On 28 Mar 2013, at 20:15, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Thursday, March 28, 2013 10:41:22 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 26 Mar 2013, at 17:53, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, March 26, 2013 10:13:09 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 26 Mar 2013, at 13:35, Craig Weinberg wrote:
It is if you assume photons bouncing back and forth.
unlike a universal
number. The fixed point of the two mirrors needs infinities of
reflexions, but the machine self-reference needs only two
diagonalizations. As I said, you must study those things and convince
It sounds like a dodge to me. Fundamental truths seem like they are
always conceptually simple. I can teach someone the principle of
binary math in two minutes without them having to learn to build a
computer from scratch. You don't have to learn to use Maxwell's
equations to be convinced that electromagnetism involves wave
I can explain diagonalization in two minutes. If this can help.
What would help more is to explain how diagonalization contributes
to a computation being an experienced awareness rather than an
Diagonalization shows that a machine can refer to itself in many
sense, which are equivalent in "god's eyes", but completely different
in the machine's eyes, and some of those self-reference verify
accepted axioms for knowledge, observable, etc.
> or a cartoon of a lion talking about itself into some kind of
> subjective experience for the cartoon, or cartoon-ness, or lion-
> ness, or talking-ness. Self-reference has no significance unless we
> assume that the self already has awareness.
Hmm... I am open to that assumption, but usually I prefer to add the
universality assumption too.
> If I say 'these words refer to themselves', or rig up a camera to
> point at a screen displaying the output of Tupper's Self-
> formula, I still have nothing but a camera, a screen and some
> meaningless graphics. This assumption pulls qualia out of thin air,
> ignores the pathetic fallacy completely, and conflates all
> territories with maps.
On the contrary, we get a rich and complex theory of qualia, even a
testable one, as we get the quanta too, and so can compare with
nature. Please, don't oversimplify something that you have not
How can there be a such thing as a theory of qualia? Qualia is
precisely that which theory cannot access in any way.
Yes, that is one the main axiom for qualia. Not only you have a
theory, but you share it with me.
How do you know it is a main axiom for qualia?
It is not someything I can know. It was just something we are agreeing
on, so that your point made my points, and refute the idea that you
can use it as a tool for invalidating comp.
It's like saying that the important thing about the Moon is that we
can't swim there. The fact that I understand that the Moon is not in
the ocean doesn't mean I can take credit for figuring out the Moon.
To me it shows the confirmation bias of the approach. You are
looking at reality from the start as if it were a kind of theory,
I bet I can find a theory, indeed. But this does not mean that
anything about machine can be made into a theory.
so that this detail about qualia being non-theoretical has inflated
It is important indeed, but of course it is not use here as an
argument for comp, only as showing that you can't use the absence of a
theory as an argument against comp, because computer science explains
that absence of theory, and the presence of useful meta-theory.
If you were a shoemaker, the important thing about diamonds might be
that they aren't shoes.
>>> I might find it convenient to invent an entirely new spectrum of
>>> colors to keep track of my file folders, but that doesn't mean
>>> that this new spectrum can just be 'developed' out of thin air.
>> You must not ask a machine something that you can't do yourself,
>> compare it to yourself.
>> But if you are saying that a machine can come up with a new format
>> by virtue of its self reference, then that is what I assume Comp
>> says is the origination of color.
> Qualia obeys laws.
> Qualia makes laws. Laws are nothing except the interaction of
> on multiple nested scales.
That's much too vague.
Vague is ok if it is accurate too.
Too vague leads to empty accuracy. It is accurate because we don't
Or it could be that we understand that the reality can only be
accurately described in vague terms - the reality itself is vague,
hence it has flexibility to create the derived experiences of
It is exactly the justification of letting people lacking rigor in
philosophy, theology, etc.
By making the non-understanding intrinsic, you can jutisfy all the
possible wishful thinking, and introduce all the arbitrariness you want.
Now, if reality is vague, I could likewise use that to doubt even more
your apparent certainty that machine cannot support consciousness ...
I would if I could, but when I try that, it doesn't work. I'm only
interested in making sense of reality, not making sense of theories.
But then develop your ideas without pretending that they make false
other theories. Why not trying to be cautious with the work of
others, if you don't want theorize.
Why asserting that machine cannot support consciousness, if you are
not interested in making sense of theories.
Because my hypothesis shows why comp would not be true, so even
though I don't study every theory which assumes comp is true, I can
understand that they must all be false, at least in their ultimate
You don't show that at all. Each time you did, you illustrate that you
agree what the machines are already saying.
That is not to say there is not a lot of important things to study
by assuming that comp is true, I only say that consciousness itself
is not one of them.
Comp is defined by consciousness invariance, so what you say does not
Qualia are useful
to accelerate information processing, and the integration of that
processing in a person.
I challenge that. Whatever accelerations you are attributing to
qualia I think are just other types of quanta.
No quanta are physical objects. I guess you mean number. But it is
not because qualia can have some consequences capable of being
evaluate with some numbers, that qualia are numbers themselves.
I didn't think we were talking about physical objects. I was trying
to say that any kind of functional benefit for arithmetic agendas
would be better served by an unconscious quantitative feature than a
Because you assume that a program might not been able to support an
experience, but this force you to introduce non turing emulability of
something present in the brain or in the molecules, but you fail to do
so. So you are speculating on something just to prevent a type of
It is like a creationist saying that Darwin evolution is a brilliant
idea, explaining a lot, but failing on what is important: how God made
the world in six days.
And they are unavoidable for machines in rich
and statistically stable universal relations with each others.
I don't think that you can know that what you are looking at which
fulfills the requirements of the UMs is qualia. It's non-
communicable, and therefore trivially 'private', but that doesn't
mean it is experiential.
No, but assuming comp, they are at the least the best candidate for
the qualia, especially when using the classical theory of knowledge
and observation, which provide a notion of experience, as explained
in the paper and in some post I sent.
Sure I agree, but to me assuming comp is like assuming the sky is
yellow. If the sky is yellow then puffy clouds on a sunny day would
likely be black. I don't disagree with the logic, but the beginning
assumption is wrong.
It is wrong because you assume it wrong. You fail to show it is wrong,
without begging the question, I'm afraid.
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