On 28 Mar 2013, at 20:36, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Thursday, March 28, 2013 1:29:19 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 28 Mar 2013, at 13:23, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Strong AI may not really want to understand consciousness
This is a rhetorical trick. You put intention in the mind of others.
You can't do that.
You can say something like,: "I read some strong AI proponents and
they dismiss consciousness, ..., and cite them, but you can't make
affirmative statement on a large class of people.
That's interesting because it seems like you make statements about
large classes of UMs frequently. You say that they have no answers
on the deep questions, or that they don't see themselves as
machines. What if Strong AI is a program...a meme or spandrel?
What if the soul is in the air, and that each time you cut your hair
you become a zombie?
You are coherent because you search a physical theory of
consciousness, and that is indeed incompatible with comp.
I don't seek a physical theory of consciousness exactly, I more seek
a sensory-motive theory of physics.
I will wait for serious progresses.
But your argument against comp are invalid, beg the questions, and
contains numerous trick like above. Be more careful please.
That sounds like another 'magician's dismissal' to me. I beg no more
question than comp does.
You miss the key point. There is no begging when making clear what you
assume. You can assume comp, as you can assume non-comp. But you do
something quite different; you pretend that comp is false. So we ask
for an argument, and there you beg the question, by using all the time
that comp must be false in your argument, and that is begging the
question.
I have no tricks or invalid arguments that I know of, and I don't
see that I am being careless at all.
Which means probably that you should learn a bit of argumentation, to
be frank. Or just assume your theory and be cautious on the theory of
other people.
Bruno
Craig
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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