Hi Russel Thank goodness Clarcky has the same/similar complaint as me. I think Brent does too, because he said he had an initial reaction to the step like this and then offered an analysis of the probabilities to me all of which were certainties rather than indeterminacies. He didn't get back to me on that, but I think he has doubts or should have.
>>If that is not what you said, what do you think that man would experience? a) Nothing b) being in Moscow xor being in Washington c) being in Moscow and Washington d) being in neither Moscow nor Washington Logically, these four possibilities exhaust the situation. Only b) is compatible with COMP. You have to remember that the question is asked before the man is duplicated and consequently only c is compatible with comp. I hope Bruno's ideas are not too dependent on b being compatible with comp, because b is incompatible. If the scan of the man successfully copies the 'I'ness, then that 'I'ness must be sent to washington AND moscow. And, given comp, prior to duplication he should expect to experience both moscow and washington. All the best. > From: stath...@gmail.com > Date: Sat, 28 Sep 2013 14:02:44 +1000 > Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name? > To: firstname.lastname@example.org > > On 28 September 2013 05:54, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > On Wed, Sep 25, 2013 at 11:37 PM, LizR <lizj...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > >> > Anyone who has a problem with Bruno's teleportation thought experiment > >> > should logically have the same problem with the MWI. > > > > > > No, you are entirely incorrect. The Many World's Interpretation is about > > what you can expect to see, and although it may seem strange to us Everett's > > ideas are 100% logically self consistent. Bruno's "proof" is about a feeling > > of identity, about who you can expect to be; but you do not think you're the > > same person you were yesterday because yesterday you made a prediction about > > today that turned out to be correct, you think you are the same person you > > were yesterday for one reason and one reason only, you remember being Liz > > yesterday. It's a good thing too because I make incorrect predictions all > > the time and when I do I don't feel that I've entered oblivion, instead I > > feel like I am the same person I was before because I can remember being the > > guy who made that prediction that turned out to be wrong. > > > > Bruno thinks you can trace personal identity from the present to the future, > > but that is like pushing on a string. You can only pull a string and you can > > only trace identity from the past to the present. A feeling of self has > > nothing to do with predictions, successful ones or otherwise, and in fact > > you might not even have a future, but you certainly have a past. > > Teleportation thought experiments are also about what you can expect to see. > > If you toss a coin and teleport to either Washington or Moscow that is > like a single world interpretationof QM. > > If teleport to both Washington and Moscow that is like the MWI. > > It is generally accepted that you can't tell which is the case from > experience. If you think they are different then you would have a > proof or disproof of the MWI. Is that what you claim? > > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.