# Re: Hitch

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On 11 Jul 2013, at 22:14, meekerdb wrote:```
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```On 7/11/2013 12:34 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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On 11 Jul 2013, at 18:46, meekerdb wrote:

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```On 7/10/2013 11:25 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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I have given the equation. I try to explain this on FOAR but it relies on some familiarity in logic. Normally you should know already that physics is given by a measure on relative computational continuations, and the logic explains already the statistical interferences.
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QM is deterministic and there is only one 'computational continuation';
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If you measure up+down in the base {up,down}, you get two computational continuation, unless you add a non deterministic collapse.
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No, you only get one in which the measuring device state (including you) is entangled with the system measured.
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you * (up + down) = (you * up)  +  (you * down),

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That is a deterministic bifurcation leading to two (at least) computational continuations, one where you see the electron in the up state and one in which you see the electron in the down state.
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That's what "entangle" means in QM without collapse.

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To get two you have to treat "measurement" as some non-unitary operator.
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Not at all, I can also use the FPI. The measurement becomes a machine interaction followed by self-reference/personal memory access.
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That's the puzzle that Everett addressed by throwing out the collapse postulate and assuming only one kind of continuation. Since that seemed like an attractive idea the problem has become how to explain the experience of one thing happening and another not.
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It is solved completely by the FPI. We experience one thing and not the other for the same comp reason why we see only W (or only M) in the WM duplication. That is why Everett can use comp and remains in a purely deterministic framework. The only problem is that Everett did not discovered explicitly the FPI, which occurs also in arithmetic, which would have forced him to understand that the wave itself must be phenomenologically derived from a measure on all computations, and not one circumscribe to any special universal machine (like the quantum one).
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Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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