On 12 Jul 2013, at 19:18, meekerdb wrote:

On 7/12/2013 2:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 11 Jul 2013, at 22:14, meekerdb wrote:On 7/11/2013 12:34 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 11 Jul 2013, at 18:46, meekerdb wrote:On 7/10/2013 11:25 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:I have given the equation. I try to explain this on FOAR but itrelies on some familiarity in logic.Normally you should know already that physics is given by ameasure on relative computational continuations, and the logicexplains already the statistical interferences.QM is deterministic and there is only one 'computationalcontinuation';?If you measure up+down in the base {up,down}, you get twocomputational continuation, unless you add a non deterministiccollapse.No, you only get one in which the measuring device state(including you) is entangled with the system measured.you * (up + down) = (you * up) + (you * down),That is a deterministic bifurcation leading to two (at least)computational continuations, one where you see the electron in theup state and one in which you see the electron in the down state.But it is not a bifurcation because it can be undone by subsequentevolution of the wave function;

OK.

which means there is only one computational continuation.

From the 3p view only.

It is only if you assume collapse of the wave function that theevolution cannot be reversed and that is what decoherence attemptsto explain in terms of diffusing information into the environment.But a fundamental theory of everything has no "environment".

`Indeed. But we don't need the collapse, we need only that the persons`

`in question does not erase their memory. It is exactly like with the`

`FPI. The W and M persons can still fuse, if they forget which city`

`they are in.`

That's what "entangle" means in QM without collapse.To get two you have to treat "measurement" as some non-unitaryoperator.Not at all, I can also use the FPI. The measurement becomes amachine interaction followed by self-reference/personal memoryaccess.But here you deviate from QM and treat the individual consciousnessas something that can irreversibly bifurcate. It is essentiallyWigner's initial theory that consciousness collapses the wavefunction. The only difference is you suppose both branches to exist.

`If you interpret Wigner in that way, you are right. But keeping the`

`branches makes the process reversible, and the 3p picture deterministic.`

That's the puzzle that Everett addressed by throwing out thecollapse postulate and assuming only one kind of continuation.Since that seemed like an attractive idea the problem has becomehow to explain the experience of one thing happening and anothernot.It is solved completely by the FPI. We experience one thing andnot the other for the same comp reason why we see only W (or onlyM) in the WM duplication.What is that reason? According to QM there are two systems that areentangled with environments such that they are statisticallyunlikely to recohere and hence form persistently different memories.

`Like the W-person and the M-person. Fusing remains possible, even`

`reversibly, by dissociating or discarding memories, of course this`

`needs perfect isolation of those memories from the environment.`

That is why Everett can use comp and remains in a purelydeterministic framework. The only problem is that Everett did notdiscovered explicitly the FPI,He explicitly postulated it of observers in QM.

Yes, that is what I say. He could have derived if from comp directly.

which occurs also in arithmetic, which would have forced him tounderstand that the wave itself must be phenomenologically derivedfrom a measure on all computations, and not one circumscribe to anyspecial universal machine (like the quantum one).I don't see how reference to a "quantum machine" is relevant. QM isjust a theory and in fact just a schema for theories; you need thespecify the Hilbert space and the Hamiltonian before you actuallyhave a theory.

`Hamiltonians provide just different models (realities) instantiating`

`the QM basic axioms. A theory is just a set of axioms and rules.`

Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.