherent in any discussion of belief, whether we
acknowledge it or not.


I study the case of machines believing in some limited number of sentences in computer science, with some rules of reasoning, and study what they can believe, known, observe, feel, etc. With precise definition of each terms. It is testable, as comp predicts they will believe in some precise physics
that we can compare with nature, and so we can refute
comp+classical-epistemology.
As it is a very weak theory (comp is weak, and classical epistemology too), its refutation would make us learning a lot. If it is not refuted, then we have a much simpler theory of everything, ---simpler than the actual one,
which is QM (+general relativity). And the new theory explains the
difference between qualia and quanta, and this is a point where QM fails to address explicitly the question, although with Everett it leans toward the
comp theory.

Bruno


We need to have a long discussion as to how the quanta emerges in such a
way as to allow the appearance of a physical world (a 'reality') for
multiple observers. I am assuming that an observer is defined as the
intersection of infinitely many computations as per comp.


See sane04 for a precise rendering on this, based on the first person
statistics in the UD* or arithmetic.

Bruno



--
Onward!

Stephen


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