On 12 Jul 2013, at 17:34, John Clark wrote:

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On Thu, Jul 11, 2013 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:>> Turing proved 80 years ago that in general you can't predict whatan external purely deterministic system will do,> In the long run, and without any indeterminacy in the functioningof its parts. Yes. We might not know if the machine will stop ornot, but whatever happens is determined by the initial digitalconditions.Yes, and that means that determinism and predictability are NOT thesame thing.

Exactly.

> That has nothing to do with the First Person IndeterminacyIf we can't predict what a external complex system will do then wecan't predict what another complex system, ourselves, will see or doeither. Because of this some will just say "I dunno what city I willsee next or what I will do about it when I do see it"

OK.

while others who wish to be more pompous will say "not knowing whatcity I will see is an example of First Person Indeterminacy".

`Because if you agree with "I dunno which city I will see", by deducing`

`it through an explicit appeal to a level of mechanical substitution,`

`you see that the digital third person determinacy is responsible for`

`indeterminate, from the first person points of view, experiences.`

If you agree with it, it means you can go to step 4.

The term "First Person Indeterminacy" may be a new invention ofyours but the idea behind it was well known in the stone age.

Excellent. Indeed, we know that since we were amoebas. Sometime saying the obvious can change everything.

`That relative indeterminacy is invariant for some digital`

`transformation, or substitution, and that has some consequences.`

`Eventually it shows that both grandmother in the garden, and the`

`physicists in the LHC uses what a logician would call a limitation`

`principle, which is equivalent with an induction axiom (like in Peano`

`Arithmetic).`

`They bet there is a reality, following patterns, and that predicting`

`third person patterns allows them to lift the prediction on the first`

`person experience, but with comp we get a substitution level, and we`

`lost that connection below it.`

> nor the quantum indeterminacy.Those two things are apparently unrelated (although who knows, Iwouldn't be too surprised if it later turned out there was some sortof connection),

`Once you get the UDA you can bet that they are related, and AUDA`

`confirms with the math.`

but the fact that some events have no cause and that in the real world

What do you mean by real world?

no complex system is 100% deterministic only makes what I said abovestronger.>> all we can do is watch it and see; and as for the first personexpectation we've known for much much longer than 80 years thatoften (perhaps usually) we don't know what we are going to do untilwe do it.> So when you put water on the gas, your theory to predict what youwill experience is just wait and see?Read what I said again, I didn't say you can never know what you cando next, I said you can't always know what you will do next, and(perhaps) usually we don't.

`But there are very different kind of indeterminacies, and the math of`

`each of them is different.`

`If comp and QM are correct, the QM indeterminacies is the`

`arithmetical FPI, that is why the comp + theories/definition becomes`

`testable.`

`The SWE becomes a theorem in arithmetic, concerning what universal`

`numbers can bet about the most probable universal numbers in some of`

`its universal neighbors.`

`But the relation with the Turing halting problem is more subtle, and`

`basically made explicit in the math part. You don't need it for`

`grasping the UDA. And I try to explain the basic math on this very list.`

And there is no foolproof way to separate the times when we canreliably make predictions from the times when we can not;

`You make general statements without given your card. I still don't`

`know what is your theory. You seem to assume a primitive physical`

`universe, meaning that you seem we have to *assume* the physical`

`reality?`

`Keep in mind I don't make that assumption. Normally UDA shows that it`

`might be neither necessary, nor possible, when assuming comp.`

`In some theoretical situation, like in some experimental situation, we`

`can reason in the theory and predict facts, including, predicting`

`first person unpredictable experiences, in clear setting, and we can`

`develop the math.`

`With computer science/mathematical logic, we can study what indeed`

`such relative numbers can predict in the average.`

`If you find the FPI so easy that it belongs to the stone age, then`

`what are you waiting for step 4?`

so even when we're making good prophecies we can't always be certainthat they are in fact good prophecies.

The end result of all this is that predicting is hard, especiallythe future.

`It is certainly hard for me to predict the time you will get at step`

`4, that's sure.`

Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.