On 26 Mar 2013, at 18:19, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/26/2013 4:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I can explain why if a machine can have experience and enough
reflexivity, then the machine can already understand that she
cannot justify rationally the presence of its experience. No
machine, nor us, can ever see how that could be true. It *is* in
the range of the non communicable.
If some aliens decide that we are not conscious, we will not find
any test to prove them wrong.
And if we decide the Mars Rover is conscious, can any test prove us
wrong?
Yes. But it is longer to explain than for comp. Strong AI is refutable
in a weaker sense than comp. The refutation here are indirect and
based on the acceptance of the classical tgeory of knowledge, that is
S4 (not necessarily Theaetetus).
Or if Craig decides an atom is conscious, can any test prove him
wrong?
A person can be conscious. What would it mean that an atom is
conscious? What is an atom?
Which I think is John Clark's point: Consciousness is easy.
Intelligence is hard.
Consciousness might be more easy than intelligence, and certainly than
matter. Consciousness is easy with UDA, when you get the difference
between both G and G*, and between Bp, Bp & p, Bp & Dt, etc. (AUDA).
Matter is more difficult. Today we have only the propositional
observable.
Intelligence, in my opinion is rather easy too. It is a question of
"abstract thermodynamic", intelligence is when you get enough heat
while young, something like that. It is close to courage, and it is
what make competence possible.
Competence is the most difficult, as they are distributed on
transfinite lattice of incomparable degrees. Some can ask for
necessary long work, and can have negative feedback on intelligence.
Bruno
Brent
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