On 03 Apr 2013, at 16:48, Craig Weinberg wrote:


Computationalism is the opposite of reductionism. It points on the failure of the reductionist conception on numbers and machines.

But it does so by swallowing whole all phenomena which are not numbers and machines.

Not at all. It does that by attributing consciousness to person when supported by the relevant arithmetical relations.

Therefore it is also reductionist,

Not at all. You are reductionist, as you reduce those person into inexistent and see only their local bodies/arithmetical relations.

and *radically so* because all realism is reduced to the consequences of arithmetic.

That is just because those consequences are enough for the ontology, once we assume comp, and we prove in detail that the epistemology is already not boundable by any mathematics.

I think it's telling that you deny that it is reductionist and claim that it could be 'the opposite' of reductionism. It seems like you don't care that all of the universe including our experience is dehydrated into interchangeable granular sequences, as long as it elevates and liberates arithmetic.

That is comp, and it liberate indeed the robots and many arithmetical creature from reductionism. We get a view from inside, mainly private and unknown from outside for those creature. You reduce them into zombie.

What would a universe of numbers really want with personhood and sensation?

It is an open question if the "universe of numbers" want something, but it is provable that it cannot avoid the universal numbers, relatively to each other, to develop complex multileveled public and private relationships and personhood.

It should seem obvious that you are the reductionist here, as you attribute consciousness to less entities than a computationalist. Indeed you invoke a pathetic fallacy where a non reductionist, like a computationalist, will invoke a possibly genuine consciousness, sensation and personhood.



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