On Tuesday, February 26, 2013 6:30:59 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 25 Feb 2013, at 20:59, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Monday, February 25, 2013 1:26:49 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 25 Feb 2013, at 01:30, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> >> >> >> On Sunday, February 24, 2013 3:07:12 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 22 Feb 2013, at 17:45, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Thursday, February 21, 2013 12:11:36 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 21 Feb 2013, at 15:06, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Thursday, February 21, 2013 5:58:20 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 20 Feb 2013, at 21:15, meekerdb wrote: >>>>> >>>>> On 2/20/2013 8:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Hi John, >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 19 Feb 2013, at 23:28, John Mikes wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Craig, it seems we engaged in a fruitful discussion- thank you. >>>>> >>>>> I want to reflect to *a few* concepts only from it to clarify MY >>>>> stance. >>>>> First my use of *a 'model'.* There are different models, from the >>>>> sexy young females over the math-etc. descriptions of theoretical >>>>> concepts >>>>> (some not so sexy). - What I (after Robert Rosen?) use by this word is an >>>>> extract of something, we may not know in toto. Close to an 'Occamized' >>>>> version, but "cut" mostly by ignorance of the 'rest of it', not for added >>>>> clarity. Applied to whatever we know TODAY about the world. Or: we THINK >>>>> WE >>>>> KNOW. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> A scientist know nothing. Just nothing, not even his own >>>>> consciousness. >>>>> >>>>> In science we have only beliefs, >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> But then, according to you, if they happen to be true they are >>>>> knowledge. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Yes, but "we" can't know that. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Can "we" know that we can't know that? >>>> >>>> >>>> Yes. That something that the machine can prove and know. >>>> >>> >>> How can we know what a machine can prove or know if our own knowledge is >>> only belief? >>> >>> >>> Because some time our beliefs are true. >>> >> >> What does 'true' mean if we can only believe? >> >> >> We can't define that, but we have a lot of example. >> >> Suppose we meet and that I give you a slap. Then "Bruno gave a slap to >> Craig" would be true. It would not be true, if we meet, or not, and don't >> give you a slap. >> > > How do you know that we met or didn't meet? Maybe it was just a dream? > > > Then it is true, or false, with respect to the dream. I was only > illustrating a concept, known to de not definable, although approximable. >
There isn't necessarily a particular condition which is true or false in a dream. More often it just 'seems like' someone is your old college roommate in one sense, but maybe your brother also. Both truth and belief here are a posteriori to the sense experience of the dream itself, which is a gestalt and not meaningfully described by either-or expectations with respect to either belief or truth. In a dream, we don't know what we experience and we don't not-know what we experience. This is a truer representation of sense than public realism, which is disambiguated by thermodynamic irreversibility among the total collection of experiences. > > > > >> >> When we believe something, it means that we believe that it is true, even >> when keeping in mind that it is a belief, and that we might be wrong, that >> is not true. >> > > Not necessarily. There may be no objective truth quality. > > > ? > Sense pre-figures truth. Truth is a proportion or qualitative ratio of sense agreements against disagreements. > > > We may be creating belief synthetically by our expectation. > > > That is called wishful thinking. > No, I'm talking about the idea that we have no beliefs at all until we question them. It may be an analytical abstraction that is a posteriori. We don't literally 'have a belief' that the sky is blue - we participate in a universe in which it seems that the sky is blue. It's a bit of sleight of hand to insert this presumption of belief where in fact the experience of the sky's color is not derived from any proposition or logical relation. > If your criteria is wishful thinking, that might explain your question > begging type of 'argument'. > > > > If you ask someone whether they believe that eating meat is immoral, they > may not have had an opinion one way or another about it before you asked. > There may not be an expectation that their spontaneously projected 'belief' > reflects something that is 'true', but just an expression of what makes > sense to them - what feels best in their mind or seems appropriate for > their idea of their own character. > > > I think it is better to try to see on what we agree, and build from that. > Statements like "eating meat is immoral" are very complex high level > statements not well suited for reasoning. > If what I'm saying is true, "eating meat is immoral" is a very simple statement on the personal level, and ideal for pointing out the bad assumptions of reasoning as an assembled low level mechanism. Children can become vegetarian (I have known one in my family) because they grasp the simple reality of how animals become meat, not because they have deliberated anything with any particular complexity. It would be very complex if we tried to create these feelings from an impersonal level, I would say impossible, but within the personal range of sense, these considerations are very simple and direct, while calculus is very complex. Your view is that complexity just increases from the bottom up, while mine is that simplicity is conserved at every level by sense. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
