Hi Bruno, and thanks for the reply. >> Precisely: the expectation evaluation is asked to the person in Helsinki, >> before the duplication is done, and it concerns where the person asked will >> feel to be, from his first person point of view.
------------------------------------------------------- Yes, but in the responses Ive had from yourself and others the situation has been addressed from the situation after Helsinki. So far at least. ------------------------------------------------------- >> If one of the 'me's is asked after teleportation but before the doors are opened what are the chances of being in moscow, then I can see that there is indeterminacy. OK. So you can derive the First Person Indeterminacy (FIP) from the Delayed Uncertainty Principle: If I can predict with certainty (modulo default hypothesis) that tomorrow I will feel to be uncertain about some outcome of some experience, then I am already uncertain now about that outcome. Not sure about that Bruno. I know that if I believe I have been duplicated and end up at the terminal of some teleport system without knowing which terminal I'm at then the probabilities change from the situation before teleportation. At that point I believe I will be duplicated and genuinely end up at both terminals. That entails there are probabilities! Indeed. There is one me befoe the duplication, and two me's after, from the or a third person point of view. But, assuming comp, there is always only one "me", from the first person points of view. In Helsinki, you can predict with certainty that you will write in your diary that you are specifically in only one precise city, and the umber of first-person-me has not changed, it is still one. From that view, you inherit a doppelganger in the other city, but it is another "first-person" entity, even if intellectually ( or from a third person view) you can consider that it is a "you". If I am sufficiently described by the reading process to maintain 'I'ness then this 'I'ness goes to washington and moscow. That is a third person view on the first person view. You are right. But the question in Helsinki concerned the first person view on the first person view. ------------------------------------------------------- I think I'm beginning to see where your confusion comes from. Strictly speaking one can not have a first person view on a first person view. The viewing is 1 - p and whatever is viewed, however hard you try to fool yourself that it is also a 1 - p view is, in fact, 3 - p. It is the object of viewing. The object of the 1 - p. I can imagine my self viewing Moscow or Washington, perhaps as a 1st person camera perspective a la Blair Witch Project - i can even split screen it so that I can imagine a simultaneous Washington and Moscow view. But in fact here the 1 -p is the imagining not the 'viewing Moscow or viewing Washington'. Consequently, there is nothing really to suggest that I have 'intellectualized' the process anymore than you have. And in fact, at this point in your informal 'proof' you suggest people should attempt to 'feel' rather than think the point through. Alarm bells start ringing whenever philosophers appeal to 'feels' over thought. You do not present an argument for why feels should be given precedence and of course it is an open question as to what a comp practitioner would feel anyway. It is an extraordinarily tenuous 'slight of hand' at the crux of your informal proof. Of course, one person can only have one 1-p view. That states the obvious. However, If I am one person about to be duplicated and if I believe in comp (and beliefs are paradigmatically 1-p phenomena) then ISTM I will also believe that my identity carries over to two places. This will not be an intellectualized think through, it will be a second nature 'feel'. Otherwise, I do not genuinely accept comp. And Im afraid I do not think you do accept comp. Just to turn the screw a little tighter, I believe my description of what our practitioner about to be teleported would think and feel is far closer to a 1-p description of the feels and thoughts a comp accepter would have. That is precisely the point. I am trying to describe how a comp practitioner would feel. You on the other hand, despite proclaiming the opposite, in fact go to great lengths to intellectualize the situation. You fail to 'get into the head' of a comp practitioner prior to duplication. All the best. From: [email protected] To: [email protected] Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name? Date: Sun, 29 Sep 2013 09:17:45 +0200 On 28 Sep 2013, at 20:28, meekerdb wrote: On 9/28/2013 12:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 27 Sep 2013, at 19:55, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Sep 25, 2013 Russell Standish <[email protected]> wrote: > I do remember a conversation you had with Bruno about 5 years ago when you were discussing what a man in Helsinki would experience when undergoing the duplicator experiment. Yes. > I seem to recall you thought the man would experience being in both places at once, No, that is NOT what I said! I said that if Russell Standish were duplicated then Russell Standish would be in Moscow and Washington. I also said the vague and sloppy use of words like "you"and "he" and "I" and "the man" is at the root of Bruno's intense confusion, and apparently yours as well. > which does violence to the notion of "survival after copying" assumption of COMP. Bullshit. And this beautifully illustrates why I am reluctant to go back to square one and list all the blunders Bruno made in just the first few pages that I read, I have already written about 6.02*10^23 posts that covers the subjects in this post and most are in far far greater detail. Just provide one link. We have answered them all. You kept repeating the same confusion between different person points of view, or, in some post, you confuse the phenomenology of the indeterminacy with all their different logical origins. In many, you just change the definitions given. I have come to the conclusion that logical arguments will not convince anybody if it is their policy to first decide what they want to believe and only then look for evidence to support it. I have never met a scientist not convinced by the first person indeterminacy, accepting to discuss this privately or publicly. You try to avoid the debate, and that's the only strategy used by philosophers to hide the (quite simple) discovery. You act like a pseudo-religious dogmatic pseudo-philosopher, it seems to me. If you would have a real argument, you would take a pleasure to explain it calmly, and without using insults and mocking hand waving. So, provide an argument, answer the questions, or try to admit that you lost your point. I'm not sure you even need to convince JC of the FPI due to duplication. He already believes there is uncertainty due to MWI of QM. Isn't that enough for your argument to proceed. It would make the derivation of quantum logic and QM circular. The original point in the FPI is that we get a strong form of indeterminacy which does not assumes QM, and the whole reversal reasoning needs this. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. 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