On 03 Apr 2013, at 16:48, Craig Weinberg wrote:
snip
Computationalism is the opposite of reductionism. It points on the
failure of the reductionist conception on numbers and machines.
But it does so by swallowing whole all phenomena which are not
numbers and machines.
Not at all. It does that by attributing consciousness to person when
supported by the relevant arithmetical relations.
Therefore it is also reductionist,
Not at all. You are reductionist, as you reduce those person into
inexistent and see only their local bodies/arithmetical relations.
and *radically so* because all realism is reduced to the
consequences of arithmetic.
That is just because those consequences are enough for the ontology,
once we assume comp, and we prove in detail that the epistemology is
already not boundable by any mathematics.
I think it's telling that you deny that it is reductionist and claim
that it could be 'the opposite' of reductionism. It seems like you
don't care that all of the universe including our experience is
dehydrated into interchangeable granular sequences, as long as it
elevates and liberates arithmetic.
That is comp, and it liberate indeed the robots and many arithmetical
creature from reductionism. We get a view from inside, mainly private
and unknown from outside for those creature. You reduce them into
zombie.
What would a universe of numbers really want with personhood and
sensation?
It is an open question if the "universe of numbers" want something,
but it is provable that it cannot avoid the universal numbers,
relatively to each other, to develop complex multileveled public and
private relationships and personhood.
It should seem obvious that you are the reductionist here, as you
attribute consciousness to less entities than a computationalist.
Indeed you invoke a pathetic fallacy where a non reductionist, like a
computationalist, will invoke a possibly genuine consciousness,
sensation and personhood.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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