Hi Bruno, and thanks for the reply.

>> Precisely: the expectation evaluation is asked to the person in Helsinki, 
>> before the duplication is done, and it concerns where the person asked will 
>> feel to be, from his first person point of view.

-------------------------------------------------------

Yes, but in the responses Ive had from yourself and others the situation has 
been addressed from the situation after Helsinki. So far at least.


-------------------------------------------------------

>> 
If one of the 'me's is asked after teleportation but before the doors are 
opened what are the chances of being in moscow, then I can see that there is 
indeterminacy.

OK. So you can derive the First Person Indeterminacy (FIP) from the Delayed 
Uncertainty Principle: If I can predict with certainty (modulo default 
hypothesis) that tomorrow I will feel to be uncertain about some outcome of 
some experience, then I am already uncertain now about that outcome.

Not sure about that Bruno. I know that if I believe I have been duplicated and 
end up at the terminal of some teleport system without knowing which terminal 
I'm at then the probabilities change from the situation before teleportation. 
At that point I believe I will be duplicated and genuinely end up at both 
terminals.

That entails there are probabilities! Indeed. 

There is one me befoe the duplication, and two me's after, from the or a third 
person point of view.

But, assuming comp, there is always only one "me", from the first person points 
of view. In Helsinki, you can predict with certainty that you will write in 
your diary that you are specifically in only one precise city, and the umber of 
first-person-me has not changed, it is still one. From that view, you inherit a 
doppelganger in the other city, but it is another "first-person" entity, even 
if intellectually ( or from a third person view) you can consider that it is a 
"you".

If I am sufficiently described by the reading process to maintain 'I'ness then 
this 'I'ness goes to washington and moscow.


That is a third person view on the first person view. You are right. But the 
question in Helsinki concerned the first person view on the first person view.


-------------------------------------------------------

I think I'm beginning to see where your confusion comes from. Strictly speaking 
one can not have a first person view on a first person view. The viewing is 1 - 
p and whatever is viewed, however hard you try to fool yourself that it is also 
a 1 - p view is, in fact, 3 - p. It is the object of viewing. The object of the 
1 - p. I can imagine my self viewing Moscow or Washington, perhaps as a 1st 
person camera perspective a la Blair Witch Project - i can even split screen it 
so that I can imagine a simultaneous Washington and Moscow view. But in fact 
here the 1 -p is the imagining not the 'viewing Moscow or viewing Washington'. 
Consequently, there is nothing really to suggest that I have 'intellectualized' 
the process anymore than you have. And in fact, at this point in your informal 
'proof' you suggest people should attempt to 'feel' rather than think the point 
through. Alarm bells start ringing whenever philosophers appeal to 'feels' over 
thought. You do not present an argument for why feels should be given 
precedence and of course it is an open question as to what a comp practitioner 
would feel anyway. It is an extraordinarily tenuous 'slight of hand' at the 
crux of your informal proof.

Of course, one person can only have one 1-p view. That states the obvious. 
However, If I am one person about to be duplicated and if I believe in comp 
(and beliefs are paradigmatically 1-p phenomena) then ISTM I will also believe 
that my identity carries over to two places. This will not be an 
intellectualized think through, it will be a second nature 'feel'. Otherwise, I 
do not genuinely accept comp. And Im afraid I do not think you do accept comp.

Just to turn the screw a little tighter, I believe my description of what our 
practitioner about to be teleported would think and feel is far closer to a 1-p 
description of the feels and thoughts a comp accepter would have. That is 
precisely the point. I am trying to describe how a comp practitioner would 
feel. You on the other hand, despite proclaiming the opposite, in fact go to 
great lengths to intellectualize the situation. You fail to 'get into the head' 
of a comp practitioner prior to duplication.

All the best.

From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
Date: Sun, 29 Sep 2013 09:17:45 +0200


On 28 Sep 2013, at 20:28, meekerdb wrote:              On 9/28/2013 12:11 AM, 
Bruno Marchal      wrote:
        
              On 27 Sep 2013, at 19:55, John Clark wrote:                       
   
            On Wed, Sep 25, 2013  Russell              Standish 
<li...@hpcoders.com.au>              wrote:
               
                >                  I do remember a conversation you had with 
Bruno about                  5 years ago when you were discussing what a man in 
                 Helsinki would experience when undergoing the                  
duplicator experiment.
                                
                            Yes.
                
                 > I seem to                  recall you thought the man would 
experience being in                  both places at once,                 
                                No, that is NOT what I said! I said that if 
Russell                  Standish were duplicated then Russell Standish would   
               be in Moscow and Washington. I also said the vague and           
       sloppy use of words like "you"and  "he" and "I" and                  
"the man" is at the root of Bruno's intense confusion,                  and 
apparently yours as well. 
                                
                   > which does violence to the                    notion of 
"survival after copying" assumption of                    COMP.
                                    
                                    Bullshit. And this beautifully illustrates 
why I                    am reluctant to go back to square one and list all     
               the blunders Bruno made in just the first few pages              
      that I read, I have already written about                     6.02*10^23 
posts that covers the subjects in this                    post and most are in 
far far greater detail.                                                         
            
                Just provide one link.         
                We have answered them all. You kept repeating the same          
confusion between different person points of view, or, in some          post, 
you confuse the phenomenology of the indeterminacy with          all their 
different logical origins. In many, you just change          the definitions 
given.        
                
                
                                                                              I 
have come to the conclusion that logical                    arguments will not 
convince anybody if it is their                    policy to first decide what 
they want to believe and                    only then look for evidence to 
support it. 
                                                                                
      
                
                I have never met a scientist not convinced by the first         
 person indeterminacy, accepting to discuss this privately or          
publicly.         You try to avoid the debate, and that's the only strategy     
     used by philosophers to hide the (quite simple) discovery.        
                You act like a pseudo-religious dogmatic          
pseudo-philosopher, it seems to me. If you would have a real          argument, 
you would take a pleasure to explain it calmly, and          without using 
insults and mocking hand waving.         
                So, provide an argument, answer the questions, or try to        
  admit that you lost your point.
                      
    I'm not sure you even need to convince JC of the FPI due to    duplication. 
 He already believes there is uncertainty due to MWI of    QM.  Isn't that 
enough for your argument to proceed.

It would make the derivation of quantum logic and QM circular. The original 
point in the FPI is that we get a strong form of indeterminacy which does not 
assumes QM, and the whole reversal reasoning needs this.
Bruno

    
    Brent
    
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