On 30 Mar 2013, at 14:19, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Saturday, March 30, 2013 7:08:25 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 29 Mar 2013, at 13:31, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Friday, March 29, 2013 6:28:02 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 28 Mar 2013, at 20:36, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Thursday, March 28, 2013 1:29:19 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 28 Mar 2013, at 13:23, Craig Weinberg wrote:

Strong AI may not really want to understand consciousness

This is a rhetorical trick. You put intention in the mind of others. You can't do that.

You can say something like,: "I read some strong AI proponents and they dismiss consciousness, ..., and cite them, but you can't make affirmative statement on a large class of people.

That's interesting because it seems like you make statements about large classes of UMs frequently. You say that they have no answers on the deep questions, or that they don't see themselves as machines. What if Strong AI is a program...a meme or spandrel?

What if the soul is in the air, and that each time you cut your hair you become a zombie?

Then people would avoid cutting their hair I would imagine. Unless they were suffering. But seriously, what makes you think that Strong AI is not itself a rogue machine, implanted in minds to satisfy some purely quantitative inevitability?

You are coherent because you search a physical theory of consciousness, and that is indeed incompatible with comp.

I don't seek a physical theory of consciousness exactly, I more seek a sensory-motive theory of physics.

I will wait for serious progresses.

But your argument against comp are invalid, beg the questions, and contains numerous trick like above. Be more careful please.

That sounds like another 'magician's dismissal' to me. I beg no more question than comp does.

You miss the key point. There is no begging when making clear what you assume. You can assume comp, as you can assume non-comp. But you do something quite different; you pretend that comp is false. So we ask for an argument, and there you beg the question, by using all the time that comp must be false in your argument, and that is begging the question.

Comp is false not because I want it to be or assume it is, but because I understand that experience through time can be the only fundamental principle, and bodies across space is derived. I have laid out these reasons for this many times - how easy it is to succumb to the pathetic fallacy, how unlikely it is for experience to have any possible utility for arithmetic, how absent any sign of personality is in machines, how we can easily demonstrate information processing without particular qualia arising, etc. These are just off the top of my head. Anywhere you look in reality you can find huge gaping holes in Comp's assumptions if you choose to look, but you aren't going to see them if you are only listening to the echo chamber of Comp itself. Indeed, if we limit ourselves to only mathematical logic to look at mathematical logic, we are not going to notice that the entire universe of presentation is missing. Comp has a presentation problem, and it is not going to go away.

Well if you *understand* that time is fundamental, then comp is false for you.

I understand that *experience* (through 'time') is fundamental, only because no other option ultimately makes as much sense.

OK, but you never explain why. Of course experience are very important, but why could a machine not support one, when it can be shown that they will develop talk on their experience, and, if instrosoecive enough, be confronted to the same feeling that it has to be fundamental, and they are correct from the first person view.

The pathetic fallacy is not a logical fallacy.

No, it's more important than logic.

I think the pathetic fallacy is, as a fallacy, itself a pathetic fallacy. From which I can't conclude.

You just say that you believe that comp is false, but machines have naturally that belief, as comp is provably counter-intuitive.

That's just comp feeding back on its own confirmation bias. Comp is a machine which can only see itself. It's the inevitable inversion meme which arises from mistaking forms and functions for reality rather than the capacity to project and receive them.

Yes, comp feedback in this way. You don't like that, apparently, but that's not an argument. I am not defending comp, I am just criticizing the reason you provide to think that comp is false.

I have no tricks or invalid arguments that I know of, and I don't see that I am being careless at all.

Which means probably that you should learn a bit of argumentation, to be frank. Or just assume your theory and be cautious on the theory of other people.

I'm only interested in uncovering the truth about consciousness. What other people think and do is none of my business.

You are asserting without argument that a theory is incorrect,

I have been asserting my arguments in writing for thousands of hours. Why do you say that it is without argument unless it is simply too awful to accept that there is no valid counter-argument?

I have not seen argument which does not invoke wishful thinking, or begging of the question. If you find a real argument against comp, publish it, and you will become famous. But in the literature, all arguments against comp (like Lucas and Penrose for example) have been debunked.

and you do this by assuming that it cannot do this or that, but with no argument that your personal feeling.

Why are common sense observations shared by all people since the beginning of humanity reduced to 'my personal feeling', but esoteric works of mathematics from the last couple of centuries are are infallible?

They are not infallible, and personal feeling are not argument.

I just explain to you that machines might have already that feeling, as it looks like when we listen to them.

I understand that, but I'm saying that the whole idea that machines might have any feeling at all is unsupported by anything except the very theory which begs the question to begin with.

Assuming is not begging. If you assume non-comp it is all right. But you pretend to have an argument against comp, so it is normal we ask it too you, and well, we don't really see an argument. To be sure, machines cannot think, and the expression "machine can think" is a short cut for "machine can support a person with respect to some environment".

Why would machines feel anything? "Well, lets assume that we are machines, and therefore whatever we do is something that a machine can do, including feel." Or, we could assume that we are ears of corn, and therefore whatever we do is something that an ear of corn can do if it was coaxed into becoming as complex a vegetable as we are. We could decide that we are a TV show, and that TV shows will someday evolve into us, so that the shows we see now are just baby shows where the characters haven't grown very realistic yet.

You are correct. If we assume that we are angels, then we can conclude that angels can feel. But nowhere I have attempted to prove that machine can feel. It is my working assumption, and I am interested in its fundamental consequence. But *you* pretend that comp is necessary wrong, so we wait for the argument. Not a personal feeling.

I am a logician. I defend more the use of valid reasoning than the truth of any proposition, including comp.

Let me give you a good argument against comp. It does look obvious that there is primitive fundamental physical reality. But with comp that cannot exist in any reasonable sense by the UDA argument, so comp is wrong. Of course the weakness of that argument is that there is no evidence for a *primitively* physical reality. There are only evidences for a physical reality. And here comp explains where such evidences comes from.
So you will have to try harder.
Or just develop your theory, keeping some agnosticism about the fact that your theory might contradict or not some other theories. May be you will find a valid contradiction by working in that way, in comp or in your theory. If not you look like a philosopher having some prejudice against some entities a priori.




You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Reply via email to