On 29 Mar 2013, at 13:31, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Friday, March 29, 2013 6:28:02 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 28 Mar 2013, at 20:36, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Thursday, March 28, 2013 1:29:19 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 28 Mar 2013, at 13:23, Craig Weinberg wrote:

Strong AI may not really want to understand consciousness

This is a rhetorical trick. You put intention in the mind of others. You can't do that.

You can say something like,: "I read some strong AI proponents and they dismiss consciousness, ..., and cite them, but you can't make affirmative statement on a large class of people.

That's interesting because it seems like you make statements about large classes of UMs frequently. You say that they have no answers on the deep questions, or that they don't see themselves as machines. What if Strong AI is a program...a meme or spandrel?

What if the soul is in the air, and that each time you cut your hair you become a zombie?

Then people would avoid cutting their hair I would imagine. Unless they were suffering. But seriously, what makes you think that Strong AI is not itself a rogue machine, implanted in minds to satisfy some purely quantitative inevitability?







You are coherent because you search a physical theory of consciousness, and that is indeed incompatible with comp.

I don't seek a physical theory of consciousness exactly, I more seek a sensory-motive theory of physics.

I will wait for serious progresses.






But your argument against comp are invalid, beg the questions, and contains numerous trick like above. Be more careful please.

That sounds like another 'magician's dismissal' to me. I beg no more question than comp does.

You miss the key point. There is no begging when making clear what you assume. You can assume comp, as you can assume non-comp. But you do something quite different; you pretend that comp is false. So we ask for an argument, and there you beg the question, by using all the time that comp must be false in your argument, and that is begging the question.

Comp is false not because I want it to be or assume it is, but because I understand that experience through time can be the only fundamental principle, and bodies across space is derived. I have laid out these reasons for this many times - how easy it is to succumb to the pathetic fallacy, how unlikely it is for experience to have any possible utility for arithmetic, how absent any sign of personality is in machines, how we can easily demonstrate information processing without particular qualia arising, etc. These are just off the top of my head. Anywhere you look in reality you can find huge gaping holes in Comp's assumptions if you choose to look, but you aren't going to see them if you are only listening to the echo chamber of Comp itself. Indeed, if we limit ourselves to only mathematical logic to look at mathematical logic, we are not going to notice that the entire universe of presentation is missing. Comp has a presentation problem, and it is not going to go away.


Well if you *understand* that time is fundamental, then comp is false for you.
The pathetic fallacy is not a logical fallacy.
You just say that you believe that comp is false, but machines have naturally that belief, as comp is provably counter-intuitive.










I have no tricks or invalid arguments that I know of, and I don't see that I am being careless at all.

Which means probably that you should learn a bit of argumentation, to be frank. Or just assume your theory and be cautious on the theory of other people.

I'm only interested in uncovering the truth about consciousness. What other people think and do is none of my business.

You are asserting without argument that a theory is incorrect, and you do this by assuming that it cannot do this or that, but with no argument that your personal feeling. I just explain to you that machines might have already that feeling, as it looks like when we listen to them.

Bruno






Craig


Bruno






Craig


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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