On 27 Sep 2013, at 21:54, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Sep 25, 2013 at 11:37 PM, LizR <lizj...@gmail.com> wrote:
> Anyone who has a problem with Bruno's teleportation thought
experiment should logically have the same problem with the MWI.
No, you are entirely incorrect. The Many World's Interpretation is
about what you can expect to see, and although it may seem strange
to us Everett's ideas are 100% logically self consistent. Bruno's
"proof" is about a feeling of identity,
Not at all. It is about a result that I can expect in an experiment.
Like Liz and Quentin said, the situation is isomorphic with Everett
QM. Everett mention what you call "feeling of identity", which is a
consequence of modeling the observer by a machine with personal memory.
about who you can expect to be; but you do not think you're the same
person you were yesterday because yesterday you made a prediction
about today that turned out to be correct, you think you are the
same person you were yesterday for one reason and one reason only,
you remember being Liz yesterday. It's a good thing too because I
make incorrect predictions all the time and when I do I don't feel
that I've entered oblivion, instead I feel like I am the same person
I was before because I can remember being the guy who made that
prediction that turned out to be wrong.
Bruno thinks you can trace personal identity from the present to the
I insist, on the contrary, that we don't need any identity theory to
get the FPI.
but that is like pushing on a string. You can only pull a string and
you can only trace identity from the past to the present. A feeling
of self has nothing to do with predictions, successful ones or
otherwise, and in fact you might not even have a future, but you
certainly have a past.
With comp, in all cases we have one future, in the first person pov
(and infinitely many in the third person pov), bith in comp, and in
Everett QM. I have explained this with many examples.
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