On 12 Jul 2013, at 17:34, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Jul 11, 2013  Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

>> Turing proved 80 years ago that in general you can't predict what an external purely deterministic system will do,

> In the long run, and without any indeterminacy in the functioning of its parts. Yes. We might not know if the machine will stop or not, but whatever happens is determined by the initial digital conditions.

Yes, and that means that determinism and predictability are NOT the same thing.


Exactly.




> That has nothing to do with the First Person Indeterminacy

If we can't predict what a external complex system will do then we can't predict what another complex system, ourselves, will see or do either. Because of this some will just say "I dunno what city I will see next or what I will do about it when I do see it"

OK.




while others who wish to be more pompous will say "not knowing what city I will see is an example of First Person Indeterminacy".


Because if you agree with "I dunno which city I will see", by deducing it through an explicit appeal to a level of mechanical substitution, you see that the digital third person determinacy is responsible for indeterminate, from the first person points of view, experiences.

If you agree with it, it means you can go to step 4.







The term "First Person Indeterminacy" may be a new invention of yours but the idea behind it was well known in the stone age.


Excellent. Indeed, we know that since we were amoebas.

Sometime saying the obvious can change everything.

That relative indeterminacy is invariant for some digital transformation, or substitution, and that has some consequences.

Eventually it shows that both grandmother in the garden, and the physicists in the LHC uses what a logician would call a limitation principle, which is equivalent with an induction axiom (like in Peano Arithmetic).

They bet there is a reality, following patterns, and that predicting third person patterns allows them to lift the prediction on the first person experience, but with comp we get a substitution level, and we lost that connection below it.





> nor the quantum indeterminacy.

Those two things are apparently unrelated (although who knows, I wouldn't be too surprised if it later turned out there was some sort of connection),

Once you get the UDA you can bet that they are related, and AUDA confirms with the math.





but the fact that some events have no cause and that in the real world


What do you mean by real world?





no complex system is 100% deterministic only makes what I said above stronger.

>> all we can do is watch it and see; and as for the first person expectation we've known for much much longer than 80 years that often (perhaps usually) we don't know what we are going to do until we do it.

> So when you put water on the gas, your theory to predict what you will experience is just wait and see?

Read what I said again, I didn't say you can never know what you can do next, I said you can't always know what you will do next, and (perhaps) usually we don't.


But there are very different kind of indeterminacies, and the math of each of them is different.

If comp and QM are correct, the QM indeterminacies is the arithmetical FPI, that is why the comp + theories/definition becomes testable.

The SWE becomes a theorem in arithmetic, concerning what universal numbers can bet about the most probable universal numbers in some of its universal neighbors.

But the relation with the Turing halting problem is more subtle, and basically made explicit in the math part. You don't need it for grasping the UDA. And I try to explain the basic math on this very list.




And there is no foolproof way to separate the times when we can reliably make predictions from the times when we can not;


You make general statements without given your card. I still don't know what is your theory. You seem to assume a primitive physical universe, meaning that you seem we have to *assume* the physical reality?

Keep in mind I don't make that assumption. Normally UDA shows that it might be neither necessary, nor possible, when assuming comp.

In some theoretical situation, like in some experimental situation, we can reason in the theory and predict facts, including, predicting first person unpredictable experiences, in clear setting, and we can develop the math.

With computer science/mathematical logic, we can study what indeed such relative numbers can predict in the average.

If you find the FPI so easy that it belongs to the stone age, then what are you waiting for step 4?




so even when we're making good prophecies we can't always be certain that they are in fact good prophecies.


The end result of all this is that predicting is hard, especially the future.


It is certainly hard for me to predict the time you will get at step 4, that's sure.

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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