On Thu, Mar 28, 2013 at 10:52 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
> On 26 Mar 2013, at 18:19, meekerdb wrote:
>
> On 3/26/2013 4:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> I can explain why if a machine can have experience and enough reflexivity,
> then the machine can already understand that she cannot justify rationally
> the presence of its experience. No machine, nor us, can ever see how that
> could be true. It *is* in the range of the non communicable.
>
> If some aliens decide that we are not conscious, we will not find any test
> to prove them wrong.
>
>
> And if we decide the Mars Rover is conscious, can any test prove us wrong?
>
>
> Yes. But it is longer to explain than for comp. Strong AI is refutable in a
> weaker sense than comp. The refutation here are indirect and based on the
> acceptance of the classical tgeory of knowledge, that is S4 (not necessarily
> Theaetetus).
>
>
>
> Or if Craig decides an atom is conscious, can any test prove him wrong?
>
>
> A person can be conscious. What would it mean that an atom is conscious?
> What is an atom?
>
>

Davies suggests that the threshold for consciousness based on the
Lloyd limit is the complexity of the human cell.

>
>
> Which I think is John Clark's point: Consciousness is easy.  Intelligence is
> hard.
>
>
>
> Consciousness might be more easy than intelligence, and certainly than
> matter. Consciousness is easy with UDA,  when you get the difference between
> both G and G*, and between Bp, Bp & p, Bp & Dt, etc. (AUDA).
>
> Matter is more difficult. Today we have only the propositional observable.
>
> Intelligence, in my opinion is rather easy too. It is a question of
> "abstract thermodynamic", intelligence is when you get enough heat while
> young, something like that. It is close to courage, and it is what make
> competence possible.
>
> Competence is the most difficult, as they are distributed on transfinite
> lattice of incomparable degrees. Some can ask for necessary long work, and
> can have negative feedback on intelligence.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Brent
>
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> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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