On 30 Sep 2013, at 14:05, Telmo Menezes wrote <to Craig>:
The comp assumption that computations have
qualia hidden inside them is not much of an answer either in my view.
I have the same problem.
The solution is in the fact that all machines have that problem. More
exactly: all persons capable of surviving a digital substitution must
have that and similar problems. It is a sort of meta-solution
explaining that we are indeed confronted to something which is simply
totally unexplainable.
Note also that the expression "computation have qualia" can be
misleading. A computation has no qualia, strictly speaking. Only a
person supported by an infinity of computation can be said to have
qualia, or to live qualia. Then the math of self-reference can be used
to explain why the qualia have to escape the pure third person type of
explanations.
A good exercise consists in trying to think about what could like an
explanation of what a qualia is. Even without comp, that will seem
impossible, and that explains why some people, like Craig, estimate
that we have to take them as primitive. here comp explains, why there
are things like qualia, which can emerge only in the frist person
points of view, and admit irreductible components.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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