On 26 Mar 2013, at 13:35, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Tuesday, March 26, 2013 7:21:39 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 25 Mar 2013, at 19:35, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Monday, March 25, 2013 1:25:30 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 25 Mar 2013, at 14:02, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Monday, March 25, 2013 6:26:00 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 24 Mar 2013, at 20:25, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Sunday, March 24, 2013 1:44:01 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

But that is what you get at the Turing universal threshold. If you look at the computer's functioning, you will see local computable rules obeyed by the gates, but that doesn't mean there aren't non-computable agendas being pursued by genuine person supported by those computations.

Absolutely, but does it mean that it has to be a genuine person? To me it makes sense that the natural development of persons may be restricted to experiences which are represented publicly in zoological terms. The zoological format is not the cause of the experience but it is the minimum vessel with the proper scale of sensitivity for that quality of experience to be supported. Trying to generate the same thing from the bottom up may not be feasible, because the zoological format arises organically, whereas an AI system skips zoology, biology, and chemistry entirely and assumes a universally low format.

It is does not. Self-reference leads machine to develop multi- variated leves of "formatting".

Why would it, and how could it?

You must study  bit of computer science.

But just in very general terms, what would be the principle which would tie together the function of self reference with any kind of presented experience?

The (arithmetical) reality of the experience itself. It is a fixed point of the map/brain when embedded in the arithmetical reality (which is beyond words).

That doesn't make sense to me. That would make two mirrors facing each other into a being,

Not really. A mirror is not a dynamical structure, unlike a universal number. The fixed point of the two mirrors needs infinities of reflexions, but the machine self-reference needs only two diagonalizations. As I said, you must study those things and convince yourself.

or a cartoon of a lion talking about itself into some kind of subjective experience for the cartoon, or cartoon-ness, or lion- ness, or talking-ness. Self-reference has no significance unless we assume that the self already has awareness.

Hmm... I am open to that assumption, but usually I prefer to add the universality assumption too.

If I say 'these words refer to themselves', or rig up a camera to point at a screen displaying the output of Tupper's Self-Referential formula, I still have nothing but a camera, a screen and some meaningless graphics. This assumption pulls qualia out of thin air, ignores the pathetic fallacy completely, and conflates all territories with maps.

On the contrary, we get a rich and complex theory of qualia, even a testable one, as we get the quanta too, and so can compare with nature. Please, don't oversimplify something that you have not studied.

I might find it convenient to invent an entirely new spectrum of colors to keep track of my file folders, but that doesn't mean that this new spectrum can just be 'developed' out of thin air.

You must not ask a machine something that you can't do yourself, to compare it to yourself.

But if you are saying that a machine can come up with a new format by virtue of its self reference, then that is what I assume Comp says is the origination of color.

Qualia obeys laws.

Qualia makes laws. Laws are nothing except the interaction of qualia on multiple nested scales.

That's much too vague. I can agree and relate to comp. Qualia makes the quanta, notably, but I was just explaining that we get a theory of qualia.

If some qualia exist, some machine can realize them, but this does not mean we can create some new spectrum, or that this would be an easy task for a machine to complete when ordered. Most of our qualia needed long time computations, and trial and errors, etc.

You can't make blue by trial and error because there is nothing to try. It's a circular argument - for trial and error blue would already have to be one of the possible qualia in the universe, in which case trial would be redundant. By trial and error you could perhaps stumble upon time travel, invisibility, teleportation, and a thousand other super powers, but there is no way to stumble upon even a single qualia in a universe which lacks them. It isn't in the mix of possibilities. There is no solution to any function which could possibly be x = {the experience of seeing blue}.


Consciousness does not seem to be compatible with low level unconscious origins to me. Looking at language, the rules of spelling and grammar do not drive the creation of new words. A word cannot be forced into common usage just because it is introduced into a culture. There is no rule in language which has a function of creating new words, nor could any rule like that possibly work.

You ignore completely the notion of creative set or universal machine. You talk like if we could have a complete theory about them, but we can't, provably so if we are Turing emulable. You just communicate your feeling where the machine already can explain why their feeling can be misleading on this subject.

Any particular feeling can be misleading only relative to some other felt expectation and felt realization.

I am OK with this. All content of consciousness can be doubted, except one ...


The existence of feeling itself can't be misleading though.

... yes. That one. Consciousness is the fixed point of the doubt.

Universal machine looking inward are lead to that constructive and creative doubt.

Couldn't it perform the functions associated with doubt without experiencing doubt though? I could look at the flame of a candle swaying back and forth and project some narrative of doubt and prevarication, but must that be the case?

If comp is true, then non-comp is consistent and conceivable, yes. That does not makes non-comp true or even plausible. Comp is not provable. It is only refutable. But comp is plausible, and doubly so after the discovery of the universal machine.

Comp would be possible if there were no qualia, but I don't see how Comp could or would make use of qualia, let alone generate an entire universe overflowing with it.

It is a bit what happens, please study the theory. Qualia are useful to accelerate information processing, and the integration of that processing in a person. And they are unavoidable for machines in rich and statistically stable universal relations with each others.

I don't know what you are saying that I am ignoring.

That universal machine are more weird entities that you and me can suspect.

That I don't doubt, but I doubt that their weirdness is the same as our weirdness.

All creatures have their own weirdness. We are different from silicon machines, but the question is on the existence of a private experiences, not on the similarity with your's or mine's.

I don't think that machines qua machines can have either privacy or experiences beyond the limits of the natural inclination of the materials upon which the program is executed. If the basic unit is digital and binary, then the experience is probably limited to the circuitry itself. A living animal cell has the capacity to self- organize on higher levels but cannot be controlled completely. This has nothing to do with materials or vitalism, it is a recognition that consciousness can only be propagated as experience developed through evolutionary scales of time, not reverse engineered from instantaneous spatial configurations.

OK. But then universal machine are not machines qua machines.

I think it is a perpendicular weirdness which cannot stand independently of some sensory experience.

I agree, but there is no reason to assume at the start that a program cannot have a sensory experience, when embedded in the some universal computations, istelf related to a reality (immaterial with comp).

There's no reason for you to assume that, but I have several reasons to assume that:

The pathetic fallacy.
The map-territory-relation.
The presentation problem (hard problem, explanatory gap, binding problems, symbol grounding problem, body-space::experience-time symmetry problem) The failure of thought to recognize its own emotional and sensory roots.

That is not reasoning. I will do what you do.

You do:

The I am superior fallacy
The map-territory fallacy
The God of the gap sort of explanation
The failure of thought to recognize the emotion and sensory roots in others.

I don't deny that machines could be unintentionally creative, but it isn't the same thing that we experience. We care, machines don't.

Well, as you know I assume that we are machines, so by definition, whatever I or you can do, some machines can do it (us).

I study the consequence of that hypothesis, and I object only to you argument that such an hypothesis is obviously false.

I would not say that it is obviously false, only that I can't see how it could be true

I can explain why if a machine can have experience and enough reflexivity, then the machine can already understand that she cannot justify rationally the presence of its experience. No machine, nor us, can ever see how that could be true. It *is* in the range of the non communicable.

I don't have a problem with that, but I'm not talking about justifying my own experience, I'm talking about justifying the ontology of sensory-motor experience in general, particularly motive participation.

That is what comp can explain. But if you bet that machines have no experiences, you can not listen to them, and you are in a trap, built by yourself.

If some aliens decide that we are not conscious, we will not find any test to prove them wrong.

We won't need to, because if I'm right, they will already have a sense that we might be conscious or else their consciousness is so alien to ours that by comparison we are relatively unconscious to them in their experienced reality. Like an ant colony, they might guess we could be having experiences, but only children and etymologists are likely to give it any serious consideration.

given that experience doesn't make sense as a product of forms or functions,

Indeed. But no semantics of sufficiently complex programs can be harnessed by those programs. Once you go through the Turing universal level, understanding yourself only make yourself more hard to understand, and more rich too.

Turing universality I think is a powerful reflection of some of the important themes of 1p subjectivity from a 3p skeletal description, but the description alone doesn't do anything. It can be used to make more descriptions is all.

but forms and functions naturally follow from the extension of sense into its own absence (entropy/spacetime). If there is something that functions+awareness can do that functions alone cannot, then I have no problem considering Comp to be an equal possibility.

Yes, that's the case. that's the bomb contained in Gödel, Church, Kleene, Post, Turing results.

Do those results specify awareness is required in arithmetic?


Further, while I agree that the third person view of our body and its behaviors are a good fit for mechanism, I don't see that such a mechanism can coexist with the natural universe in which we find ourselves where 1p and 3p are orthogonally juxtaposed.

Good insight. That is impossible. There is no natural universe. It is the belief in a natural universe which stuck the progress on the mind-body problem since we reify the notion of matter. Science and theology are born from the understanding of this, but after awhile we forget and resume the bad instinctive habits. It is a normal and unavoidable conflict between life and afterlife. It will be with us forever.

We don't have to insist on a natural universe, but we must admit the 1p and 3p perpendicular juxtaposition. I don't see that mechanism makes sense in that context.

Study it, or be cautious in negative affirmation.

Given the nature of our actual experience, it only makes sense to me that 3p mechanism could arise as a multiplicity of 1p experiences,

Correct (with respect to comp).

reflected in a drastically diminished (and thus mechanical seeming) presentation.

I don't know if it is true or false, nor if that would be a good news or a bad news. Some consequences are fascinating, and it leads to an elegant scheme of (incomplete of course) TOE (like elementary arithmetic).

I think it is false from an absolute perspective, but nearly true from a local perspective, so that studying consequences of Comp is worthwhile, and indeed the only possible way to really deduce knowledge about the 1p - provided that we remember to invert the conclusions. Where Comp points to mechanism, we should see it as a mechanistic reflection of the genuine experience which we cannot contact indirectly.

If you could control the behavior of language use from the bottom up however, you could simulate that such a rule would work, just by programming people to utter it with increasing frequency. This would satisfy any third person test for the effectiveness of the rule, but of course would be completely meaningless.

Don't confuse machine and language.

Interesting... aren't they both made of the same thing in Comp? Is there a separate arithmetic truth which creates machines and one which creates languages?

Language is when machine talks, but the machine's mindscape is much vaster than any of their possible language and theories.

Can't you use one machine's language to build another nested machine though? Isn't that the self-referential implications of Church-Turing?

Not the only one. Except for computability, all other epistemic notions can grow on a transfinite ladder. All transcendental surprises hide another one.
Comp leads to transcendental humility.

Still though, it seems pretty ambiguous...one machine's language is another language's machine.

They can be translated, but can be very different. And then it can differ for all epistemic notion except computability.

How are they not confused already?

What would it look like if the brain as a whole were driving the neurons?

Either it would be like saying that a high level program can have a feedback on some of its low level implementations, which is not a problem at all, as this already exist, in both biology and computer science, or it would be like saying that a brain can break the physical laws, or the arithmetical laws and it would be like pseudo-philosophy.

What about the relation between high level arithmetic laws - like the ones which allow for 1p subjectivity in UM, LM, etc and the programs which support them?

To eat or to be eaten relatively to the most probable universal neighbors. The relations can be complicated.

Their being complicated is what I would expect from high level laws - but how is it that low level processes wind up being influenced by them? How does the law that says dumb code can begin to think for itself come to be followed by dumb code?


How do low level processes know that they are subject to the commands of the high level processes?

Usually, they don't know. But then some can observe and infer, and build theories/questions.

Maybe 'know' is too strong. What I meant, is how do low level processes come to receive and respond to high level commands?

Probably by a mixture of chance and conformity to the laws. Then it is accelerated by reflexion and communication. It is a complex question.

That's what I'm interested in .. this "conformity to the laws" and "refexion and communication". What could that be other than sense?

It is more primitive that sense. Semantics can be based on such notions, which can be based on number relations. It is not obvious. You need a bit of mathematical logic to grasp this.

Not between the high level program and the low level program, but between the X-Level truths and laws and all local functions?

Above the substitution level, only god knows, but you can bet and theorize locally, and, below the substitution level, you get the full arithmetical mess, the union on all sigma_i formula, well beyond the computable. It is not easy, but there are mathematical lanterns, and deep symmetries, and deep self-referential insight.
It is a reality that the universal machines cannot avoid.

It is the advantage of comp, you can translate the problem in arithmetic, but it is not necessarily a "simple", sigma_1, problem. There is a no universal panacea capable of satisfying all universal machines at once, nothing is easy.
You have to look inward, eventually.

I won't be able to understand that, but it seems to me that if exotic capabilities like 1p awareness can be made up of dumb programmatic elements, then the top-down influence of potential intelligence must be equally important as the bottom-up blind stacking of logical operators. It seems like you want it both ways - that the higher order arithmetic magic of UMs are both separate from the primitive machines of today, but the potential for magic is inherent and inevitable strictly from inferences of the lowest arithmetic truths.

Not at all, they are beyond. You still think about arithmetic like if incompleteness wasn't discovered.

I see incompleteness as a limitation on the ontology of arithmetic, but you see it as an invitation to omnipotence.

I see it as pointing on the fundamental difference between truth and what is observable, guessable, sharable, communicable, etc. Incompleteness concerns our limitation, already just in front of the arithmetical facts.

Since we can know that incompleteness exists though, I see that as supporting the idea that sense transcends the limits of any particular arithmetic or logical model of it.

It transcends the ability of the terrestrial and divine creatures (except perhaps god, but with comp even god is a bit overwhelmed by the creation: matter is when god loose power). You might still confuse a bit the truth, and what creatures can take from the truth. We can only scratch the surface, we are limited even through the experiential, but much more through the communicable. That can explain why there is art.

Yes, I'm not hung up on communication. Sense has all kinds of modalities in which experiences can be shared besides verbal language. I see arithmetic as a specialized language, which is tailored to a specific class of lowest common denominator 3p universals. An immensely powerful language, obviously, but its power is inversely proportional to its ability to properly address 1p proprietary significance. It bets on 3p so much that it sees 1p as a complex assembly of 3p rather than the simplicity behind all possible wholes.

That would make you into an intuitionist, but that does not change much in comp, or in arithmetic.

I don't understand why. Lots of things are incomplete, but we don't assume that it means they are the ground of being. Why not language? That seems much more incomplete and creative than arithmetic.

Language are mode of expression. You *can* see machines as languages, but it can confuse the beginners. The important distinction is between truth and communicable.

We are indeed question ourselves. A brain, or a universal number, is just an encapsulation of a question that the arithmetical reality asks to itself, somehow. We are divine hypotheses, not answers.

I don't see the human experience as merely hypothesis or questions.

That is why I prefer to separate machine and language, as it shows quickly that we are hypothetical (and immaterial) ourselves. But we are, in normal struggling for life situation, prevented to know this. Again, it is the conflict between life and afterlife. Theology is ... a morbid science, if you think twice on it.

To me it's like turning on a black light and concluding that only fluorescent colors are real. Human experience has theological dimensions, questions, and hypotheticals which engender the 'unbearable lightness of being', but there are other aspects of it as well. That lightness is not a valid basis to try to duplicate our universe or ourselves if a creator had to start from scratch.

We are participants, shapers of divinity itself. When we are thirsty and drink cool pure water, there is no question or answer, there is only the explosive tangibility of direct sensory participation. The representation function is not plausible to justify such a presentation.

We cannot represent to ourself that association, if it exists, but this impossibility can be explained.

That sounds like a dodge. What are you saying it is that we can't represent to ourselves?

Semantically, yes.

That we participate in the world? That we can enjoy drinking water without having questions be answered?

Notably. Among many things.

We need certain vitamins also, yet we do not find the inhalation of powdered vitamin pills to be an adequate substitute for nutritious food. Even if pleasure could be justified as a motivator (it can't, really) in a quantitative universe, there would not be any advantage to having aesthetic variation in that pleasure. As in a game, the abstraction of 'points' or 'scoring' is quite sufficient to drive any advantageous mechanical action.

It does not, for real time behavior, in concrete complex environment.

Aha! Now you smuggle in a natural physical universe when it suits your position.

No. I assume some physical reality at the start, if not I wouldn't define comp with artficial and physical brain, build by real doctors, who promised they will work in real time, so that I can see the next real soccer cup. What is not assumed, and eventually abandoned, is the idea that such "real physical phenomena" have to be assume at the start.

Real time is meaningless to a machine. However long the program takes is the only reality of time there can ever be. Complexity is a human expectation. Machines have no particular recognition of complexity as far as I can tell. Concrete? Hahaha. Concrete indeed.

It is local, like your sensory experiences. You make opportunistic statements. Try to get the point.

Qualia chunks a lot the information,

So do variables and subroutines, databases chunk as much information as you want. Isn't the whole of quanta dedicated to chunking information?

Not really. Apparently consciousness and qualia accelerates informations processing in an unboundable way.

You run out of Greek letters, so instead of stacking Greek and Chinese characters you invent color and feelings out of nowhere?

That's what we do.

I don't understand how nobody here can see that the wheels fall off of Comp as soon as you try to justify qualia as a quant function.

This cannot be done entirely, but that fact can be explained. That's the point.

You want qualia having no role at all? You will become eliminativist or epiphenomenalist, then.

and accelerate your doing with respect to the most probable universal neighbor. Funnily, the first time I have been called crackpot, was when I said that one day computer would use screen and images, instead of printing tape. For exactly that reason. But today, the computers use screen only for the help of the user. One day they will use mental screening and imaging to speed themselves up. But that will still take some time. We are not yet at the beginning of machine evolution, even if the little baby gods are already born (the universal numbers, brain and computers).

We disagree there. I think that optical image production is superfluous to data transfer, storage, integration, etc. If you need to add hardware and software to encode the data as images and decode images as data, then why not just skip the images and send the data?

Because for me and you, but also for machine, the images can structured the relevant information in a way which speed up the retrievable of what is important. Of course that simplicity need a big work for the brain/computer, but once you have it, you win lot of time, which is a key to find prey and escape predators. Wandering spiders have much big eyes than waiting spiders, for example.



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