# RE: What gives philosophers a bad name?

```Hi Bruno, and thanks for the reply.

>> Precisely: the expectation evaluation is asked to the person in Helsinki,
>> before the duplication is done, and it concerns where the person asked will
>> feel to be, from his first person point of view.```
```
-------------------------------------------------------

Yes, but in the responses Ive had from yourself and others the situation has
been addressed from the situation after Helsinki. So far at least.

-------------------------------------------------------

>>
If one of the 'me's is asked after teleportation but before the doors are
opened what are the chances of being in moscow, then I can see that there is
indeterminacy.

OK. So you can derive the First Person Indeterminacy (FIP) from the Delayed
Uncertainty Principle: If I can predict with certainty (modulo default
hypothesis) that tomorrow I will feel to be uncertain about some outcome of

Not sure about that Bruno. I know that if I believe I have been duplicated and
end up at the terminal of some teleport system without knowing which terminal
I'm at then the probabilities change from the situation before teleportation.
At that point I believe I will be duplicated and genuinely end up at both
terminals.

That entails there are probabilities! Indeed.

There is one me befoe the duplication, and two me's after, from the or a third
person point of view.

But, assuming comp, there is always only one "me", from the first person points
of view. In Helsinki, you can predict with certainty that you will write in
your diary that you are specifically in only one precise city, and the umber of
first-person-me has not changed, it is still one. From that view, you inherit a
doppelganger in the other city, but it is another "first-person" entity, even
if intellectually ( or from a third person view) you can consider that it is a
"you".

If I am sufficiently described by the reading process to maintain 'I'ness then
this 'I'ness goes to washington and moscow.

That is a third person view on the first person view. You are right. But the
question in Helsinki concerned the first person view on the first person view.

-------------------------------------------------------

I think I'm beginning to see where your confusion comes from. Strictly speaking
one can not have a first person view on a first person view. The viewing is 1 -
p and whatever is viewed, however hard you try to fool yourself that it is also
a 1 - p view is, in fact, 3 - p. It is the object of viewing. The object of the
1 - p. I can imagine my self viewing Moscow or Washington, perhaps as a 1st
person camera perspective a la Blair Witch Project - i can even split screen it
so that I can imagine a simultaneous Washington and Moscow view. But in fact
here the 1 -p is the imagining not the 'viewing Moscow or viewing Washington'.
Consequently, there is nothing really to suggest that I have 'intellectualized'
the process anymore than you have. And in fact, at this point in your informal
'proof' you suggest people should attempt to 'feel' rather than think the point
through. Alarm bells start ringing whenever philosophers appeal to 'feels' over
thought. You do not present an argument for why feels should be given
precedence and of course it is an open question as to what a comp practitioner
would feel anyway. It is an extraordinarily tenuous 'slight of hand' at the

Of course, one person can only have one 1-p view. That states the obvious.
However, If I am one person about to be duplicated and if I believe in comp
(and beliefs are paradigmatically 1-p phenomena) then ISTM I will also believe
that my identity carries over to two places. This will not be an
intellectualized think through, it will be a second nature 'feel'. Otherwise, I
do not genuinely accept comp. And Im afraid I do not think you do accept comp.

Just to turn the screw a little tighter, I believe my description of what our
practitioner about to be teleported would think and feel is far closer to a 1-p
description of the feels and thoughts a comp accepter would have. That is
precisely the point. I am trying to describe how a comp practitioner would
feel. You on the other hand, despite proclaiming the opposite, in fact go to
great lengths to intellectualize the situation. You fail to 'get into the head'
of a comp practitioner prior to duplication.

All the best.

From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?
Date: Sun, 29 Sep 2013 09:17:45 +0200

On 28 Sep 2013, at 20:28, meekerdb wrote:              On 9/28/2013 12:11 AM,
Bruno Marchal      wrote:

On 27 Sep 2013, at 19:55, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Sep 25, 2013  Russell              Standish
<li...@hpcoders.com.au>              wrote:

>                  I do remember a conversation you had with
Bruno about                  5 years ago when you were discussing what a man in
Helsinki would experience when undergoing the
duplicator experiment.

Yes.

> I seem to                  recall you thought the man would
experience being in                  both places at once,
No, that is NOT what I said! I said that if
Russell                  Standish were duplicated then Russell Standish would
be in Moscow and Washington. I also said the vague and
sloppy use of words like "you"and  "he" and "I" and
"the man" is at the root of Bruno's intense confusion,                  and
apparently yours as well.

> which does violence to the                    notion of
"survival after copying" assumption of                    COMP.

Bullshit. And this beautifully illustrates
why I                    am reluctant to go back to square one and list all
the blunders Bruno made in just the first few pages
posts that covers the subjects in this                    post and most are in
far far greater detail.

We have answered them all. You kept repeating the same
confusion between different person points of view, or, in some          post,
you confuse the phenomenology of the indeterminacy with          all their
different logical origins. In many, you just change          the definitions
given.

I
have come to the conclusion that logical                    arguments will not
convince anybody if it is their                    policy to first decide what
they want to believe and                    only then look for evidence to
support it.

I have never met a scientist not convinced by the first
person indeterminacy, accepting to discuss this privately or
publicly.         You try to avoid the debate, and that's the only strategy
used by philosophers to hide the (quite simple) discovery.
You act like a pseudo-religious dogmatic
pseudo-philosopher, it seems to me. If you would have a real          argument,
you would take a pleasure to explain it calmly, and          without using
insults and mocking hand waving.
So, provide an argument, answer the questions, or try to

I'm not sure you even need to convince JC of the FPI due to    duplication.
He already believes there is uncertainty due to MWI of    QM.  Isn't that
enough for your argument to proceed.

It would make the derivation of quantum logic and QM circular. The original
point in the FPI is that we get a strong form of indeterminacy which does not
assumes QM, and the whole reversal reasoning needs this.
Bruno

Brent

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