On 02 Apr 2013, at 15:38, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Tuesday, April 2, 2013 4:44:45 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 01 Apr 2013, at 17:23, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Monday, April 1, 2013 6:12:48 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 31 Mar 2013, at 21:54, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Sunday, March 31, 2013 10:59:22 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 30 Mar 2013, at 14:19, Craig Weinberg wrote:

If, instead of a video screen and joystick, I had an arcade game fitted with a speaker and microphone, I could have another computer programmed to play PacMan on the first machine using only modem-like screeching to satisfy the logic of the PacMan game. Instead of graphic ghosts and visible maze, there would be squealing sound representing what would have been the pixels on a screen. There would be no difference for this equipment at all. As long as the representation was isomorphic, it would make no difference to either computer that there was no visual experience of PacMan at all but instead just one dimensional noise streaming back and forth between two machines.

If you want me to believe that a machine could support an experience, then you have to explain why and how that is even a remote possibility without begging the question by smuggling in our own experience. If I do not agree that we are only machines, then I do not agree that our experience is evidence of machine experience.

I have never said it is an evidence. It is just by definition of comp, which is my working hypothesis. You are the one saying that comp is false.

That means that from the start, the only way to suggest that machines can't be conscious is to suggest that people can't be conscious,

This does not follow from what I said. All I say is that you make a stroing statement: machines cannot support thinking, but you don't provide any argument, at least none that I can understand. You refer to your experience, and indeed vindicate the right to do that in some post.

The argument that I have provided (repeatedly) is that machines are necessarily assembled as a configuration of forms in space according to an agenda or motivation which is foreign to the assembly. A living organism is not assembled but rather its growth and reproduction are autopoietic and native to the circumstance of its initiation as an event in time. My position is that all natural bodies are a reflection of some set of sensory-motor experiences on some level of description (speed, scale) and that forms and functions are driven by sense and motive. Artificial systems are not biological bodies since they are assembled rather than reproduced from a single cell, therefore the quality of the sense experiences are limited to the inorganic range of quality. They lack the experience of caring about their own survival, and consequently have no capacity for empathy, warmth, understanding, or emotion, which are, IMO the roots of intelligence which cannot be substituted by abstract rules.

I tend to agree with you, insofar as it looks like what the machines already tell me. You are good in phenomenology, but bad in logic, and it is sad, because it prevents you to appreciate that the machines might agree with you, somehow. But now you will have to convince those machines that they are machines, and some of them, like you, will have some serious difficulty to swallow the pill.

Comp share this with the Gödelian sentence: it asserts at some level its own non believability. The more you understand comp, the less you can believe in it. It is normal.

which would be sophistry. I'm not playing that game though. My interest is in understanding the nature of consciousness and its relation to physics and information. What I have come up with explains exactly why machine functions cannot be conflated with experience, and why presentations cannot arise from representations alone.

If a machine works without an experience, why invent any such thing as experience?

If you accept the antic theory of knowledge, then machines, once above the Löbian complexity threshold, cannot not have experience.

What's the antic theory of knowledge?

That "knowing p -> p", "knowing p -> knowing knowing p", that "knowing (p -> q) -> knowing p -> knowing q. . the modus ponens rule, and the necessitation rule from A infer knowing A. It the modal logic known as S4.

What relates this to a complexity threshold and the possibility of experience?

It is a bit technical, but in a nutshell, it means that such machines can refute Socrates' refutation of Theaetetus proposal to define knowledge by the true opinion. Church's thesis rehabilitates Pythagoras, and Gödel's incompleteness rehabilitates the Theaetetus theory of knowledge, and this by giving the classical theory of knowledge, with one axiom more, to be precise.

I tried to look it up but nobody on the internet seems to have ever mentioned it in the history of the world.

The internet is not God. You might have to go to some good library. You might serach on "modal S4".

Ok. I found some modal logic pages with S4.

OK. The Löbian theory of knowledge is S4 + Grz (Grz = [] ([] (p-> []p) -> p) -> p, a weird formula which can lead to antisymmetrical evolution of knowledge states).

I don't see what complexity has to do with the possibility of experience - quality of experience, sure, but possibility?

The complexity treshold is the Löbian treshold. It is rather low. It gives a universal machine the ability to know, in some weak sense, that she is universal. It is responsible for mal-king the machine beliefs and knowledge to be introspective enough and verify []p -> [] [] p. Like in the knowledge theory above.

Why would that be an experience?

That was not experience. Only sharable beliefs. the experience is when the belief is acknowledge by God, if you want. When the belief happens to be true, or related to truth in some way.

When a toilet float turns off the flow of water by pulling a lever, does that mean the toilet as a whole is having a conscious experience?

Plausibly not as a toilet float mechanism lacks the ability to represent itself, and so there is no room for making relatively true some self-referential fixed point. You need at least universality for that, and more for self-consciousness.

Now, universality is very cheap, and it might be that your toilet float is universal when seen in some way, but then its consciousness might be trivial, in the complete beatitude of the blissful ignorance, and without the slightest awareness of its instinctive turning off the flow of water. May be some atemporal and fuzzy reminiscence of the ocean, brought by the water, who knows, but that is in arithmetic, and the float toilet mechanism is in your mind, in the FPI sense.

If Donkey Kong works just as well without anyone seeing him, then why have a modem sound either? Just connect the two machines directly.

The pathetic fallacy is not a logical fallacy.

No, it's more important than logic.

I think the pathetic fallacy is, as a fallacy, itself a pathetic fallacy. From which I can't conclude.

I understand that is your position, but I think that is a radically theoretical view which doesn't apply to the universe in which we actually live. In this universe, not everything that can be programmed to smile on command has emotions.

We cannot program emotion. We can program "help yourself, or multiply yourself". Emotion have simple roots, but get quickly highly entangled in a non predictible way with the intensional variant of self-reference when emerging in long story.

Can't something help or multiply itself without emotion?

When the resources are limited, emotion and conflicts might appear.

From where?

Locally. Most animals becomes aggressive when they lack rooms.

Emotions might appear when the universal instinctive goal (multiply) is jeopardized by the local situation.

Why would they? What would be the function of emotions?

To decide quickly in human complex situation involving complex attraction and repulsion, playing at different levels, with internal and external conflicts.

To motivate the running in front of the predator, and the food forecasting.

You just say that you believe that comp is false, but machines have naturally that belief, as comp is provably counter-intuitive.

That's just comp feeding back on its own confirmation bias. Comp is a machine which can only see itself. It's the inevitable inversion meme which arises from mistaking forms and functions for reality rather than the capacity to project and receive them.

Yes, comp feedback in this way. You don't like that, apparently, but that's not an argument. I am not defending comp, I am just criticizing the reason you provide to think that comp is false.

I have repeatedly provided a whole list of reasons but your criticism is not really offering any criticism other than that you don't think my view has any merit.

On the contrary. I do see merit in some serious non-comp theory. I am criticizing only your philosophy/opinion, and non valid defense of it, that it is obvious that machines cannot support persons.

I don't think that it is obvious that machines cannot support persons. To understand why they won't requires a deep understanding of privacy as a qualitative enrichment through experience and a willingness to see persons as sensory-motor participants rather than Doxastic functions.

That is not an argument.

Is that an argument?

No. It is an observation.

You don't explain why though.

I am the one asking "why". You are saying that a theory is wrong, and I just show that your reasoning is non valid.

You don't show that my reasoning is non valid,

I did, and Stathis tries too, but your approach is too fuzzy, so you can answer all points, but when we try to see the point, it begs the question and relies on the idea that we are not machine. When we show to you that you get zombie, you never answer.

I *always* answer. The notion of zombies is a misinterpretation of what might ordinarily be called a puppet or a pretender.

No a puppet pretends nothing. The man who manipulate the puppet might pretend something, but not the puppet.

To be a pretender ypou already need to be conscious. A zombie cannot be a pretender.

These are everywhere, I hope you would agree. From patterns of color that we take for faces of actors on TV, film, or photo, to voice mail systems, to scarecrows...

We have stop to believe that statue are alive, though. But in the case of machines, it is different, as the biology described Turing emulable mechanism, and physics too, and computer science shows that little programs can eat their own tail, and develop complex relation with itself, which is not done by puppet, voice mail system, nor movies, etc.

the effectiveness of a simulation depends on the sensitivity of the audience. It is about perceptual relativity and has nothing to do with the actual presence of a subjective experience.

OK. But that is true for man, machines and any possible aliens alike. False cops in wood will progress. There will be quasi-zombies, but there will have very mlimited range of mimics, and will be quite different from program reflecting themselves coherently through long histories, and which have those fixed points or not, as only truth know and we have to be cautious on that.

I have given numerous examples, such as the lack of recovered personal memories from the 1940s by contemporary Elvis impersonators.


These do not beg the question, and they do not rely on the idea that we are not machines, they support and inspire the idea that we are not machines.

Supporty and inspire? That's look like propaganda.

You just say that they are puppet, like if that change of name would invalidate the argument.

Then you don't understand the significance of the name change. The name zombie refers to a living being whose consciousness is absent. This is quite ordinary in sleepwalking people and blindsight shows that we can also have zombie vision.

I dont believe in zombie vision. Those are case of dissociation. Likewize, I don't believe in unconscious sleepwalking people. They are in a quite altered state of consciousness, hard to rememeber, but "non consciousness" might be non sensical, with comp. It can't be a first person experience. It is always a relative judgement from outside.

The p-zombie is a problem because it takes for granted the premise that consciousness is a function.

The contrary. It makes look like consciousness has no function, given that the zombie acts exactly like if it was conscious, but is not.

To accept the existence of p-zombie makes consciousness even more mysterious, as it makes it without any function.

With comp, consciousness has many important role, from exploiting free will, accelerate the self-independence from the universal neighbors, scheduling the path from earth to heaven, developing relative responsibility, etc.

That is an unrecoverable error and it explains the appearance of the paradox. Asking about a p-zombie is effectively asking 'what happens when a function is not itself?' Since consciousness is not a function, but rather the ground of being and the source of all functions, there is no absence of consciousness, only changes of scale and depth of aesthetic quality.

I can agree with that. But you insist that the degree might depend on the nature of our parts, and I don't see why.

you just say, correclty that I won't subscribe to comp's own criteria of validation.

That does not really exist. There are criteria of refutation, but there is no experimental validation. Just local confirmation, which are simply absence of refutation.

How convenient for comp.

Come on. That's the case for "all" theories. Even the theory according to which you have parents. Science can only make hypothesis, and we progress when shown false. The rest is war and violence, from people using the old trick to exploit the others, which has play some role in our history, but which we try to escape, with civilization (= open mind on different hypothesis/belief/axiom/opinion).

You assume that I am doing this because I am stubborn and ignorant of the math...which I am both,

I never make assumption of that kind. I suspect some incompetence in logic, but not that you are stubborn. Racist, perhaps, but stubborn?

I am no more of a sensory-motor supremacist than you are an arithmetic supremacist. Your accusation of racist is hypocrisy.

No, it is factual. It just that you like me, so you are kind enough to give steak to my sun in law, but you despise him so much, just because of what I take as different clothe (a silicon brain).

but that isn't why I reject comp's criteria of validation. I reject comp's validation because *I can*, and because I can it means that my non-comp approach is superior at modeling the limits of comp than comp is of modeling its own limits.

The whole technical point is that machine are very good to guess their own limitations. Again, you just affirm you are superior, but that is not an argument.

If I have the ability to disregard arithmetic truth, but a machine does not, then I am superior in that regard.


Be careful. Look at this ( about 47 minutes) to get what we can get when disregarding arithmetic.


Gosh, I can no more see it in my country!

I can *feel* the difference

You can feel private things. You cannot feel what another entity feel or not.

If you can claim to know what I can or cannot feel, then you claim to be able to do precisely what you insist I cannot do.


Of course I use comp, but if you can feel that some other cannot feel, then you assert non-comp in a very strong way. You say that you don"t need to assume non-comp, as you know it to be true. Sorry but this is pseudo-science and pseudo-religion.

and see the difference aesthetically, while comp can only poke and prod around in the dark, making statistical bets - using no intuition, no instinct, no sense of value or appropriateness, no empathy or nuance. Comp is autism.

Is not non-comp autism with respect to machines?

Sure. Which should be an indicator that the overlap between sentient being and machine is narrow.

Of course, but only by your pretension.

It only shows that it is hard for a person to believe she is locally supported by a machine. But "hard to believe" is not an argument.

If a sighted person sees what a blind person does not, then the sighted person will find it hard to believe that the blind person's view of reality is complete. The fact of it being hard to believe is not the argument, but a symptom of the inability of the blind person to even participate in the argument. For the blind person, there is no argument. Sight is simply the ability to detect the locations of various objects in your environment, by touch, by echolocation, by smell, etc. How does the sighted person argue against the blind? What contradiction in their blindness can she show?


I wrote a post... 

There is no specific challenge to all of the things I mentioned. I say pathetic fallacy, you say you don't respect it. I say the Map is not the Territory and the Menu is not the Meal but you don't seem to accept that these are comprehensible ideas.

They just comfort opinion, without making a point.

Isn't that what you are doing when you say that? These things make clear, common sense points as far as I can tell. How does your assertion that they don't change that? To say the map is not the territory is quite precise and profound. The point is to provide an obvious example for why we cannot assume representations automatically imply presentations, and vice versa. How is that not a point? It is an observation about the ontology of perception and physics which seems to be universally true, but is completely ignored and denied in comp.

Where and why would perception be ignored by comp? It is not.

Can you support that?

Google on artificial smell, automated vision, robotics, etc.

All seems to evaporate into a smoke screen and impatience. You don't take the argument seriously and always fall back on my ignorance of mathematical theory. My arguments question the foundation of math itself though.

That makes your point even weaker. It is up to you to either abandon your strong assertion that comp is false. You can study non- comp without it. I respect and encourage alternative to comp. But you says that comp is false, and just explain why you believe so, without showing a contradiction in comp.

Why I understand comp is false is precisely because I see that it can only reflect on its own truths and has no independent access to what is present. It is an echo chamber, and all logic is ultimately circular, having no access to the thinker themselves. Logic is the deferment of personal feeling, so it can never make sense of the very feelings which inspire logical intent to begin with.

You ignore self-reference theory, the 3p and the 1p. The logic is circular, but the circles can be shown explicitly not being "vicious".

It still cannot transcend logic into feeling, sensation, or presentation of any kind.

On the contrary, it cannot avoid it.

I have no tricks or invalid arguments that I know of, and I don't see that I am being careless at all.

Which means probably that you should learn a bit of argumentation, to be frank. Or just assume your theory and be cautious on the theory of other people.

I'm only interested in uncovering the truth about consciousness. What other people think and do is none of my business.

You are asserting without argument that a theory is incorrect,

I have been asserting my arguments in writing for thousands of hours. Why do you say that it is without argument unless it is simply too awful to accept that there is no valid counter-argument?

I have not seen argument which does not invoke wishful thinking, or begging of the question.

For example?

Just read what you wrote above.

I don't see any wishful thinking or begging of the question. Maybe unsupported innuendo, but that's an intentional provocation.

That does not help.

Neither does  'Just read what you wrote above. '

If you find a real argument against comp, publish it, and you will become famous. But in the literature, all arguments against comp (like Lucas and Penrose for example) have been debunked.

You can't debunk comp using mathematical theory, you have to reason from the perceptual experience.

This is equivalent with "God phoned me and told me that comp is false". That might be true, but is not an argument.

Not at all. If you are underwater, you are limited to tools which can be used underwater. Math floats on the surface of the water of feeling and builds structures in the air, but it cannot get beneath itself...which is what Gödel showed, but apparently not in your view.

Gödel shows on the contrary that the incompleteness can be proved by or in the theory itself.

But what it proves is that provability is incomplete.

But it proves that the machines can prove that, and that they becomes transfinitely-complete-able on expanding creative path, and they can even come back.

Math can spread out on the surface of the world's ocean, and it can infer many things from the motions on the surface, make predictions, predict the weather, etc, but the depths of the ocean will always be inaccessible to it.

That's correct, and has already been proved by machines, when looking inward.

Ok. So would you say that the surface is the top of the water or that the water is a collection of merged surfaces?

I don't see whay I would say that. The ocean was an image. The problem, but also the richness, of comp, is that there are infinitely many infinite abysses. It is big and complex.

As far as I'm concerned, it is comp that has to argue against its own presentation problems.

Comp, like tuns of theories, has many problems. Having a problem is more a symptom of being interesting than being false.

If having major problems is not a symptom of being false,


then what could be?

Getting a contradiction.

Isn't a contradiction a major problem?

A fatal one, sure. But getting a formulable non solved problem is on the contrary a mark that there is something interesting.

It may not be proof that a theory is false, but having problems is certainly a symptom of a false theory.

Not at all. It is a symptom of being refutable, interesting, improvable, enrich-able, etc.

A cough is a symptom of both a cold and tuberculosis. Not all coughs mean tuberculosis but all tuberculosis could be potentially identified by a cough. How else can a theory be false?

A tuberculosis can be inferred from a cough, and then from further analysis, which refute or confirm, but never prove. We never prove anything about reality. Nature or reality only refutes.

and you do this by assuming that it cannot do this or that, but with no argument that your personal feeling.

Why are common sense observations shared by all people since the beginning of humanity reduced to 'my personal feeling', but esoteric works of mathematics from the last couple of centuries are are infallible?

They are not infallible, and personal feeling are not argument.

Why aren't personal feelings an argument when the subject is the ability of persons and feelings to exist?

Because they are personal, and quite variate among different people. That is why we make theories, and reason hypothetico- deductively, and keeping in mind that any theory can be false.

That they are variable is a characteristic of personality itself. If you make depersonalized theories then you can only trace a universal outline which is the underlap of all personhood, i.e. the universal unperson = comp.

Or the universal person.

No, that's what I'm saying, that is a misunderstanding of the ontology of private physics. Personhood is inseparable from proprietary uniqueness. They are the same physical phenomenon. The universal person is dehydrated water.


Don't you see that you are a priori disqualifying the very thing that you think you are explaining? There can be no theory which becomes an experience and Comp is a theory about theories.

Comp is a theological theory assuming that machine can vehiculate immaterial, and even partially non mechanical experience. Computer science gives the room for it, and this is enough to refute your point, independently of the truth or falsity of comp.

What does it mean for a machine to vehiculate? Look at how graphic animation works. There is no movement. There is only rapid (to our visual sense) cycling of pixels flashing on and off. Like the marquee effect, where blinking lights seem to be moving in some direction to us but the instruction to the video screen does nothing but blink stationary lights in a particular pattern. Why move a if you can teleport?

Indeed. With comp, movement and the whole of physics are reduced to arithmetical teleportation, through the FPI. Indeed.

Ok, so that is something unexplained for comp for it to find some sorely needed self doubt.

? the comp machine does self-doubt, that ius why I insist that it is an hypothesis, and that it asks for an act of faith. You are the one asserting some "truth", instead of assumption.

I just explain to you that machines might have already that feeling, as it looks like when we listen to them.

I understand that, but I'm saying that the whole idea that machines might have any feeling at all is unsupported by anything except the very theory which begs the question to begin with.

Assuming is not begging. If you assume non-comp it is all right. But you pretend to have an argument against comp, so it is normal we ask it too you, and well, we don't really see an argument. To be sure, machines cannot think, and the expression "machine can think" is a short cut for "machine can support a person with respect to some environment".

I don't assume non-comp, like Deleuze, I reason that comp is representation, and representation can neither receive nor mobilize anything on its own.

That's non-comp. The question is why a person can't neither receive and mobilize things on its own, when represented at or below some representation level.

That begs the question of personhood as computation though. It presumes our personal awareness is a function of impersonal, 3p dynamics of information processing. A person is not that though. A person is an experience which includes sub-personal and super- personal contexts, but it is a sensory-motor system from top to bottom.

Comp explains the difference between the impersonal 3p and the personal 1p.

I don't doubt that. I can explain the differences between a Michelin three star restaurant and McDonalds but that doesn't make me a gourmet chef. Comp can be used to find a functional skeleton of the universal-personal symmetry but it can only do so from the universal reductive perspective.

You are the reductionist. You are the soul eliminativist for the machines and the humans with artificial brain. The comp people are those who will give the right to vote to some future machines. The right to marry a machine, etc.

Experience can inform, but that is not the primary function of experience. The primary function of qualia is not a function at all, it is just appreciation of aesthetic presence. It is because we are present as sense-motor participants in a public context of the same that we must receive and mobilize public interactions. Representations have no such participation.

If qualia and consciousness have no function, how can they participate? How can experience be fundamental. You contradict your own theory.

They participate because they make up the cosmos.


They are participation itself. Experience is fundamental because "How" is a question which arises through experience. I don't contradict my own theory at all.

I was asking how, indeed, but you don't answer.

That's why we can think about eating a baby without actually hurting any babies. That's why we can erase a character in a virtual world without anyone in that world mourning the loss. It's hard even to articulate examples of this because it is so pervasive and plainly obvious.

Nothing is plainly obvious around the mind-body problem.

It's pretty obvious that there is a difference between a person and a picture of a person.


It's pretty obvious that if you photoshop someone out of an image that the other people in the image don't miss them.

But none of those analogies shows that it ios pretty obvious that a machine can't develop her own conscious privacy.
You argument looks like "machines cannot think, just look at my fridge".

It like, "organic animals cannot walk on the moon, look at the amoebas!".

Any example you can give me of a representation I can show you how it doesn't mobilize or receive anything. No computation occurs in a vacuum, of its own intention, it must always be a reflection or projection within some genuine presentation of material objects or subjective experiences.


Because computation is not an independent phenomenon, it is a particular protocol of sense so that it can only ride on the back of something which has sensory experience.

Excellent. That is indeed a non trivial consequence of comp, correct for the *physical* computations.

Computations in general are just arithmetical relations, and are supposed with elementary arithmetic at the start.

Why would machines feel anything? "Well, lets assume that we are machines, and therefore whatever we do is something that a machine can do, including feel." Or, we could assume that we are ears of corn, and therefore whatever we do is something that an ear of corn can do if it was coaxed into becoming as complex a vegetable as we are. We could decide that we are a TV show, and that TV shows will someday evolve into us, so that the shows we see now are just baby shows where the characters haven't grown very realistic yet.

You are correct. If we assume that we are angels, then we can conclude that angels can feel. But nowhere I have attempted to prove that machine can feel. It is my working assumption, and I am interested in its fundamental consequence. But *you* pretend that comp is necessary wrong, so we wait for the argument. Not a personal feeling.

I don't pretend comp is wrong, I reason that it cannot be right.

That reasoning is missing. You always end up refering to your opinion or experience. That explain why you assume non-comp, not why we should assume it.

I invite others to use their reason also.

The arguments have been listed several times but they boil down to the presentation problem. Computation has no need for any kind of sensory-motor presentation.


Because it has data instead.

They comes from the sum on infinities of computations.

Why? Why would a sum of computations begin to itch or get dizzy?

I don't know, you tell me why not, as you are the one who says that this is impossible. You must justify your assertion. I assert nothing, as I assume comp only.

It has no capability to bring any presentation into being.


Because if it did, we wouldn't need need any hardware. Our experience is that a stop sign doesn't make anything stop unless that thing cares about its interpretation of that sign.

I do not use some particular personal feeling as evidence against comp, but the unquestionable variety of aesthetic modalities that we experience make no sense as a compression algorithm.

There are infinitely many other algorithms.

Ok, but why would any algorithm have any particular aesthetic modality?

Why not?

Because it doesn't need one

How do you know that?

and it can't generate one.


If it could, you would not need a sound card or a video screen, you could just feel data directly.

That is what happen with the brain, but universal machines want more and they have to handle the new data with hands or machines.

Again, my PacMan example. I can play PacMan on one computer, and have the data from the game sent over a fast modem as screeching noises to another computer, which will be able to play the game just as well. I won't be able to play at all without the video graphics though.

Nor the other computer, unless you help him to handle the noise, or give him the time to learn or something.

The whole point of universal machines is their universality - what would be the point of converting data into sensations and then back into data?

Communication and action relatively to a probable world.

Why is the world different from a data set?


If the world is a simulation, then why isn't it an invisible, intangible data set?

Are dreams invisible intangible data sets?

I am a logician. I defend more the use of valid reasoning than the truth of any proposition, including comp.

Let me give you a good argument against comp. It does look obvious that there is primitive fundamental physical reality. But with comp that cannot exist in any reasonable sense by the UDA argument, so comp is wrong.

That's not a good argument to me, it's the straw man you keep in stock. I can easily see how memory could naturally acquire the kinds of characteristics which we consider physical - fixed positions, reliable connections, efficiently organized forms, etc. That is not a problem for me, and I have no problem understanding that functions in time map to topologies in space.



The elephant in comp's room is this: Presentation. Sensory-motor participation. Experience. This will never be explained by any theory.

In a 100% way? You are right. But this does not add a iota to the idea that it is false.

If the theory asserts that experience can be explained by something other than experience, then I think it does mean that theory is ultimately false.

This explains why you don't study the theory.

I tried. And I appreciate the phenomenology, but you waste it by wanting to be not a theory, but a sort of communicable religious conviction against another theory.
It is sad, for your theory. Not just my sun in law.

Only a theory which begins and ends with experience can explain the universe.


Because experience isn't a plausible outcome of unexperienced forms or functions. Functions can lead to functions, but they need no forms or experience. Forms can imply forms which could lead to functions but again, no experience would be involved.

"Functions" is ambiguous. They can be defined extensionnally (set of input-output) or intensionally with programs and machines. That leads to different mathematics, and for intensional functions, the evidence is that they develop private truth, experience, etc. Indeed a whole theology, including their physics.

The same evidence also would show that they have no experience but are able to simulate it when programmed by someone with that expectation.

That is true for any of us. It is your acceptance of zombie.

Of course the weakness of that argument is that there is no evidence for a *primitively* physical reality. There are only evidences for a physical reality. And here comp explains where such evidences comes from.
So you will have to try harder.
Or just develop your theory, keeping some agnosticism about the fact that your theory might contradict or not some other theories. May be you will find a valid contradiction by working in that way, in comp or in your theory. If not you look like a philosopher having some prejudice against some entities a priori.

Again, I only care about explaining consciousness.

It seems to me that if you start from experience, then you take consciousness for granted.

It seems to me that if you start from anywhere else, you still take consciousness for granted,

But I do that explicitly, with the definition of comp. Then I listen to the machine about that question.

So we both take consciousness for granted. What does comp explain then?

Theology including physics, and 99% of consciousness, and this from elementary arithmetic (+ "yes doctor" and Church's thesis).



You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Reply via email to