On 29 Sep 2013, at 12:19, chris peck wrote:

Hi Bruno, and thanks for the reply.

>> Precisely: the expectation evaluation is asked to the person in Helsinki, before the duplication is done, and it concerns where the person asked will feel to be, from his first person point of view.


Yes, but in the responses Ive had from yourself and others the situation has been addressed from the situation after Helsinki. So far at least.


You might quote mùe, but I make clear and insist, at each step of the UDA, that the question is addressed before the duplication. After, it would not have any meaning (like "what is the probability to get Head after the coin has been throwned"). The confirmation or refutation of the prediction is asked after. So the guy which predicted "W and M" is refuted by its own seeing (After, both will see only one city, and the question was about that seeing, and not the body localization).


If one of the 'me's is asked after teleportation but before the doors are opened what are the chances of being in moscow, then I can see that there is indeterminacy.

OK. So you can derive the First Person Indeterminacy (FIP) from the Delayed Uncertainty Principle: If I can predict with certainty (modulo default hypothesis) that tomorrow I will feel to be uncertain about some outcome of some experience, then I am already uncertain now about that outcome.

Not sure about that Bruno. I know that if I believe I have been duplicated and end up at the terminal of some teleport system without knowing which terminal I'm at then the probabilities change from the situation before teleportation. At that point I believe I will be duplicated and genuinely end up at both terminals.

That entails there are probabilities! Indeed.

There is one me befoe the duplication, and two me's after, from the or a third person point of view.

But, assuming comp, there is always only one "me", from the first person points of view. In Helsinki, you can predict with certainty that you will write in your diary that you are specifically in only one precise city, and the umber of first-person-me has not changed, it is still one. From that view, you inherit a doppelganger in the other city, but it is another "first-person" entity, even if intellectually ( or from a third person view) you can consider that it is a "you".

If I am sufficiently described by the reading process to maintain 'I'ness then this 'I'ness goes to washington and moscow.

That is a third person view on the first person view. You are right. But the question in Helsinki concerned the first person view on the first person view.


I think I'm beginning to see where your confusion comes from.

It might not help you to betray that you are searching a confusion, as this betrays you want the result to be false, before understanding. But OK. let us see.

Strictly speaking one can not have a first person view on a first person view.

On the contrary, it is very simple. After the duplication you can say I am in both place, so in both place there are two 1-views, as I do attribute consciousness to my doppelganger. This is a third person view, but which attribute 1-view to both people. I have introduced this only to refute Clark idea that this fact shows there is no indeterminacy, and this lead by analogy to distinguish it from the genuine 1-view on oneself. of course you are right, the 1-view on the 1-view is an 1-view.

The viewing is 1 - p and whatever is viewed, however hard you try to fool yourself that it is also a 1 - p view is, in fact, 3 - p. It is the object of viewing.

Which is inferred, and of course not viewed (I might be dreaming, or deluded, etc.).

The object of the 1 - p.

That is ambiguous.

I can imagine my self viewing Moscow or Washington,

I can predict that I will view W or M, but you cannot view "M v W", or that can mean too many things.

perhaps as a 1st person camera perspective a la Blair Witch Project - i can even split screen it so that I can imagine a simultaneous Washington and Moscow view. But in fact here the 1 -p is the imagining not the 'viewing Moscow or viewing Washington'.

Keep in mind that here 1p is defined by the content of the personal diary or memory. The reasoning works by given a (simple) 3p definition of the 1p.

Consequently, there is nothing really to suggest that I have 'intellectualized' the process anymore than you have. And in fact, at this point in your informal 'proof' you suggest people should attempt to 'feel' rather than think the point through. Alarm bells start ringing whenever philosophers appeal to 'feels' over thought. You do not present an argument for why feels should be given precedence and of course it is an open question as to what a comp practitioner would feel anyway.

"Feel" just emphasizes that the probability has to bear on the 1p. You can use "write in his personal diary that he took with him in Helsinki" instead. It is not philosophy, and the protocol are completely clear. By assuming comp we know in advance that after the duplication, the guy will feel (or write in his diary) "I feel to be in W", or "I feel to be in M".

It is an extraordinarily tenuous 'slight of hand' at the crux of your informal proof.

I hope you see better now.

Of course, one person can only have one 1-p view. That states the obvious. However, If I am one person about to be duplicated and if I believe in comp (and beliefs are paradigmatically 1-p phenomena)

Knowledge is typically 1p, but belief are sharable and more typically 3p. This does not paly any role here, but is used in the arithmetical (and constructive) version of the UDA. We can come back on this (much) later.

then ISTM I will also believe that my identity carries over to two places.

That is correct. You can say, already in Helsinki: "you can join me by phone at W and at M". But you know that you will get the 1p experience of (feel) the phone call only in one place, even if the correspondent give a phone call to M and to W.


It is a very simple idea. I am not sure what you are missing.

This will not be an intellectualized think through, it will be a second nature 'feel'.

We assume comp, and the question bear on the "direct feeling". In W you cannot even be sure that the reconstitution has been done in the other city. You will need third person evidences. So, unless you introduce some (non-comp) telepathy between the two reconstitution, you will get the point that the "direct feeling" (to use your term) was not predictable.

Otherwise, I do not genuinely accept comp. And Im afraid I do not think you do accept comp.

I do not philosophy. My acceptance or not of comp is private. The point is only that IF comp is true THEN there is that first person indeterminacy in self-multiplication.

Just to turn the screw a little tighter, I believe my description of what our practitioner about to be teleported would think and feel is far closer to a 1-p description of the feels and thoughts a comp accepter would have. That is precisely the point. I am trying to describe how a comp practitioner would feel. You on the other hand, despite proclaiming the opposite, in fact go to great lengths to intellectualize the situation. You fail to 'get into the head' of a comp practitioner prior to duplication.


of course, comp is used to reason (which is mainly 3p). So I certainly intellectuallized, but comp just gives the way to "intellectualize" about the first person subjective points of view.

I fail to see if you have grasped the 1p-indeterminacy. You certainly failed to provide a flaw, in case you think there is one. may be you can elaborate. be sure to grasp what we mean by the 1p, and if you think you can determine it in advance, explain how. It is much simpler than you thought. A child recently saw by himself that even God cannot predict to you (in Helsinki) the outcome felt after such duplication. Arguably, this FPI is also used implicitly in Everett QM.




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