On 29 Mar 2013, at 13:31, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Friday, March 29, 2013 6:28:02 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 28 Mar 2013, at 20:36, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Thursday, March 28, 2013 1:29:19 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 28 Mar 2013, at 13:23, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Strong AI may not really want to understand consciousness
This is a rhetorical trick. You put intention in the mind of
others. You can't do that.
You can say something like,: "I read some strong AI proponents and
they dismiss consciousness, ..., and cite them, but you can't make
affirmative statement on a large class of people.
That's interesting because it seems like you make statements about
large classes of UMs frequently. You say that they have no answers
on the deep questions, or that they don't see themselves as
machines. What if Strong AI is a program...a meme or spandrel?
What if the soul is in the air, and that each time you cut your hair
you become a zombie?
Then people would avoid cutting their hair I would imagine. Unless
they were suffering. But seriously, what makes you think that Strong
AI is not itself a rogue machine, implanted in minds to satisfy some
purely quantitative inevitability?
You are coherent because you search a physical theory of
consciousness, and that is indeed incompatible with comp.
I don't seek a physical theory of consciousness exactly, I more
seek a sensory-motive theory of physics.
I will wait for serious progresses.
But your argument against comp are invalid, beg the questions, and
contains numerous trick like above. Be more careful please.
That sounds like another 'magician's dismissal' to me. I beg no
more question than comp does.
You miss the key point. There is no begging when making clear what
you assume. You can assume comp, as you can assume non-comp. But you
do something quite different; you pretend that comp is false. So we
ask for an argument, and there you beg the question, by using all
the time that comp must be false in your argument, and that is
begging the question.
Comp is false not because I want it to be or assume it is, but
because I understand that experience through time can be the only
fundamental principle, and bodies across space is derived. I have
laid out these reasons for this many times - how easy it is to
succumb to the pathetic fallacy, how unlikely it is for experience
to have any possible utility for arithmetic, how absent any sign of
personality is in machines, how we can easily demonstrate
information processing without particular qualia arising, etc. These
are just off the top of my head. Anywhere you look in reality you
can find huge gaping holes in Comp's assumptions if you choose to
look, but you aren't going to see them if you are only listening to
the echo chamber of Comp itself. Indeed, if we limit ourselves to
only mathematical logic to look at mathematical logic, we are not
going to notice that the entire universe of presentation is missing.
Comp has a presentation problem, and it is not going to go away.
Well if you *understand* that time is fundamental, then comp is false
for you.
The pathetic fallacy is not a logical fallacy.
You just say that you believe that comp is false, but machines have
naturally that belief, as comp is provably counter-intuitive.
I have no tricks or invalid arguments that I know of, and I don't
see that I am being careless at all.
Which means probably that you should learn a bit of argumentation,
to be frank. Or just assume your theory and be cautious on the
theory of other people.
I'm only interested in uncovering the truth about consciousness.
What other people think and do is none of my business.
You are asserting without argument that a theory is incorrect, and you
do this by assuming that it cannot do this or that, but with no
argument that your personal feeling. I just explain to you that
machines might have already that feeling, as it looks like when we
listen to them.
Bruno
Craig
Bruno
Craig
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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