On Thu, Mar 28, 2013 at 10:52 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 26 Mar 2013, at 18:19, meekerdb wrote: > > On 3/26/2013 4:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > I can explain why if a machine can have experience and enough reflexivity, > then the machine can already understand that she cannot justify rationally > the presence of its experience. No machine, nor us, can ever see how that > could be true. It *is* in the range of the non communicable. > > If some aliens decide that we are not conscious, we will not find any test > to prove them wrong. > > > And if we decide the Mars Rover is conscious, can any test prove us wrong? > > > Yes. But it is longer to explain than for comp. Strong AI is refutable in a > weaker sense than comp. The refutation here are indirect and based on the > acceptance of the classical tgeory of knowledge, that is S4 (not necessarily > Theaetetus). > > > > Or if Craig decides an atom is conscious, can any test prove him wrong? > > > A person can be conscious. What would it mean that an atom is conscious? > What is an atom? > >
Davies suggests that the threshold for consciousness based on the Lloyd limit is the complexity of the human cell. > > > Which I think is John Clark's point: Consciousness is easy. Intelligence is > hard. > > > > Consciousness might be more easy than intelligence, and certainly than > matter. Consciousness is easy with UDA, when you get the difference between > both G and G*, and between Bp, Bp & p, Bp & Dt, etc. (AUDA). > > Matter is more difficult. Today we have only the propositional observable. > > Intelligence, in my opinion is rather easy too. It is a question of > "abstract thermodynamic", intelligence is when you get enough heat while > young, something like that. It is close to courage, and it is what make > competence possible. > > Competence is the most difficult, as they are distributed on transfinite > lattice of incomparable degrees. Some can ask for necessary long work, and > can have negative feedback on intelligence. > > Bruno > > > > > > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
