On Thursday, February 21, 2013 12:11:36 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 21 Feb 2013, at 15:06, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Thursday, February 21, 2013 5:58:20 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 20 Feb 2013, at 21:15, meekerdb wrote: >> >> On 2/20/2013 8:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> Hi John, >> >> >> On 19 Feb 2013, at 23:28, John Mikes wrote: >> >> Craig, it seems we engaged in a fruitful discussion- thank you. >> >> I want to reflect to *a few* concepts only from it to clarify MY stance. >> First my use of *a 'model'.* There are different models, from the sexy >> young females over the math-etc. descriptions of theoretical concepts (some >> not so sexy). - What I (after Robert Rosen?) use by this word is an extract >> of something, we may not know in toto. Close to an 'Occamized' version, but >> "cut" mostly by ignorance of the 'rest of it', not for added clarity. >> Applied to whatever we know TODAY about the world. Or: we THINK WE KNOW. >> >> >> >> A scientist know nothing. Just nothing, not even his own consciousness. >> >> In science we have only beliefs, >> >> >> But then, according to you, if they happen to be true they are knowledge. >> >> >> Yes, but "we" can't know that. >> > > Can "we" know that we can't know that? > > > Yes. That something that the machine can prove and know. >
How can we know what a machine can prove or know if our own knowledge is only belief? > It is not obvious, and is based on the fact, known already by Gödel, that > machines or formal systems can prove their own incompleteness theorem. The > rest follows from the Theatetus' definition of knowledge, and some work. > Isn't the proof of incompleteness also incomplete? i.e. we don't know that what senses we have access to unless our personal range of sense informs us about them. We may in fact have intuitions which are true without being believed or even detected explicitly (hence blindsight). > > > > > > >> >> >> >> I'd say it's the other way around, scientists have no beliefs, only >> hypotheses. >> >> >> >> I define "belief" by "hypothesis" or "derived from hypotheses". That's >> why in the ideally correct case, belief = provable. This works because >> provable does not entail truth. >> >> >> >> >> >> If you ask a physicist, for example, if he believes GR he will probably >> give a complicated answer about how it is our best theory of macroscopic >> gravitation and it has proven correct in many experiments and it is our >> best model - BUT it is almost certainly not right because its inconsistent >> with QM. >> >> >> OK. (assuming QM is correct, of course). >> >> > I think that if QM were applied to itself, > > > QM is an abstract theory about physical objects, not about abstract > theories. If you meant that QM applies to physicists, seen as physical > object, then we get the MWI. > I mean that if the kind of thought processes which have gone into QM were applied to the theories of QM themselves, then it would likely mandate that QM can only be as true as it is false. Every truth in the theory can only exist by borrowing from a false condition that it creates. > > > > > it would likely conclude that it was at once the truest and the least true > theory to date, and I would agree with that. > > see above - QM is true/false just as quantum is particle/wave... unless theories are exempt from physics... which would mean that QM is just unacknowledged dualism. Craig > > ? > > Bruno > > > > > > Craig > > >> >> >> and the best we can hope, is to refute them, by making them clear >> enough. >> >> I insist on this because there is a widespread misconsception in >> popular science, but also among many materialist scientists (= many >> scientists), that we can know something "scientifically", but that is >> provably wrong with comp, and plausiibly wrong with common sense. >> >> A scientist who make public his knowledge is a pseudo-scientist, or a >> pseudo-religious person, or is simply mad. >> >> >> Is that true of logicians too. :-) >> >> >> Yes. Actually logicians made this explicit, where most scientists are >> unaware that their "scientific beliefs" are hypotheses. Many believe that >> they are just "truth". Well, not all, of course. Some scientists have still >> a scientific view, thanks God! >> >> :) >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> Brent >> >> >> There is always an interrogation mark after any theory. Theories are >> beliefs, never public knowledge. Even 1+1=2. >> But we can (temporally) agree on some theories. We have to do that to >> refute them, and learn. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> * >> You mention 'statistical' in connection with adaptation. I deny the >> validity of statistics (and so: of probability) because it depends on the >> borderlines to observe in "counting" the items. 1000 years ago (or maybe >> yesterday) such boderlines were different, consequently different >> statistics came up with different chances of occurrence in them (not even >> mentioning the indifference of WHEN all those chances may materialize). >> * >> *"...within a looped continuum of perceived causality..." * >> Perceived causality is restricted to the 'model' content, while it may be >> open to be entailed by instigators beyond our present knowledge. >> Furthermore (in the flimsy concept we have about 'time' I cannot see a >> 'loop' - only a propagating curve as everything changes by the time we >> think to 'close' the loop (like the path of a planet as the Sun moves). >> * >> *"...I couldn't agree with you more. That's a big part of what my TOE is >> all about http://multisenserealism.com/8-matter-energy/..."* >> Your TOE? - MY FOOT. - Agnostically we are so far from even speaking about >> * 'everything'* that the consecutively observable levels of gathering >> some knowledge (adjusted to our ever evolving mental capabilities into some >> personal 'mini-solipsism' - different always for everyone) is a great >> pretension of the human conventional sciences. >> (Don't take it personally, please). We LIVE and THINK within (my) model. >> Whatever is beyond is unknowable. But it affects the model content. >> The URL was an enjoyable reading - with Stephen's addition to it. >> >> Best regards >> John Mikes >> * >> * >> * >> * >> On Sun, Jan 27, 2013 at 9:47 PM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com>wrote: >> >>> I was so impressed with this page >>> http://evolution.berkeley.edu/evolibrary/misconceptions_faq.php#a1 >>> >>> that I thought it was worth listing a few here: >>> >>> *MISCONCEPTION: Natural selection involves organisms trying to adapt.* >>> >>> *MISCONCEPTION: Natural selection acts for the good of the species.* >>> >>> *MISCONCEPTION: The fittest organisms in a population are those that >>> are strongest, healthiest, fastest, and/or largest.* >>> >>> *MISCONCEPTION: Natural selection is about survival of the very fittest >>> individuals in a population.* >>> >>> *MISCONCEPTION: All traits of organisms are adaptations.* >>> >>> *MISCONCEPTION: Evolutionary theory implies that life evolved (and >>> continues to evolve) randomly, or by chance. >>> >>> **MISCONCEPTION: Evolution results in progress; organisms are always >>> getting better through evolution.* >>> >>> ** >>> >>> * >>> * >>> >>> * >>> * >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en >>> . >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> No virus found in this message. >> Checked by AVG - www.avg.com >> Version: 2013.0.2899 / Virus Database: 2639/6114 - Release Date: 02/18/13 >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. > To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com<javascript:> > . > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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