On Sunday, March 31, 2013 10:59:22 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 30 Mar 2013, at 14:19, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, March 30, 2013 7:08:25 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 29 Mar 2013, at 13:31, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, March 29, 2013 6:28:02 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 28 Mar 2013, at 20:36, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, March 28, 2013 1:29:19 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 28 Mar 2013, at 13:23, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Strong AI may not really want to understand consciousness
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> This is a rhetorical trick. You put intention in the mind of others. 
>>>> You can't do that. 
>>>>
>>>> You can say something like,: "I read some strong AI proponents and they 
>>>> dismiss consciousness, ..., and cite them, but you can't make affirmative 
>>>> statement on a large class of people.
>>>>
>>>
>>> That's interesting because it seems like you make statements about large 
>>> classes of UMs frequently. You say that they have no answers on the deep 
>>> questions, or that they don't see themselves as machines. What if Strong AI 
>>> is a program...a meme or spandrel?
>>>
>>>
>>> What if the soul is in the air, and that each time you cut your hair you 
>>> become a zombie? 
>>>
>>
>> Then people would avoid cutting their hair I would imagine. Unless they 
>> were suffering. But seriously, what makes you think that Strong AI is not 
>> itself a rogue machine, implanted in minds to satisfy some purely 
>> quantitative inevitability?
>>  
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> You are coherent because you search a physical theory of consciousness, 
>>>> and that is indeed incompatible with comp.
>>>>
>>>
>>> I don't seek a physical theory of consciousness exactly, I more seek a 
>>> sensory-motive theory of physics.
>>>
>>>
>>> I will wait for serious progresses.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>  
>>>
>>>>
>>>> But your argument against comp are invalid, beg the questions, and 
>>>> contains numerous trick like above. Be more careful please.
>>>>
>>>
>>> That sounds like another 'magician's dismissal' to me. I beg no more 
>>> question than comp does.
>>>
>>>
>>> You miss the key point. There is no begging when making clear what you 
>>> assume. You can assume comp, as you can assume non-comp. But you do 
>>> something quite different; you pretend that comp is false. So we ask for an 
>>> argument, and there you beg the question, by using all the time that comp 
>>> must be false in your argument, and that is begging the question.
>>>
>>
>> Comp is false not because I want it to be or assume it is, but because I 
>> understand that experience through time can be the only fundamental 
>> principle, and bodies across space is derived. I have laid out these 
>> reasons for this many times - how easy it is to succumb to the pathetic 
>> fallacy, how unlikely it is for experience to have any possible utility for 
>> arithmetic, how absent any sign of personality is in machines, how we can 
>> easily demonstrate information processing without particular qualia 
>> arising, etc. These are just off the top of my head. Anywhere you look in 
>> reality you can find huge gaping holes in Comp's assumptions if you choose 
>> to look, but you aren't going to see them if you are only listening to the 
>> echo chamber of Comp itself. Indeed, if we limit ourselves to only 
>> mathematical logic to look at mathematical logic, we are not going to 
>> notice that the entire universe of presentation is missing. Comp has a 
>> presentation problem, and it is not going to go away.
>>
>>
>> Well if you *understand* that time is fundamental, then comp is false for 
>> you. 
>>
>
> I understand that *experience* (through 'time') is fundamental, only 
> because no other option ultimately makes as much sense.
>
>
> OK, but you never explain why. Of course experience are very important, 
> but why could a machine not support one, when it can be shown that they 
> will develop talk on their experience, and, if instrosoecive enough, be 
> confronted to the same feeling that it has to be fundamental, and they are 
> correct from the first person view.
>

If, instead of a video screen and joystick, I had an arcade game fitted 
with a speaker and microphone, I could have another computer programmed to 
play PacMan on the first machine using only modem-like screeching to 
satisfy the logic of the PacMan game. Instead of graphic ghosts and visible 
maze, there would be squealing sound representing what would have been the 
pixels on a screen. There would be no difference for this equipment at all. 
As long as the representation was isomorphic, it would make no difference 
to either computer that there was no visual experience of PacMan at all but 
instead just one dimensional noise streaming back and forth between two 
machines.

If you want me to believe that a machine could support an experience, then 
you have to explain why and how that is even a remote possibility without 
begging the question by smuggling in our own experience. If I do not agree 
that we are only machines, then I do not agree that our experience is 
evidence of machine experience.

If a machine works without an experience, why invent any such thing as 
experience? If Donkey Kong works just as well without anyone seeing him, 
then why have a modem sound either? Just connect the two machines directly.
 

>
>
>  
>
>> The pathetic fallacy is not a logical fallacy.
>>
>
> No, it's more important than logic.
>
>
> I think the pathetic fallacy is, as a fallacy, itself a pathetic fallacy. 
> From which I can't conclude. 
>

I understand that is your position, but I think that is a radically 
theoretical view which doesn't apply to the universe in which we actually 
live. In this universe, not everything that can be programmed to smile on 
command has emotions.
 

>
>
>
>  
>
>> You just say that you believe that comp is false, but machines have 
>> naturally that belief, as comp is provably counter-intuitive. 
>>
>
> That's just comp feeding back on its own confirmation bias. Comp is a 
> machine which can only see itself. It's the inevitable inversion meme which 
> arises from mistaking forms and functions for reality rather than the 
> capacity to project and receive them.
>
>
> Yes, comp feedback in this way. You don't like that, apparently, but 
> that's not an argument. I am not defending comp, I am just criticizing the 
> reason you provide to think that comp is false. 
>


I have repeatedly provided a whole list of reasons but your criticism is 
not really offering any criticism other than that you don't think my view 
has any merit. You don't explain why though. There is no specific challenge 
to all of the things I mentioned. I say pathetic fallacy, you say you don't 
respect it.  I say the Map is not the Territory and the Menu is not the 
Meal but you don't seem to accept that these are comprehensible ideas. All 
seems to evaporate into a smoke screen and impatience. You don't take the 
argument seriously and always fall back on my ignorance of mathematical 
theory. My arguments question the foundation of math itself though.


>
>
>
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I have no tricks or invalid arguments that I know of, and I don't see 
>>> that I am being careless at all.
>>>
>>>
>>> Which means probably that you should learn a bit of argumentation, to be 
>>> frank. Or just assume your theory and be cautious on the theory of other 
>>> people. 
>>>
>>
>> I'm only interested in uncovering the truth about consciousness. What 
>> other people think and do is none of my business.
>>
>>
>> You are asserting without argument that a theory is incorrect, 
>>
>
> I have been asserting my arguments in writing for thousands of hours. Why 
> do you say that it is without argument unless it is simply too awful to 
> accept that there is no valid counter-argument?
>
>
> I have not seen argument which does not invoke wishful thinking, or 
> begging of the question. 
>

For example?
 

> If you find a real argument against comp, publish it, and you will become 
> famous. But in the literature, all arguments against comp (like Lucas and 
> Penrose for example) have been debunked.
>

You can't debunk comp using mathematical theory, you have to reason from 
the perceptual experience. As far as I'm concerned, it is comp that has to 
argue against its own presentation problems.


>
>
>
>  
>
>> and you do this by assuming that it cannot do this or that, but with no 
>> argument that your personal feeling.
>>
>
> Why are common sense observations shared by all people since the beginning 
> of humanity reduced to 'my personal feeling', but esoteric works of 
> mathematics from the last couple of centuries are are infallible?
>
>
> They are not infallible, and personal feeling are not argument. 
>

Why aren't personal feelings an argument when the subject is the ability of 
persons and feelings to exist? Don't you see that you are a priori 
disqualifying the very thing that you think you are explaining? There can 
be no theory which becomes an experience and Comp is a theory about 
theories.
 

>
>
>
>
>  
>
>> I just explain to you that machines might have already that feeling, as 
>> it looks like when we listen to them.
>>
>
> I understand that, but I'm saying that the whole idea that machines might 
> have any feeling at all is unsupported by anything except the very theory 
> which begs the question to begin with. 
>
>
> Assuming is not begging. If you assume non-comp it is all right. But you 
> pretend to have an argument against comp, so it is normal we ask it too 
> you, and well, we don't really see an argument. 
> To be sure, machines cannot think, and the expression "machine can think" 
> is a short cut for "machine can support a person with respect to some 
> environment".
>

I don't assume non-comp, like Deleuze, I reason that comp is 
representation, and representation can neither receive nor mobilize 
anything on its own.
 

>
>
>
>
> Why would machines feel anything? "Well, lets assume that we are machines, 
> and therefore whatever we do is something that a machine can do, including 
> feel." Or, we could assume that we are ears of corn, and therefore whatever 
> we do is something that an ear of corn can do if it was coaxed into 
> becoming as complex a vegetable as we are. We could decide that we are a TV 
> show, and that TV shows will someday evolve into us, so that the shows we 
> see now are just baby shows where the characters haven't grown very 
> realistic yet.
>
>
> You are correct. If we assume that we are angels, then we can conclude 
> that angels can feel. But nowhere I have attempted to prove that machine 
> can feel. It is my working assumption, and I am interested in its 
> fundamental consequence. But *you* pretend that comp is necessary wrong, so 
> we wait for the argument. Not a personal feeling.
>

I don't pretend comp is wrong, I reason that it cannot be right. The 
arguments have been listed several times but they boil down to the 
presentation problem. Computation has no need for any kind of sensory-motor 
presentation. It has no capability to bring any presentation into being. I 
do not use some particular personal feeling as evidence against comp, but 
the unquestionable variety of aesthetic modalities that we experience make 
no sense as a compression algorithm. The whole point of universal machines 
is their universality - what would be the point of converting data into 
sensations and then back into data?


> I am a logician. I defend more the use of valid reasoning than the truth 
> of any proposition, including comp. 
>
> Let me give you a good argument against comp. It does look obvious that 
> there is primitive fundamental physical reality. But with comp that cannot 
> exist in any reasonable sense by the UDA argument, so comp is wrong.
>

That's not a good argument to me, it's the straw man you keep in stock. I 
can easily see how memory could naturally acquire the kinds of 
characteristics which we consider physical - fixed positions, reliable 
connections, efficiently organized forms, etc. That is not a problem for 
me, and I have no problem understanding that functions in time map to 
topologies in space.

The elephant in comp's room is this: Presentation. Sensory-motor 
participation. Experience. This will never be explained by any theory. Only 
a theory which begins and ends with experience can explain the universe.
 

> Of course the weakness of that argument is that there is no evidence for a 
> *primitively* physical reality. There are only evidences for a physical 
> reality. And here comp explains where such evidences comes from. 
> So you will have to try harder.
> Or just develop your theory, keeping some agnosticism about the fact that 
> your theory might contradict or not some other theories. May be you will 
> find a valid contradiction by working in that way, in comp or in your 
> theory. If not you look like a philosopher having some prejudice against 
> some entities a priori. 
>

Again, I only care about explaining consciousness. It doesn't enter my mind 
to consider other people's expectations of what I'm interested in doing.

Thanks,
Craig
 

>
> Best,
>
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.


Reply via email to