I conjecture that most of those physical realities would be Boltzmann
brains.
We don't need them, arithmetic is enough. It contains the UD.
Rather than assuming that belief is a logical stick model built up
from
nothing,
It is not build up for nothing. It is an arithmetical relation
between a
number, and some universal numbers.
No, Bruno. The fact that we can construct any number from the
empty set
I don't assume sets, at the base level.
explicitly demands that we are building up things from nothing.
You refer to one implementation of number in set theory. But we
don't need
that.
This does not, IMHO, remove the 'reality' from them so long as the
mutual
agreement actions are possible.
OK.
I think it makes more sense to see it as a local fog which
interferes with
out larger grounding in the sense of eternity and totality.
Knowledge does that. By linking belief with truth.
But where does the 'truth' obtain from if not a physical instance?
It comes from arithmetical truth.
It need not be ontological primitive, as a physical world could be
defined
as merely that which at least 3 observers can agree upon as being
real.
Not with comp. Physics is more solid than that. Infinities of
observers can
be wrong.
We say: "Jim believed that Brussels was the capital of the USA, but
now, he
know better".
We don't say "Jim knew that Brussels was the capital of the USA,
but now, he
believed better".
Careful that we don't define a word to have a property and then
use the
word to show the existence of that property. This is bootstrapping!
This is not done here.
This is something that can easily creep into any immaterialist
ontology and
ruin it (unless it is accounted for, like what Jon Barwise does in
his
work).
We can't bootstrap belief from inert conditions - sense and
participation
are implicit and inherent in any discussion of belief, whether we
acknowledge it or not.
I study the case of machines believing in some limited number of
sentences
in computer science, with some rules of reasoning, and study what
they can
believe, known, observe, feel, etc. With precise definition of each
terms.
It is testable, as comp predicts they will believe in some precise
physics
that we can compare with nature, and so we can refute
comp+classical-epistemology.
As it is a very weak theory (comp is weak, and classical
epistemology too),
its refutation would make us learning a lot. If it is not refuted,
then we
have a much simpler theory of everything, ---simpler than the
actual one,
which is QM (+general relativity). And the new theory explains the
difference between qualia and quanta, and this is a point where QM
fails to
address explicitly the question, although with Everett it leans
toward the
comp theory.
Bruno
We need to have a long discussion as to how the quanta emerges
in such a
way as to allow the appearance of a physical world (a 'reality') for
multiple observers. I am assuming that an observer is defined as the
intersection of infinitely many computations as per comp.
See sane04 for a precise rendering on this, based on the first person
statistics in the UD* or arithmetic.
Bruno
--
Onward!
Stephen
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an
email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to everything-
[email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an
email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to everything-
[email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
