On Tuesday, October 1, 2013 7:13:17 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 30 Sep 2013, at 14:05, Telmo Menezes wrote <to Craig>:
> The comp assumption that computations have
> qualia hidden inside them is not much of an answer either in my view.
> I have the same problem.
> The solution is in the fact that all machines have that problem. More 
> exactly: all persons capable of surviving a digital substitution must have 
> that and similar problems. It is a sort of meta-solution explaining that we 
> are indeed confronted to something which is simply totally unexplainable.
> Note also that the expression "computation have qualia" can be misleading. 
> A computation has no qualia, strictly speaking. Only a person supported by 
> an infinity of computation can be said to have qualia, or to live qualia. 
> Then the math of self-reference can be used to explain why the qualia have 
> to escape the pure third person type of explanations.
> A good exercise consists in trying to think about what could like an 
> explanation of what a qualia is. Even without comp, that will seem 
> impossible, and that explains why some people, like Craig, estimate that we 
> have to take them as primitive. here comp explains, why there are things 
> like qualia, which can emerge only in the frist person points of view, and 
> admit irreductible components. 

Explaining why X is local to a certain perspective, or why X is irreducible 
does not explain why X is an aesthetic presence though. You can have 
numerical expressions which are irreducible and local to a machine without 
there being any such thing as flavor or color. As long as we are saying 
that both qualia and quanta are real, I don't see any advantage of making 
qualia supervene on quanta instead of the other way around, especially when 
we can understand that the nature of counting is to create figurative 
reductions which are nameless and homeless. We can't turn a wavelength into 
a color without color vision and real illumination, but we can turn color 
into a wavelength simply by discarding all of the actual color experience 
and looking at general patterns within optics analytically (abstractly). 
The irreducibility and 1p locality are hints, but they are neither 
necessary nor sufficient to access any specific qualia. I really don't 
think that I am missing something here. I can easily see it the other way 
around, I just don't think that it is true of the universe that we live in. 
Yes, it makes sense why a machine would not be able to tell that its 
experience is the result of a machine, but it doesn't make sense that Santa 
Claus would make that experience into tongues that taste that are different 
from eyes that see. All that matters is information transfer, so that 
difference would not engender any qualia, just clever addressing.


> Bruno
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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